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Abstract 
Post-crisis market realities in Greece are expected to lead to increased M&A activity 
in the coming years, little evidence is provided in the academic literature on Greek 
M&A post-acquisition performance and its driving factors. The overall aim of this 
thesis is to complement and enhance the existing M&A literature by examining the 
impact of two post-acquisition actions, of asset divestiture and resource 
redeployment on the long-term performance of Greek M&A deals over the period 
2005-2009. 
The conceptual framework of this thesis draws on the strategic management 
perspective. Using the cost efficiencies argument, the thesis examines how cost 
savings, due to asset divestiture affect the post-acquisition performance of both the 
target and the acquiring firm. In addition, by drawing on the resource-based view of 
the firm and the dynamic capabilities perspective, the thesis explores the effects of 
post-acquisition resource redeployment from acquirers to targets and vice versa, on 
revenue-enhancing capabilities. 
The findings revealed that the divestiture of the acquirers’ assets does not reduce 
costs. In addition, the importance of revenue-based synergies was shown, through the 
mediating variables of market coverage and innovation capabilities. Finally, 
acquirer’s resource redeployment has a positive and significant effect on cost savings 
and the same holds true for the resource redeployment to the target. These results 
indicate that resource redeployment contributes in achieving higher cost efficiency. 
The originality of this study is that it tries to obtain new insights on the subject of the 
post-acquisition performance using arguments from the cost-based and resource-
based synergies, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and the dynamic 
capabilities perspective. In addition, this is a large-scale empirical study conducted in 
Greece drawing on detailed primary data on a high range of post-acquisition actions 
followed by the managers of the acquiring companies rather than secondary data. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A, hereafter) have been a widely employed method for 
corporate expansion and restructuring (Porter, 1987; Maksimovic et. al, 2011). 
Expansion through M&A offers considerable advantages compared with internal or 
organic growth. The most important sources of value creation through M&A are 
through a) increases in market power and market share (Anand and Singh, 1997; 
Hayward, 2002), redeployment and leveraging of marketing resources (Capron and 
Hulland, 1999; Srivastava et al., 2001), capabilities and network externalities 
(Hoopes et al., 2003; Shapiro, 1989), b) cost savings, via the reduction of excess 
capacity (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004) and exploitation of scale, scope 
(Witteloostuijn and Boone, 2006) and learning economies (Hayward, 2002) and, c) 
increased growth opportunities linked to the creation of new business models as well 
as the development of capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Lockett et al., 
2009), resources, products and processes (Meyer, 2001; Sudarsanam, 2010). Other 
sources of value creation are also discussed in the literature. Some of these are 
increased efficiency and productivity, reduction in the cost of capital, managerial 
discipline and, better allocation of resources through effective internal markets 
(Stein, 1997). Of course not all M&As create or enhance value. Theories for non-
value maximising reason for M&As exist as well. Such theories include managerial 
hubris, managerial discretion and managerial entrenchment (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Jensen, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
The popularity of M&A is apparent when one considers that such activity has 
reached record levels in the last ten years leading to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
During this period, the global economy has witnessed its latest wave of M&A 
activity, with deals reaching a total value of approximately $5.5 trillion. As expected, 
the most recent rise in M&A activity coincided with a similar trend in global stock 
market activity.  
In Greece M&A activity was lagging behind due to the existence of a heavily 
regulated environment, consisting of many state-controlled banks, regulated interest 
rates, credit rules, and restrictions in the movement of capital (Pagoulatos and 
2 
 
Triantopoulos, 2009). The first wave of M&A deals in Greece took place during the 
period 1997-2000, triggered by a combination of financial system reforms in the 
second half of the 1990s and a buoyant stock market. 
In spite of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent eruption of the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, the Greek banking sector proved to be somewhat 
resilient. This can be mainly attributed to its traditionalist operations, its relatively 
small exposure to “toxic” assets and its marginal integration into the European 
Union’s (EU) financial markets, compared to other countries within the EU 
(Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009). It was not until late 2009, when the 
shockwaves of the 2007-2009 crisis affected Greece that was economically 
vulnerable due to chronic problems such as low competitiveness, trade and 
investment imbalances and fiscal mismanagement (Featherstone, 2011). 
As a result of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the Greek banking system suffered 
from a massive outflow of deposits – following speculation regarding Greece’s exit 
from the Euro zone, with more than 25 billion Euros being withdrawn since 2012 
(Halkos and Tzeremes, 2013). This, in turn, led to a massive liquidity shortage in the 
interbank market that subsequently spread to other aspects of the economy, such as 
housing and consumer lending, the shipping industry, small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs), tourism and the agricultural sector (Pagoulatos and 
Triantopoulos, 2009). In addition, the productivity of the manufacturing sector 
shrunk by 9% in 2007-2008 (National Statistical Service of Greece, 2009). 
Both the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the Greek sovereign debt crisis have 
refuelled the long-standing debate on the inefficiencies of the Greek public and 
private sectors. As far as the private sector is concerned, these inefficiencies mainly 
stem from the incumbent firms’ inability to compete at the international level. This is 
primarily due to the fact that the sector comprises a large number of medium-sized 
companies, which do not possess the scale required to succeed in the current 
competitive environment – within and/or outside the Euro zone. It is well accepted 
that one of the main steps in the restructuring of the private sector involves the 
reduction in the large number of these companies through M&A. It is anticipated that 
successful M&As will lead to the creation of a stronger private sector, thus enabling 
companies to acclimatize and thrive within and across national borders.  
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The typical question raised in the academic literature is whether M&As add value to 
the organization, thus increasing shareholder wealth. The extant literature offers both 
theoretical and empirical contributions, attempting to address this issue from a 
number of perspectives, namely the financial/economic, strategic management, 
organisational behaviour, and process perspective (Birkinshaw et al, 2000). Those 
perspectives are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
On the one hand, a number of studies have (consistently) shown that the returns for 
the shareholders of the acquiring firms have been small and in some cases negative 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell et al., 1988; Copeland, et al., 2000). Similarly, 
“value-destroying”, results have been documented in studies examining Greek 
M&As. For instance, in an examination of M&A activity in the first merger wave of 
1997-2000, Papadakis (2002) found that 59% of the firms involved experienced a 
reduction in the return on capital employed, two years after the conclusion of the 
deal. In addition, only 40% of the deals were reported as being successful. Thus, 
despite their apparent popularity, a large portion of M&As have failed to create value 
(Hatch et al., 2004; Christofferson et al., 2004). On the other hand, little evidence on 
Greek M&As is offered in the Strategic Management or any other literature. 
One may argue that the M&A phenomenon in Greece is still in its infancy – when 
compared to the respective M&A activity in the country’s developed counterparts 
within and outside the Euro zone. Despite the fact post-crisis market realities in 
Greece are expected to lead to increased M&A activity in the coming years, little 
evidence is provided in the academic literature on Greek M&A post-acquisition 
performance and its driving factors. Therefore, Greece represents a fertile ground for 
research on this front. This is somewhat in line with the existing contributions on 
Greek M&As (see Section 2.9.5) that concur that further research on Greece is 
deemed necessary (Featherstone 2011). 
In general, the above serve as the motivation for this thesis, which seeks to address 
the issue of the impact of two post-acquisition actions, namely, asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment on the long-term performance of Greek acquisition deals. 
Nonetheless, before expanding on the theoretical framework and motivation and the 
research aims and objectives of this thesis in the following sections, it is important to 
look into the evolution of M&As. 
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1.2. M&A Activity 
1.2.1. Worldwide Merger Activity  
Worldwide M&A activity reached in 2010 almost US$3 trillion, down from US$5.5 
trillion back in 2007 (Fig. 1-1); these raw data clearly point to the adverse effects of 
the recent financial crisis on this type of activity. Figure 1.1 also reveals two “waves” 
of M&A activity, since the early 1990s. For instance, one wave spanning the period 
1992-2000 can be discerned (effectively it ended when the “dot.com” bubble burst), 
and another one starting from 2002 and lasting up to 2007, when the credit crunch 
took its toll in the financial transactions activity, including M&A deals. 
 
Figure 1.1: Worldwide Mergers and Acquisitions 
Source: Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (2010) 
Going further in the past, Table 1.1 shows the major M&A waves since the late 
1800s. The first merger wave occurred at the turn of the 20th century and primarily 
involved horizontal mergers, while the second occurred in the 1920s and involved 
vertical mergers. During the third merger wave (1965–1969), merger activity 
increased dramatically, with a lot of M&A deals involving more diverse companies, 
as acquirers bought into different industries. In the fourth wave (1981–1989) (which 
involved mainly US deals) acquiring companies became more hostile with the 
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targets, with the latter in many cases being larger than the former.  Again during this 
period, the activity was intense with a lot of horizontal deals.  
The fifth merger wave (1992-2000) was characterized by mega-deals and a buoyant 
stock market, which “emboldened companies and pressured them to do deals to 
maintain heady trading multiples” (Lipton, 2006). Indeed, the largest deals did occur 
in that wave. Further, Europe and Asia started experiencing an increasing number of 
deals. Finally, during the last merger wave, which took place over the period 2003-
2007, there was quite steep rise in M&A activity, creating the greatest merger wave 
in the history of M&A. 
Period Name Facet 
1897–1904 First Wave Horizontal mergers 
1916–1929 Second Wave Vertical mergers 
1965–1969 Third Wave Diversified conglomerate mergers 
1981–1989 Fourth Wave 
Congeneric mergers; Hostile takeovers; 
Corporate Raiding 
1992–2000 Fifth Wave Cross-border mergers 
2003–2008 Sixth Wave 
Shareholder Activism, Private Equity, 
LBO 
 
Table 1.1: Waves in M&A Activities Source: Lipton (2006) 
1.2.2. Greek M&A Activity  
The first "wave" of M&A activity in Greece took place during the 1997-1999 period, 
as domestic companies (mostly listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange) 
attempted to adapt more efficiently in the globalized money and capital markets and 
in the world markets for goods and services. In the Greek financial sector the M&A 
activity started picking up in 1995 and culminated in 2001.    
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Following Greece’s adoption of the euro in 2001, Greek interest rates started to 
decline, thereby increasing competition among the Greek financial institutions. As a 
result, the value of M&A activity started picking up. More particularly, the total 
value of transactions reached €2.5bn in 2002 (with 308 transactions), €4.3bn in 2005 
(with 217 transactions) (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2006), and in 2007, the value of 
the Greek M&A deals climbed to €8 bn. Subsequently, the number and the volume 
of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in Greece declined considerably reaching €7bn 
in 2008 (with 153 transactions) and €4 bn in 2009 (with 102 transactions) (Center for 
Economic Research, 2010).  
The majority of acquiring companies involved large companies, whose turnover 
exceeded €50m. (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2005).  
Then, the majority of the M&A deals concentrated in two sectors: the finance and the 
technology and telecommunications sector. For instance, in 2004 the aforementioned 
sectors accounted for up to 44% of the total value of M&A transactions that took 
place in 2004 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2005). Over the period 1999-2009 the 
Greek finance sector accounted for almost one quarter of the M&A transactions 
conducted (Center for Economic Research, 2010). Indeed, in the wake of Greece 
joining the euro the Greek banks realized that their size was too small for operation 
in an integrated European banking market.  
1.2.3. An Overview of the evidence from Greece 
Looking into past research studies that involve post-acquisition performance of 
M&As in Greece, the results apart from a few cases reveal a negative impact on post-
acquisition performance. In addition, the approaches used in the majority of those 
studies involve accounting-based measures and marked data (event studies) to look 
into abnormal returns on the stock prices of the merging companies. 
In an early study of M&As in Greece, Katsos and Lekakis (1991) found that small to 
medium firms merge only with similar sized firms and that firms tried to combine 
capital assets and marketing networks. Mylonidis & Kelnikola (2005) in their study 
of post-merger performance looking into pre versus post-merger accounting ratio 
comparisons from five bank-deals in Greece found a positive impact on post-merger 
performance. Papasyriopoulos et al., (2007), used an event study methodology to 
look into abnormal returns on stock prices on the day of acquisition announcements. 
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They found that “good news” has a positive effect on abnormal returns and “bad 
news” a marginal negative one. 
Furthermore, in a study looking into the operating performance of fifty Greek 
conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers, Eleftheriades et al., (2008) found that 
conglomerate mergers prevailed as more successful in liquidity and viability 
financial ratios. Rezitis, (2008), examining the effect of acquisition activity on the 
efficiency and total factor productivity of Greek banks showed that the effects are 
negative.  
Recent studies have shifted more focus on post-acquisition performance. Papadakis 
and Thanos, (2010), investigated corporate acquisition performance based on a 
sample of fifty domestic Greek acquisitions. Their results revealed failure rates of 
M&As that ranged from 50% to 60%. Pazarkis et al., (2011), investigated the post- 
acquisition operating performance of acquisition-involved firms in Greece at 
information technology industry, a knowledge-intensive industry. Their results 
showed a negative impact on post- acquisition performance regarding firms from a 
knowledge-intensive industry and no changes on any other examined ratios. 
Agorastos et al., (2011) examined the impact of the post-merger operating 
performance of Greek firms at domestic and cross-border transactions using 
accounting data. They found that cross-border M&As stipulate a better post-merger 
performance for the acquirer than the domestic ones. Alexandrakis et al. (2012) 
studied the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the post-merger operating 
performance of merger-involved firms at industrial goods and services sector of the 
ASE (Athens Stock Exchange) in Greece. The results revealed that M&As had a 
negative impact on the post-merger performance of the merged firms. Finally, 
Pazarkis et al., 2013, examined the impact of M&As on the post-acquisition 
performance of Greek-merger involved firms by looking into the two profitability 
ratios (ROA and ROE). Their results revealed that there is no significant change of 
any variable under investigation for the two profitability ratios and they concluded 
that M&As within the Greek sample do not lead to enhanced economic profitability.  
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1.3. Theoretical Framework and Motivation 
A large body of research has focused on the motives behind M&A activity.  Four 
different research streams, originating from distinct theoretical backgrounds and 
hypotheses, have been witnessed in the literature (Birkinshaw et al, 2000). As Table 
1.2 shows, these streams are the following: financial/economic, strategic 
management, organisational behaviour, and process perspectives. 
Research stream Objective function 
Theoretical 
underpinnings 
Central propositions for each 
theoretical perspective 
Financial/Economic 
To Maximize 
Shareholders 
Wealth  
Market for corporate 
control; free cash flow; 
agency theory; efficient 
market hypothesis 
(EMH) (Jensen, 1987; 
Manne, 1965) 
Acquisitions enhance the 
efficiency of the market for 
corporate control and thus 
result in net wealth creation for 
shareholders 
Strategic 
Management 
Performance of 
acquiring/target 
firms 
Industrial organization 
economics (Lubatkin, 
1983; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990) 
Resource based View 
(RBV) of the firm 
(Barney, 1988) 
Synergies (as a result of 
economies of scale and scope, 
and increased market power 
etc.) will have a positive impact 
on performance 
 
Only synergies (to the bidder-
target pair) or unexpected 
synergies will have a positive 
impact on performance 
Organizational 
Behaviour 
Impact of 
acquisition on 
individuals and 
organization 
culture 
Acculturation theory 
(Berry, 1984; 
Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh, 1988) 
The congruence between the 
cultures of the two merged 
organizations will facilitate 
employee satisfaction and 
effective integration 
Process Perspective Creation of Value 
after acquisition 
Behavioral theory of 
the firm (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Jemison 
and Sitkin, 1986a, 
a986b) 
The actions of management, 
and the process of integration, 
determines the extent to which 
the potential benefits of the 
acquisition are realized 
Table 1.2: Summary of Streams on M&A Research 
(adopted from Birkinshaw et al, 2000) 
The main focus of the financial-economic perspective has been on the effect of the 
acquisition on shareholder wealth. This research stream uses the “event-study” 
methodology to examine the effects of an acquisition. In the M&A literature, an 
event is considered the date when a formal announcement on the deal is made. 
Specifically, the date when investors become aware of the upcoming deal is 
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designated (i.e. the date when the event takes place) as . Then, depending on 
the influence of the event, we examine a total of days before and after the date of 
occurrence of the event; this is the size of the event window.  
In general, the majority of theoretical and empirical contributions pertinent to this 
category or M&A research, demonstrate a transfer of wealth from acquirers to 
targets. In some of the earliest studies (Jarrell et al, 1988; Jensen and Ruback, 1983), 
it was shown that real positive gains accrue to the shareholders of the acquired, but 
not the acquiring firm. For instance, Jarrell et al. (1988) in their study found that 
excess returns on acquiring firms’ share price around the announcement of takeover 
dropped from an average 4.95% in the 1960s,  to 2% in the 1970s, and to –1% in the 
1980s. In the Greek case, a widely-cited paper by Protopapas et al. (2003) examined 
the stock price reaction in 72 M&A deals, over the period 1988-1997; the authors 
found that M&A activity can land the shareholders with statistically significant 
abnormal returns of both the acquiring and target company.  
The second research stream, which deals with the strategic management 
perspective, has concentrated at the level of the individual company and, more 
specifically, at industrial organization (IO) economics. The latter are based on cost 
efficiencies due to economies of scale and scope, which can be accomplished 
through acquisition activity and the ensuing asset divestiture. Indeed, evidence 
shows that achieving the aforementioned goals, through M&As, may result in 
superior performance for the acquiring firm (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Chatterjee, 
1986; Lubatkin, 1983; Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Capron 1999). 
In addition, the underlying perspective in this research stream of research is the 
Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm, originally associated with Penrose (1959). 
More specifically, Penrose (1959) asserted that in order for resources to be useful 
and to contribute to a firm’s competitive edge, they not only have to be utilised but 
new ways must be found for utilizing the existing resources. Essentially, the RBV 
puts forward the conditions under which the resources of a firm can offer a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). And should these conditions be met when 
undertaking an M&A deal, then such an investment activity could lead to superior 
performance, through revenue enhancement. Two ways of boosting revenues 
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(through access to the resources target) are (a) the increased market coverage, and 
(b) enhanced innovation capability (Capron 1999). 
The third stream of research has delved into organizational behaviour, and 
specifically it has concentrated on the behavioural implications of acquisitions, at 
both the individual and organizational levels. The main conclusion from this strand 
of research is that long-term success can only be attained through process 
management, effective communication and sensitivity to the concerns and 
expectations of individuals on both sides of the acquisitions (Bastien, 1987; Blake 
and Mouton, 1985; Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; 
Mirvis and Marks, 1991; Sakes and Mirvis, 1984). This perspective contends that 
firms frequently use acquisitions to reconfigure the acquiring or target (i.e. acquired) 
businesses as a piece of the procedure of broader strategic change (Bowman and 
Singh, 1993; Seth, 1990b).  
The fourth research stream, that of process perspective, has concentrated on the 
actions adopted by management aimed at steering the post-acquisition process. Here, 
it is argued that strategic and organizational fit offer the potential for synergies, 
although their realization relies on the ability of management to handle the post-
acquisition process in an effective manner (Greenwood and Hinings 1994; 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1989, 1991; Howell, 1970; Hunt, 1990; Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986a, 1986b; Kitching, 1967). 
Theories attempting to account for the “value-destroying” effect of acquisitions fall 
into three categories. The first category is associated with Roll (1986) and is the 
theory of managerial hubris.  The second category associated with Jensen (1986) and 
is the theory of managerial discretion. Finally, the third category is associated with 
the theory of managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). The theories in 
the first two categories account for the underlying reasons that managers of the 
acquiring firm make unintentionally bad investment decisions, while the third 
category explains why managers make intentionally poor capital budgeting 
decisions.   
As far as the underlying theoretical justification for the acquisition activity, the 
Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm, one of the most widely recognised 
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theoretical points of view in the field of strategic management (Powell, 2001; Priem 
and Butler, 2001; and Rouse and Daellenbach, 2002), seems to offer a plausible 
explanation.  According to this theory, a company’s resources create the conditions 
under which the resources of a firm can achieve a competitive advantage relative to 
its peers (Barney, 1991). And the “easiest” way to take control of “superior” 
resources, in the absence of an efficient resource market, is to acquire another firm. 
The conceptual framework of this thesis draws on the second research stream in the 
M&A literature, namely the strategic management perspective. Specifically, using 
the cost efficiencies argument, the thesis examines how cost savings, due to asset 
divestiture (following an M&A transaction), affect the post-acquisition performance 
of both the target and the acquiring firm. In addition, by drawing on the resource-
based view of the firm and the dynamic capabilities perspective, the thesis explores 
the effects of post-acquisition resource redeployment from acquirers to targets and 
vice versa, on revenue-enhancing capabilities. Finally, the thesis examines the 
interplay between asset divestiture and resource redeployment. 
1.4. Research Aims and Objectives 
First, the overall aim of this thesis will be to complement and enhance the existing 
M&A literature by examining the impact of two post-acquisition actions (normally 
followed by the managers of the acquiring firms), of asset divestiture and resource 
redeployment on the long-term performance of Greek M&A deals over the period 
2005-2009.  
Second, the acquisition’s long-term performance will be measured by self-reported 
measures of changes in market shares, sales, intrinsic profitability, and relative (to 
the industry’s) corporate profitability. The population of the sample consists of 
acquisitions from Greek companies operating in the same or different industries. The 
period of 2005-2009 was chosen, in order to exclude a) recent acquisitions where 
post acquisition restructuring had not yet led to asset divestiture or resource 
redeployment and b) older acquisitions for which managerial turnover would make it 
difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition activities. In this study 
the population frame was chosen so as to satisfy the following criteria. First, the 
organisation should operate in Greece. Second, the acquisition should have been 
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completed. Third, a member of the top management team should be easily 
identifiable (i.e. position in the company, email). Fourth, acquisitions where the 
percentage of the target’s assets/stock that was acquired was less than 100% were 
excluded. Sources for information included the Athens Stock Exchange, the Greek 
Ministry of Regional Development and Competitiveness, ICAP Group, and Thomson 
Financials. 
Third, a review of the M&A literature will be conducted. In doing so, various ways 
of classification of acquisitions will be examined. Due to the vast number of different 
theoretical approaches dealing with the underlying motives of M&As on the one 
hand a review of the theoretical foundation of the economic theories (neo-classical) 
and types of synergies, reduction of risk and diversification and increase in market 
power will be investigated. On the other hand, a review of the non-economic motives 
of acquisitions will be analysed, that is the managerial theories and organisational 
behaviour. Also, the basic tenets of the resource based view of the firm will be 
presented along with a critical review of assumptions and limitations. Then, the 
dynamic capability perspective is considered as an extension of the RBV in that their 
assumptions are similar. It will be argued that that the dynamic capability view can 
be considered as an extension of the RBV thinking. Measures of evaluating post-
acquisition performance will be presented as well. To end the literature review, 
evidence of previous studies of post-acquisition performance along with evidence 
from Greece will be provided. Therefore arguments from both economic and non-
economic motives, the RBV and the dynamic capabilities perspective are critically 
used to create assumption and hypotheses to be tested on the empirical part of the 
thesis. 
Fourth, the analysis will be performed using a Structural Equation Modelling 
Approach, which is a multivariate technique that is described as a combination of 
both factor analysis and path analysis and facilitates the examination of the structure 
of interrelationships expressed in a series of equations, similar to a series of multiple 
regression equations. These equations depict all of the relationships among 
constructs (the dependent and independent variables) involved in the analysis. In 
particular, the thesis builds on the methods of analysis used by Capron (1999) as 
well as by subsequent reviewers and authors (Capron et al.,, 1998; Capron and 
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Hulland, 1999; Capron, et al., 2001; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Maksimovic et al., 
2011) and extends existing empirical evidence by examining the impact of post-
acquisition asset divestiture and resource redeployment on the post-acquisition 
performance. 
Fifth, the thesis will examine the effect of the post-acquisition measures taken by 
the management of the acquiring firm, in terms of resource redeployment and asset 
divestiture, on the post-acquisition performance of the merged firms. Resource 
redeployment and asset divestiture are assumed to influence post-acquisition (long-
run) performance, of the merged firms through two mediating variables, i.e. cost 
savings and revenue enhancing capabilities). On the one hand, cost-efficiency 
theories focus on cost savings resulting from an acquisition. In turn, these cost 
savings are achieved through asset divestiture. Asset divestiture refers to the extent 
to which the acquiring firm eliminates its own or the target’s physical assets (Capron 
et al. 2001). Thus asset divestiture may refer to the extent to which merging firms 
eliminate their physical assets, dispose of inefficient management (and management 
practices) and cut back their personnel in different areas, such as R&D, 
manufacturing, logistics, sales networks, and administrative services (Anand and 
Singh 1997; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2007; Maksimovic et al., 
2011). On the other hand, using arguments from the resource-based view (RBV) of 
the firm the role of resource redeployment in enhancing the revenues of the merged 
firm will be emphasized. Also, by using arguments inherent in the dynamic 
capabilities, the thesis will try to provide evidence that sustaining long-term 
competitive advantage lies in the recombination of assets and resources, that is 
resource reconfiguration (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Bowman and Ambrosini, 
2003; Abrosini and Bowman, 2009). Resource redeployment refers to the extent to 
which a target or an acquiring firm uses the other firm's resources, such as R&D 
capabilities, manufacturing know-how, marketing resources, supplier relationships, 
and distribution expertise (Capron, 1999, Capron et al., 2001; Gary, 2005). As such, 
the redeployment of assets may involve physical transfer of resources to new 
locations or sharing resources without physical transfer. Resource redeployment can 
enhance revenue, either by increasing market coverage (though geographical 
extension of the market and product line expansion) or by improving innovation 
capabilities.  
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Sixth, in this thesis, aside from investigating the direct effects on the mediating 
variables, asset divestiture and resource redeployment the indirect, or cross effects 
on these variables will be examined as well. For instance, asset divestiture commonly 
implies changes in organisational, technological or marketing resources to produce 
and sell greater volumes of goods more efficiently. Hence, asset divestiture can be 
linked to revenue enhancement as well. At the same time, the process of redeploying 
resources tends to create redundancies and conflicts with existing resources. The firm 
then tends to sell excess physical assets, shut excess facilities, and lay off surplus 
employees. Thus, resource redeployment may be linked to cost-savings. In addition 
to looking at the direct and indirect effects the thesis will examines how the 
aforementioned direct and indirect effects of asset divestiture and resource 
redeployment are modified in the presence of certain control variables. 
1.5. Main Findings and Contribution 
This thesis will attempt to make contributions at a theoretical level, conceptualisation 
and measurement level and methodology and can be a useful tool for managers and 
provide a guideline for academics. 
1.5.1. Contribution to the Literature 
This thesis will attempt to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of M&A 
activity in several ways. 
In the strategic management literature, US and UK M&As have been extensively 
investigated. On the contrary, only a small number of studies that look into this 
phenomenon in other countries exist. This statement appears even more valid when 
the focus is shifted towards post-acquisition performance examined by accounting 
data and event based studies with stock returns. Therefore, this research effort 
emerges as even more “unique” as the post-acquisition performance is investigated 
using arguments of cost-based and resource-based synergies, the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm, the dynamic capabilities perspective employing primary 
data of subjective measures obtained from the managers of the acquiring firms. Thus, 
it is that scarcity of research of asset divestiture and resource redeployment as 
predictors of post-acquisition performance in Greece that motivated the author to 
examine those phenomena. 
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First, this is (to the best of the author’s knowledge) the first large-scale empirical 
study conducted in Greece drawing on detailed primary data on a high range of post-
acquisition actions followed by the managers of the acquiring companies rather than 
secondary data.  
Second, the majority of the literature employing cost-based and resource based 
arguments to examine post-acquisition performance only looked into horizontal 
acquisitions (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et al., 1998; Capron, 1999; Capron and 
Mitchell, 2001; Krishnan et al., 2004; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007). This thesis 
contributed to the literature by examining both horizontal and conglomerate 
acquisitions. 
Third, this thesis extends the existing body of research by including new control 
variables; namely the payment method, acquisition classification, acquisition type, 
business relatedness, organisational changes, the number of top executives made 
redundant. At the same time, the thesis controls for established control variables such 
as the relative size and geographic scope. 
Fourth, at the conceptualisation and measurement level, this thesis contributes to the 
debate on whether and to what extent post-acquisition performance in Greek M&A 
deals is influenced by asset divestiture (and hence cost savings) and resource 
redeployment (and hence improved revenues). Therefore a set of measures is created 
that tries to encapsulate this vast range of post-acquisition actions. It is possible that 
this procedure can further improve empirical tests to better understand the capability 
of acquisitions to create value.  
Fifth, by looking into a large spectrum of differentiated post-acquisition actions that 
incur in various types of acquisitions this thesis adds to the debate of on the 
relationship between relatedness and acquisition performance. 
Sixth, this thesis progresses the discussion of whether organisational changes have an 
effect on the relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement 
capabilities with post-acquisition performance.  
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Seventh, by looking into different payment methods the thesis examined the effects 
of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance.  
1.5.2. Managerial Contribution 
The empirical analysis of this thesis reveals a number of important findings. To 
begin with, it was found that divestiture of the acquirer's assets has a negative impact 
on cost savings, while the divestiture of the target's assets (which is eight to twenty-
eight times more likely to occur than the divestiture of the acquirer's assets) does lead 
to cost reductions. Then, cost savings were found to have a negative effect on post-
acquisition performance; presumably this effect is due to the fact that the negative 
effects of the acquiring firm’s divestiture on cost savings outweigh the positive 
effects of the target asset’s divestiture. This has significant policy implications for 
managers who wish to present to their shareholders a case for acquiring a target firm. 
Market coverage and innovation capabilities were shown to positively affect post-
acquisition performance. Resource redeployment from acquirers to targets not only 
improves revenue-enhancing capabilities (market coverage and innovation) but also 
reduces costs.  Resources redeployment from targets to acquirers also improves 
revenue-enhancing capabilities and reduces costs.   
In addition, when further potential cross-effects were considered, it was found that 
resource redeployment’s effect on cost savings has a positive and significant effect 
on both the acquirer’s and target’s resource redeployment.  
1.5.3. Contribution to academia 
This is the first time in the field of Greek M&As that the strategic management 
perspective is applied to explore the effects of post-acquisition performance that the 
author is aware of. The overwhelming majority of studies in this area (i.e. in the field 
of Greek M&As) using the financial-economic perspective (see Table 1-2) has 
focused on the effect of the acquisition on shareholder wealth.  Hence this study fills  
a major research gap in the literature of Greece-originated M&As. 
The overwhelming majority of studies on the post-acquisition effect of M&As have 
relied either on share price reaction (Alexandrakis, et al. 2012) or on accounting 
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measures, such as the return on assets (ROA) (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2011). So, 
this thesis by using subjective measures of performance, i.e. the managers’ self-
reported opinions on how the company fared after the deal, covers a major research 
gap, at least, as far as the Greek case is concerned. 
1.6. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Following the introduction (Chapter 1) 
Chapter 2 presents the literature on resource-based theory, resource redeployment 
and asset divestiture. Definitions and classification of M&As are presented along 
with economic and non-economic theories related to acquisition motives. Also, the 
acquisition premium, cost and method of payment are presented, in conjunction with 
the choice of financing the acquisition. Moreover, strategic management motives of 
an M&A are discussed while issues related to the evaluation and evidence of post-
acquisition performance are discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the thesis’ theoretical framework and research questions. 
Therefore, the methodology and the empirical approach are set as foundations to 
examine the conceptual model of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 addresses issues relating to the theoretical foundations of business 
research, the design of the study and the data collection process, and the methods of 
analysis used to scrutinise the collected data.    
Chapter 5 reports certain descriptive statistics concerning, among other things, the 
extent and direction of post-acquisition asset divestiture and resource redeployment.  
Chapter 6 presents the factor and correlation analysis to derive meaningful factors 
form the data obtained from the questionnaires.  
Chapter 7 presents the empirical results of fitting a Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
to our data; the model examines the dependence relationships between the exogenous 
(Post-acquisition performance, Value) and endogenous variables (Target and 
Acquirer Asset Divestiture, Target and Acquirer Resource Redeployment, 
Organisational Changes) simultaneously.  
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Chapter 8 reviews the research findings. Also, different types of research 
contributions are presented as well as the research limitations and directions for 
further research.  
Finally, Chapter 9 contains the references and the Appendices of the thesis. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a systematic review of the theoretical and empirical contributions 
on the aspects of M&A pertinent to the aims and objectives of this thesis. In 
particular, Section 2.2 offers a brief discussion on the definition and classification of 
acquisitions. This is followed by an analysis of the economic and non-economic 
theories with regards to the underlying motives of M&As which is provided in the 
next two sections. Specifically, Section 2.3 presents the neoclassical approach, while 
Section 2.4 provides a brief overview of the non-economic theories on M&A. Section 
2.5 examines the contributions from the strategic management approach with regards 
to the motives behind an M&A. This approach is expressed through the Resource 
Based View (RBV) Theory, which places a special emphasis on the quantity and 
quality of resources that a firm controls, in order to gain a competitive advantage 
over its competitors. Section 2.6 examines the dynamic capabilities perspective and 
their role on the firm’s existing resource base in order to sustain or even enhance its 
competitive advantage   Section 2.7 examines the literature on the cost of M&As, the 
resulting premium, and the method of payment. Section 2.8 discusses the theoretical 
contributions on post-acquisition performance, while, Section 2.9 presents the 
respective empirical evidence. Finally, Section 2.10 provides a summary of the 
literature and sets the foundations for the research questions of this study.    
2.2. Classification of Acquisitions  
There are various ways to classify acquisitions. One is according to their form; (a) 
merger or consolidation (b) acquisition of stock and (c) acquisition of assets. Other 
ways to classify acquisitions involve distinguishing them according to their type into 
friendly vs. hostile, domestic vs. cross-border, and/or classifying them according to 
the relatedness in the lines of business of the merging firms.  
2.2.1. Classification of Acquisitions According to their Form   
In an acquisition, there are three procedures that one firm can utilise in order to 
acquire another firm, those involve a merger, or acquisition of stock (with a tender 
offer for the voting stock), or purchase of assets.  
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In an acquisition of stock, the acquiring firm usually makes a tender offer, i.e. a 
public offer to purchase (at a certain price and at a certain date) the voting stock of 
the target firm (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Bhagat et al., 2005). Often, the offer is 
made directly to the shareholders of the target firm, in order to bypass the hostility of 
the target’s management. The tender offer is communicated to the target firm’s 
shareholders via public announcements. Those shareholders who choose to accept 
the offer tender their shares by exchanging them for cash or securities (or both), 
depending on the offer. A tender offer is frequently contingent on the bidder’s 
obtaining some percentage of the total voting shares. If not enough shares are 
tendered, then the offer might be withdrawn or reformulated. 
In an acquisition of assets, the firm can effectively acquire another firm by buying 
most or all of its assets (Lee and Madhavan, 2010). This has a similar effect to 
buying the company. In this case, however, the target firm will not necessarily cease 
to exist; it will have just sold off its assets. The “shell” will continue to exist unless 
its stockholders choose to dissolve it. This type of acquisition requires a formal vote 
of the shareholders of the selling firm. One advantage to this approach is that there is 
no problem with minority shareholders holding out. However, acquisition of assets 
may involve transferring titles to individual assets. The legal process of transferring 
assets can be costly. 
Acquisitions may also take the form of a merger, which can be of two types. The 
first involves the absorption of one firm by another, where the acquiring firm retains 
its identity while the acquired (or target) firm ceases to exist (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001). The second type involves a consolidation of two (or more) 
companies into a single new company (Ross et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, another way of looking into acquisitions is as a type of takeover, 
which, in general, refers to the transfer of control (i.e. to have majority vote on the 
board of directors) from the shareholders of one firm (the target firm) to another, i.e. 
the shareholders of the bidding firm (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). A takeover may 
occur in the following three ways: (a) acquisition; (b) a proxy contest and (c) a 
going-private transaction (Fig. 2.1).  
In a proxy contest, dissident shareholders seek proxies from existing 
shareholders to gain control of the board of directors.  
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In a going-private transaction, a small group of investors purchases all of 
the firm's outstanding common stock, and the firm is then delisted. When such deals 
are financed by debt (of an amount greater than 70%), going-private transactions are 
known as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) (Lee and Madhavan, 2010), while, if the group 
of investors, which buys the firm’s common stock, comes from the firm’s 
management, then this type of acquisition activity is known as management buyout 
(MBO) (Campa and Hernando, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of Takeovers 
Source: adapted from Ross et al. (2009:824) 
 
For ease of exposition, the general term “merger” shall be used throughout this 
thesis to refer to both forms of reorganization (absorption and consolidation). In 
addition, the term “mergers and acquisitions (M&A)” shall be used to refer in 
general to the broader issue of acquisitions. 
2.2.2. Friendly and Hostile Acquisitions  
M&As can be also classified in accordance to their stance as friendly vs. hostile; 
toward the management of the target company (Sudarsanam, and Mahate, 2006). On 
the one hand, a friendly takeover, is one where the target’s management 
"welcomes" the bidder, and urges the board of directors and shareholders to accept 
22 
 
the offer. On the other hand, a hostile takeover is one where the management of the 
target company opposes the deal and encourages the shareholders to do the same 
(Armour et al., 2011). Usually such acquisitions are carried out by a tender offer, 
where the bidder makes an offer directly to shareholders of the target firm (in this 
way bypassing the management of the target) – to purchase the shares of the latter at 
a price significantly higher than the market. Frequently, however, in a tender offer, a 
significant minority of shareholders will hold out, and the target firm cannot be 
completely absorbed; such situation may delay the realization of any merger benefits 
or may be add costs.  
In some early studies on takeovers (Jensen, 1988 and Weisbach, 1993) it was 
suggested that managerial hostility (on the part of the target firm) towards an 
acquisition was likely to be motivated by managerial self-interest. In particular, it 
was suggested that under-performing managers (of the target company) were those 
more likely to resist a bid, as well as more likely to be replaced following a 
successful bid (O’Sullivan and Wong, 2005).  As a result, hostile takeovers were 
viewed as a disciplinary device for target companies, whose top management had 
failed to meet the standard shareholder objectives (Tuch and Sullivan, 2007).  
It seems that the relevance of hostile bids has decreased over time, as friendly 
acquisitions tend to be greater in number. In a study conducted by Andrade et al. 
(2001) on a total of 4,300 US acquisitions that took place in the period 1973-1998, it 
was found that hostile bids at any point fell from 14.3% of all cases in 1980-1989 to 
just 4% in the period 1990-1998. 
Using a sample consisting of 104 friendly and 104 hostile M&As in 1998 Weir and 
Laing (2003) concluded that companies acquired in friendly acquisitions were more 
efficient, used their assets more effectively, and had a lower market-to-book ratio, 
compared with target companies in hostile bids. This is in line with Sun et al. (2012), 
who suggested that friendly negotiations with target firms are more likely to lead to a 
smooth transition of management teams and thus, add value in an M&A transaction. 
2.2.3. Domestic vs. Cross-Border Acquisitions  
Acquisitions can also be classified as domestic vs. cross-border. There are arguments 
for and against the reasoning behind the two classifications. For instance, Berger et 
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al. (2001) suggested that geographical distance, language barriers and cultural 
differences lead to inefficiencies that not only impede cross-border activity, but also 
offset some of the gains in cross-border deals. Danbolt (2004) contended that 
economies of scale may be easier to achieve in domestic, rather than cross-border 
deals. Further, he suggested that the target firm’s shareholders may gain more in 
domestic acquisitions, if acquiring companies share cost savings with target 
shareholders. In addition, according to Fang et al. (2007), marketing knowledge 
resources can have a direct application in the same geographic setting, while 
technological knowledge resources might require more time to be adapted in the new 
business for any advantage to materialise. Nevertheless, the importance of cross-
border acquisitions in industrialised countries has increased significantly over time, 
with the former accounting for more than 80% (in 2000) of all foreign direct 
investment (Conn et al., 2005). Finally, Danbolt and Maciver (2012), analysed the 
impact on targets and bidders from cross-border acquisitions into and out of the UK, 
in comparison to companies involved in similar domestic acquisitions. Their sample 
comprised 251 cross-border targets and 146 cross-border bidders. They found that 
both targets and bidders gained significantly higher abnormal returns in cross-border 
acquisitions  
2.2.4. Classification Depending on the Relatedness of Business  
In strategic management, the types of the relatedness of acquisitions can affect the 
relationship between the acquiring and acquired company (Calipha, et al., 2010). 
Acquisitions may also fall into one of the following four categories:  
• Horizontal Acquisition: A horizontal acquisition occurs if the two firms, 
which compete in the same industry, merge in order to reduce competition and 
to withstand a new demanding business environment. Typically horizontal 
acquisitions involve less risk contrasted to unrelated ones (Kitching, 1967). 
• Vertical Acquisition: A vertical acquisition occurs between companies 
operating at different stages of the production process. This type of acquisition 
normally eliminates various coordination and bargaining problems between the 
supplier and the customer (Halpern, 1983). 
• Conglomerate:  A conglomerate (or diversifying) acquisition involves the 
combination of firms in unrelated lines of business; in such mergers it seems 
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that there is no scope for achieving operating synergies, as there is an lack of 
transactions among the subsidiaries (Mantell, 1998).  
• Concentric Merger: A concentric merger involves the merging of two (or 
more) firms from the same sector, with the same production technology, and 
the same products.   
Most of the mergers that occurred in the United States during the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s were conglomerate mergers. A popular explanation for the predominance of 
conglomerate mergers during that time was that regulators would not approve most 
strategic combinations because of antitrust considerations (Gleason et al., 2006). 
Then, they became much less common in the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting either the 
loosening of antitrust rules – that have allowed more strategic combinations – or an 
increase in the efficiency of financial markets, which could have the effect of 
reducing the financial synergies associated with a merger. 
2.3. Merger Motives: Economic Theories (Neo-classical) 
There are a number of different theoretical approaches dealing with the underlying 
motives of M&As. Although it is not the objective of this thesis to discuss in detail 
all of the underlying theoretical approaches of M&As, it is important to review the 
theoretical foundations this thesis was built upon. Therefore, this section discusses 
the neoclassical approach, or the economic theories, while the next section deals with 
the managerial theories and the organizational theories (Figure 2.2).  
According to the neoclassical approach, in order for a company to survive in a 
competitive environment it should aim at maximizing profits and shareholders’ 
wealth (Becker, 1962). According to Pazarskis (2008), the objective of shareholders’ 
wealth maximization and profit maximization is threefold. Figure 2.2 shows that the 
former may be attained through (revenue-enhancement and cost-saving) synergies, or 
risk reduction (because the income streams of the merged firms, at least in related 
business lines, become more stable), or increased market power (as the number of 
potential rivals decreases after the merger).  
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Figure 2.2: Theoretical Approaches in Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.3.1. Synergies 
Synergies arise whenever the (present) value of the merged firm is higher than the 
sum of the value of each firm separately (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al 1991). For 
instance, the synergies arising from the acquisition of Firm B by Firm A have as 
follows 
 = 
 − 
 + 
 
where V is the value of the firm after the acquisition, 
 is the value of Firm A, and 

 is the value of Firm B. 
Synergies can further be classified into the following categories, depending on the 
corporate aspect they affect; operating synergies, financial synergies, and 
managerial synergies (Seth et al., 2000) (Figure 2.3)   
Operating synergies can be derived either from higher revenue, and/or reduced 
operating costs and, hence, they result in higher operating cash flow for the merged 
T
H
E
O
R
E
T
IC
A
L
 A
P
P
R
O
A
C
H
E
S
1. ECONOMIC THEORIES 
(NEOCLASSICAL THEORIES)
SYNERGIES 
(Efficienies)
(Section 2.3.1)
RISK REDUCTION 
(Efficiencies)
(Section 2.3.2)
INCREASE IN MARKET POWER 
(Monopoly Theory) 
(Section 2.3.1)
2. MANAGERIAL THEORIES
HUBRIS OR MANAGERIAL 
HYPOTHESIS
(Section 2.4.1)
3. ORGANIZATIONAL & 
BEHAVIORAL THEORIES
(Not Part of this thesis)
26 
 
firm.  Financial synergies are achieved from the exploitation of tax shields and a 
reduction in the company’s cost of capital in the wake of an acquisition; so they too 
could also lead to higher operating cash (because of the presence of tax shields). 
Operating and financial synergies create efficiency gains for the company, which, in 
turn, can increase its value.  
According to the economic theories on merger motives, corporate value can also be 
increased through increasing market power (Figure 2.2). One has to carefully 
distinguish between efficiency gains, achieved through operating and financial 
synergies, and gains resulting simply because the merger increased the company’s 
market power, thus improving its ability to extract consumer surplus (Chatterjee, 
1986).  In other words, it is desireable to have M&As taking place because of a 
possible exploitation of operating and financial synergies rather than because of an 
expected increase in market power and a reduction of competition.  
 
Figure 2.3: Classification of Synergies 
Recent contributions in the literature conclude that operating synergies are the most 
significant source of gains in a merger (Devos et al., 2008). However, different 
categories of motives gave rise to the various M&A waves. Dedhia (2004), for 
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example, alludes to different underlying motives behind the various merger waves of 
the past:  
• 1920: Mergers for oligopoly (i.e. aimed at increasing market power). 
• 1960: Mergers in order to expand business activities and to reduce of risk 
(diversifying mergers). Many of those mergers however later proved to be 
unsuccessful (Andrade et al., 2001) 
• 1980: Mergers for market discipline (managerial efficiencies). Note, 
however, only 14% of deals in that decade involved hostile takeovers 
(Andrade et al., 2001). 
• 1990: Mergers due to the deregulation and liberalization of the markets. 
Figure 2.4 presents the different types of operating synergies. Essentially, operating 
synergies, resulting from revenue enhancement and/or cost savings (Gaughan, 
2007), affect the firm’s operating cash flow. The next section (2.3.1.1) considers 
synergies arising from revenue enhancement and the subsequent one (section 2.3.1.2) 
synergies arising from cost savings. 
 
Figure 2.4: Types of Operating Synergies 
Source: adapted from Ross et al. (1999:760) 
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2.3.1.1. Revenue Based Synergies 
As it was mentioned there exist four types of revenue based synergies, 
namely those are: a) market coverage, b) innovation capabilities, c) marketing gains 
and d) market power. 
a) Market Coverage  
Horizontal acquisitions have the ability to enhance market coverage through the 
geographic extension of the market and through product line extension (Aaker, 1996; 
Srivastava et al., 1998). Increased market coverage, through geographical 
expansion, permits the merged firm to sell existing products, once confined to 
particular markets, to a wider body of consumers, thereby enhancing the merged 
firm’s revenues. At the same time the company, by increasing its geographical 
coverage, diversifies its sources of revenues, since different markets may be hit by 
different macroeconomic shocks, also in some cases that same macroeconomic shock 
can have different impact in two different markets.  
b) Innovation Capabilities 
In addition, sharing the product lines enables the acquirer and the target to enlarge 
the range of their products, and ultimately to cross-sell and deliver larger quantities 
of products to customers (Capron, 1999). The overall value of these products sold to 
the customer may be greater than the value of each product separately. Furthermore, 
this extension of the product line has the ability to increase revenues if the merged 
firm succeeds in taking advantage of the strong reputation of the acquired business 
brand, sales network or marketing activities (Capron and Hulland, 1999). 
Innovation can be used strategically by firms to achieve competitive advantage (Hitt 
et al., 1998 and Ireland and Hitt, 1999), and/or to revise their strategies in accordance 
with ever changing markets and customer needs, so that they can create value and 
growth (Amit and Zott, 2001). Acquisition and divestiture activities can be used to 
increase a firm’s innovation performance (Van Beers and Sadowski, 2003). Thus, 
innovation may be used so as to achieve superior performance (Lee et al., 2000 and 
Zahra et al., 2000).  
29 
 
Recent research has highlighted the role of acquisitions as a mechanism for the 
redeployment of resources that are subject to market failure (Anand and Singh, 
1997). Horizontal acquisitions may also enhance innovation capability by 
transferring any proprietary technology, patents, know-how across the merged 
entities; this may be done in order to enhance the product features (product 
innovation capability) or to improve organizational and marketing effectiveness 
(e.g., time to market, customer satisfaction) (Capron, et al., 1998). Finally, 
innovation capability can be converted into a price premium and/or increased 
volume, leading to higher revenues.  
c) Marketing Gains  
A significant role that marketing plays lies in directing the market to recognise 
attributes and values that are unique to a product sought by customers (Lehman and 
Jocz, 1997). Also, marketing helps in revealing those values and attributes to product 
development teams through quality function deployment processes (Hauser and 
Clausing, 1988). Marketing gains are produced by more effective advertising, an 
improved distribution network, and a more balanced product mix. The redeployment 
of brands with great consumer base can help modify consumers’ perceptions of 
existing products thus distinguishing them from products offered by competitors 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Overall, superior marketing capabilities can lead to 
enhanced customer value, which in turn can be translated into premium prices 
providing and/or increased volumes (Barney, 1991; Srivastava et al, 1998). 
Therefore, with marketing, resources can be identified that are marketing specific 
and possibly reveal some required attributes of the resource based view, such as 
being rare and difficult to imitate (Srivastava et al, 2001). 
d) Market Power 
A merger may reduce competition and thereby increase the market power of the 
merged firm, thus allowing it to increase prices and extract monopoly profits from 
consumers. Hence, there exists an expectation that firms acquire substantial market 
power as they grow in size, relative to their competitors (Chatterjee, 1986). The 
finance and economics literature has long recognized that firms could increase equity 
value by exercising market power (Devos et al., 2008). For example, in a study 
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conducted by Kim and Singal (1993) reported that when airlines merged, that relative 
to other routes that were not affected by the merger, fares increased significantly. 
Thus if a merger results in increased market power there is an expectation of the 
combined firm to gain either from charging increased prices to the customers of by 
spending less to suppliers (Devos et al., 2008).   
The market power motive was a particularly important motive for many acquisitions 
prior to the passage and enforcement of antitrust legislation (Haleblian et al., 2009). 
But ever since, any acquisition that is expected to reduce substantially competition in 
the market may be challenged by the country’s regulators on antitrust grounds.  
  
2.3.1.2. Cost-based Synergies 
Figure 2.4 shows that cost savings is the second main source of operating synergies. 
Under certain circumstances, a larger firm may operate more efficiently than two 
smaller firms. Efficiency gains may come as the result of a number of factors which 
lead to lower costs. Three types of cost based synergies exist, a) economies of scale, 
b) economies of vertical integration and c) economies of scope. 
a) Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale arise when the average cost of production drops as the scale of 
production increases. There are various ways in which a company may experience a 
fall in the average cost of production as the scale of production expands. Companies 
might exhibit reduced costs as a result of plant economies of scale, i.e. the cost 
savings resulting from the fact that a factory, a workplace, or a machine is large 
(Sloman and Hinde, 2007: 187). In addition, economies of scale include the 
spreading of fixed costs over a larger production base (Shepherd, 1979).  
Finally, a third source of economies of scale involves various organizational 
efficiencies arising in the process of company growth. Thus, economies of scale can 
arise in processes such as distribution, advertising, administrative activities, research 
and development and sales (Porter, 1980; Scherer, 1980).  
Economies of scale are more likely to be achieved in horizontal acquisitions, where 
firms have overlapping businesses, rather than in unrelated acquisitions. 
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Furthermore, since economies of scale are achieved by spreading the amount of fixed 
costs over more activities, they are more likely to arise in related acquisitions than in 
unrelated ones (Seth, 1990a). 
Nevertheless, the sheer size and the respective bureaucracy in businesses may 
sometimes lead to a number of problems such as a) immobility, making the 
institution unable to respond to changing customer needs, b) profit attribution 
contradictions and, finally, c) the merging of different company cultures and 
management styles can have a negative impact on the performance of staff and 
consequently the delivery of services (Walter 1997). 
b) Economies of Vertical Integration  
Vertical integration facilitates the coordination and administration when two (or 
more) firms operating at different stages of production merge (Gilsdorf, 1995).  
Nowadays, however, there is a reversal of the trend for vertical integration, as 
companies are finding it more efficient to outsource the provision of many services 
and various types of production. This is mainly because of two reasons. First, an 
outside supplier could, for various reasons, have lower production costs. Second, a 
company may have more bargaining power when it transacts with independent 
suppliers than when it produces the inputs in-house (Mason and Phillips, 2000). 
c) Economies of Scope 
Cost efficiencies may also be due to economies of scope. Economies of scope arise 
when the merged firm achieves cost savings because it has increased the range of 
goods and services produced. Once an imperfectly divisible asset that was under-
utilized can be exploited to produce several outputs, economies of scope can arise 
(D’ Aveni et al., 2004). At the same time, however, the production of these added 
goods and services must be based, solely or in part, on shared factors of production. 
In other words, economies of scope are present whenever it is less expensive to 
combine two or more product lines than to use them separately (Panzar and Willig, 
1981).  
Cost reduction because of economies of scope can arise from a number of sources. In 
particular, they may be the result of a) spreading the fixed expenses of managing 
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client relationships, such as human resources, information technology and sustaining 
good reputation, over a broader output mix, b) the efficient use of established 
distribution channels for delivering additional products at lower marginal costs and 
c) synergies in the use of knowledge related to the production of services (Herring 
and Santomero, 1990). 
One way of increasing the scope of the firm is with horizontal acquisitions 
commonly increase the scope of the firm and allow spreading the firm's resources 
over a broader range of products (Lubatkin et al., 1998). 
2.3.1.3. Operating Synergies: Managerial Efficiency  
An acquisition may also facilitate the elimination of management inefficiencies at the 
target firm. In theory, there is always another management team that is willing to 
acquire an underperforming firm, in order to remove those managers who have failed 
to capitalise on the opportunities to create value (Weston et al., 2004). Managers 
who offer the highest value to the owners of the target firm will take over the right to 
manage the firm. As such, a company may choose to acquire a target company in 
order to improve the latter’s managerial efficiency, by restructuring its operations 
(Copeland et al., 2001). Of course the bidder sees value in the target company and 
this is the reason that drives the acquisition. At the same time, senior top executives 
and managers in the target firm will attempt to improve their managerial efficiency 
just to avoid of dismissal after acquisition. 
2.3.1.4. Lower Weighted Average Cost of Capital and Diversification 
Another source of synergy depicted in Figure 2.3, is financial synergy. Financial 
synergies may arise if a merged company can achieve a lower cost of (weighted 
average) cost of capital by improving its bargaining power over its suppliers of 
capital. Furthermore, financial synergies can also arise because of tax savings. In 
addition, a common motivation for a financial acquisition is that the acquirer believes 
that the target firm is undervalued relative to its assets due to bad management.  
Indeed, larger companies normally face more favourable financing opportunities 
(Brealey and Myers, 2000:949), and this results in a fall in the cost of debt and equity 
capital, and, consequently, in the reduction of the combined firm’s weighted average 
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cost of capital. The firm’s cost of equity can simply be reduced due to the cost 
savings resulting from larger equity issues, which the merged firm is expected to 
make.  
Furthermore, a lower cost of debt for a merged firm is exactly what is expected in a 
well-functioning bond market. While two firms are separate, they do not guarantee 
each other’s debt, and if one fails its bondholder cannot ask for their money from the 
shareholders of the other firm. But after the merger the shareholders of each 
company effectively guarantee the debt of the other company; if one part of the 
business fails, the bondholders can still take their money out of the other part. 
Because of these mutual guarantees, the debt of a merged firm should be less risky, 
hence lenders will demand a lower interest rate.  
2.3.1.5. Financial Synergies: Tax Savings  
 
Tax gains can be a powerful incentive for some acquisitions. The possible tax gains 
from an acquisition include the following: (a) The use of tax losses; (b) the use of 
unused debt capacity (Ross et al, 1999: 768-769). 
a) The Use of Tax Losses  
Normally, a company that makes losses on a pretax basis does not have any tax 
liability. Such firm may be an attractive target for a profitable (on a pre-tax basis) 
company with significant tax liabilities, since, other things being equal, the combined 
firm will have a lower taxable income. Indeed, studies by Auerbauch and Reishus 
(1987) and Hayn (1989) have confirmed the importance of taking advantage of tax 
losses in a potential target. 
b) Unused Debt Capacity  
Some firms do not employ debt in full capacity. This makes them potential targets in 
acquisitions. Adding debt can provide important tax savings, and many acquisitions 
are financed with debt. The acquiring company can deduct interest payments on the 
newly created debt and reduce taxes. 
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2.3.1.6. Managerial Synergies 
Finally, the third source of synergies involves managerial synergies. In general, a 
acquisition can be used as a tool to improve the managerial efficiency of a target firm 
(Gorton et. al 2009). Indeed, since inefficient managers are unlikely to fire or demote 
themselves, the shareholders in the firm can “elicit” a merger proposition in order to 
discipline the incompetent managers. So managerial synergy involves the 
emergence of a more effective management in the wake of an M&A; the 
precondition for this efficiency to be dubbed a managerial synergy is that this 
increased effectiveness in management (of the target firm) could not have occurred 
without the merger of the two firms. As such, the new management imposed in the 
target firm by the acquirer will increase the former’s efficiency if the latter better 
exploits the target’s resources. 
If there is an underlying managerial motive behind a merger in terms of aiding 
attrition of underperforming members of management, then it is expected that this 
will result in managerial turnover in the target firm post acquisition. Indeed, this is 
what Martin and McConnell (1991) showed in their study; it was demonstrated that 
in the year following the acquisition, the chief executive of target firms (which had 
poor performance for a four-year period before the acquisition) was four times more 
likely to be replaced than during earlier years. 
Furthermore, Parrino and Harris (1999) found that replacing the management of the 
target firm results in superior post-merger performance. The authors argued this is 
because the existing management may not act in the interest of shareholders, or 
because their incentives are not strong enough.  
2.3.2. Reduction of Risk and Diversification 
As depicted in Figure 2.2, risk reduction (through diversification) constitutes another 
cited economic motive for a merger (You and Daigler, 2010). A common argument 
in support of diversification is that lowering the risk of a firm’s stock increases its 
attractiveness to investors and thereby reduces the firm’s (equity) cost of capital. 
This is due to in theory, the more diversified a business is, the lower the variability of 
its EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), and the lower its level of business risk, its 
beta, and, ultimately, its cost of equity.  
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A common argument against the risk reduction opportunities offered by 
diversification is that investors are not interested in the reduced (unsystematic) risk 
of a diversified firm, since they can easily achieve this at a lower cost by holding a 
well-diversified portfolio. Hence, for a diversification strategy to increase the value 
of a firm’s shares, it must do more than simply reduce risk. Diversification must thus 
create either operating synergies or financial synergies. Further, diversification can 
do little to eliminate systematic risk, i.e. risk which all businesses face.   
The degree of diversification depends on how related the lines of business or two (or 
more) merging firms are. Different degrees of business relatedness, between the 
acquiring firm and the target firm, can have different effects on value creation and, 
ultimately, on acquisition performance (Lee and Liebermand, 2010). As such, 
opportunities for cost savings, achieved through divestiture of redundant assets, can 
be significantly enhanced as the degree of relatedness increases and as the 
redeployment of resources into new areas takes place (Capron et al., 1998; Penrose, 
1959; Teece, 1980, 1982) 
The underlying motives prompting a company to acquire related or unrelated 
businesses have received great attention in strategy research, yet little agreement on 
the relationship between diversification and post-acquisition performance exists 
(Palich et al., 2000; Teece, 1982). In theory, diversification must contribute to 
superior performance to the point where resources become too complex to manage or 
business units become unrelated (Wan et al., 2011). According to Ng (2007) the 
reasons behind the diversification of an organisation into unrelated businesses are not 
well understood in strategy research. 
2.3.3. Increase in Market Power 
Finally, in Figure 2.2, it is seen that increasing market power is another area of 
emphasis for the neoclassical approach to the underlying motives of a merger. The 
profit maximization goal, which the neoclassical theories see the overriding objective 
for each firm, can also be attained through increased market power, which usually 
results in the firm charging a higher price in order to earn a greater profit margin; in 
this way it appropriates part of the consumer surplus. The higher price can be 
effected since the number of competitors in the market after the acquisition falls; this 
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can be due to either the direct effect of the acquisition or because of the barriers to 
entry the merged firm may impose to any incumbent firms.  
Further, an acquisition can give the acquiring firm the direct control over the new 
market and provide it with the opportunity to take advantage of the existing 
distribution networks or different brands in the domestic or international market.  
2.4. Merger Motives: Non-Economic Motives  
2.4.1. Managerial Theories 
According to managerial theories, the underlying motives of an acquisition may not 
be related to operating or financial synergies but, instead, may be associated with 
managerial considerations (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Gorton et. al 2009). 
This theory came into prominence when Mueller (1969) argued that the salaries and 
the extra benefits (in the form of bonuses and stock options) managers receive tend 
to be associated with the size of firms, rather than with the company's profitability. 
As such, managers may resort in an acquisition so that they increase their pay and 
prestige. Also, Mueller (1969) pointed out that smaller firms usually return a higher 
portion of their profits to shareholders, compared with more mature and larger 
companies. This is due to that large companies while trying to increase in size, they 
become less interested in enhancing the welfare of their shareholders.  
Proponents of the managerial theory point to the conflict between the interests of the 
management team and those of the owners of the firm. Specifically, in companies 
with a high diffusion of shares and non-dynamic systems of internal control, 
opportunistic managers may pursue their own objectives, without taking into 
consideration the interests of the shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Gorton et. al 2009). 
This type of behaviour on the part of the management can, inter alia, lead to 
excessive expansion of the company’s lines of business (Dickerson et al., 2002) and 
short-term investments (Markidis and Singh, 1997). At the same time, acquisitions 
and firm expansion might reduce the risk of unemployment for top managers (Martin 
and McConnell, 1991).  
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According to the managerial theories, managers do not pursue the traditional goal of 
shareholders’ wealth maximization. These non-value-maximizing actions may 
ultimately cause a fall in the company’s share price. 
Indeed, if markets are not perfectly competitive the management of companies must 
pursue the goal of size maximization (instead of profit maximization) (Gorton et al., 
2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;  Winter, 1964) this goal can easily be achieved 
though an M&A. Managers may be also motivated to increase the size of the firm, if 
their compensation rises with it and entrenches them to their current positition 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). To this end, one should expect managers to pursue 
diversifying mergers in order to decrease earnings volatility, which, in turn, enhances 
corporate survival and protects their positions.  
The reaction to these theories is that managers do try to maximize value but, in their 
effort to increase the size of the firm, they may commit a lot of mistakes when it 
comes to correctly assessing the true value of the target firm. More particularly, 
according to the theory of managerial hubris (Roll, 1986; Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004) managers may have good intentions in increasing their firm’s value but, being 
over-confident, they over-estimate their abilities to create synergies. This over-
confidence, in turn, increases the probability of overpaying (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). 
Jensen’s (1986) theory of managerial discretion asserts that it is not over-confidence 
that leads to unproductive acquisitions, but instead the presence of surplus liquidity, 
or free cash flow (FCF). Firms whose internal funds are in excess of the investments 
required to fund positive net present value projects, he suggests, are more likely to 
make quick strategic decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-scale strategic 
actions with less analysis than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of liquidity 
increase managerial discretion, thus causing managers to choose probable “bad” 
acquisitions when there exist no “good” ones to utilise (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). 
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2.5. The Resource-Based View of the Firm  
One of the central aims of this thesis is the examination of the effect of resource 
redeployment on the post-acquisition performance of the merged firms. The analysis 
of the literature has so far focused on the fundamental economic theories relevant to 
acquisition motives, both economic and non-economic, and cost- and revenue-based 
synergies. According to Barney (1991), firms, since the 1960’s, use a single 
organising framework to explain that in order to sustain competitive advantages  they 
can do so by implementing strategies that exploit their internal strengths. This can 
happen with taking advantage of environmental opportunities, while trying to avoid 
internal weaknesses.  
Barney (1991) formulated the resource-based view of competitive advantage that 
relied on two assumptions: a) the resource based view assumes that firms within an 
industry can be heterogeneous by using the strategic resources they control and b) 
these resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, and therefore heterogeneity 
can be long lasting. Neo-classical economics according to Barney (2001) concentrate 
on how market forces determine the quantity, quality and price of goods and services 
sold in the market.  
 In general, resource redeployment concentrates on shifting resources from one firm 
to another, so that the latter can be used more efficiently. This section presents the 
resource-based view (RBV) or resource-based theory (RBT), which emphasizes the 
role of appropriate resource utilization in boosting corporate profitability.  
2.5.1. The Basic Assumptions of the Resource-Based View Theory 
Penrose (1959) recognized the fundamental roles that resources play in a firm’s 
competitive position. Then, Wernerfelt (1984) introduced the idea that firms should 
not only be examined from the product side, i.e. at the industry level, but they must 
also be looked at from the resource side, i.e. at the firm level. Specifically, 
Wernerfelt (1984) argued that “for the firm, resources and products are two sides of 
the same coin” (1984: 171).  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm advocates that a company’s competitive 
advantage originates at the firm, and not at the industry level, and specifically in the 
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unique bundle of resources and capabilities the firm commands (Barney 1991; 
Conner 1991; Peteraf 1993; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). 
Resources in the accounting context “resources” are identified with the firm’s 
“assets” are “stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1993:35). The resources can be (a) physical resources, such 
as plant equipment, location, access to raw materials; (b) human resources, such as 
experience, judgment, decision-making skills, intelligence, relationships, knowledge; 
and (c) organizational resources, such as culture, formal reporting structures, 
control systems, coordinating systems, informal relationships. Physical resources are 
mainly tangible resources, while human and organizational resources are intangible 
resources.   
A firm’s resources may be valuable to it if they: 
• Can add value to the firm either by influencing the firm’s demand curve or 
the firm’s supply (cost) curves.  
• Are rare, as few competitors may have them. 
• Are difficult to imitate because competitors can’t copy them. 
• Are difficult to substitute  
It is not however that resources per se are important, rather it is their functionality 
and how productively they are employed that makes the difference (Peteraf and 
Bergen, 2003; Lockett et al, 2009). This brings up the issue of capabilities, which 
refer to “a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, using 
organizational processes, to effect a desired end” (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993: 35). 
In other words, a firm will combine its resources with its capabilities in order to 
perform a business process in line with its strategy.  For instance, a firm pursuing a 
differentiation strategy would focus on new product development, whereas a firm 
following a low cost strategy, would focus on improving manufacturing process 
efficiency.  
Capabilities “are information-based, tangible or intangible processes that are firm-
specific and are developed over time through complex interactions among the firm’s 
Resources. They can abstractly be thought of as ‘intermediate goods’ generated by 
the firm to provide enhanced productivity of its Resources, as well as strategic 
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flexibility and protection for its final product or service.” (Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993: 35). 
Resources that have a positive effect on competitive advantage are usually 
accumulated over time, and they can be multifaceted (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Reed 
and DeFillipi, 1990;  Zander and Kogut, 1995). However, there is a possibility that 
some resources can have negative effects on organizational competitiveness and 
performance (Newbert, 2007; Armstrong and Shimizu, 2007). As such, according to 
the RBV, managers must also be able to recognize these “harmful” resources, but 
they are daunted by the task of removing them.  
Furthermore, successful firms possess distinctive resources and this attracts other 
firms that may not have the ability to develop resources quickly enough internally 
(Kiessling et al., 2008). One of the critical elements of enhancing post-acquisition 
performance of the acquirer is the top management team (TMT) of the target. The 
reason that the TMT is important is because it possesses knowledge critical to the 
ongoing business operations, while at the same time its managers’ removal can 
increase the level of disruption and ambiguity in the firm after the acquisition 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; Singh and Zollo, 1998). 
Organisational changes, such as in the composition of the acquired firm’s TMT, can 
have a negative impact on post-acquisition performance of the firm (Kiessling et al., 
2008). Cannella and Hambrick (1993) argue that the loss of the target company’s 
TMT will have a negative effect on the post-acquisition performance of the acquirer.  
According to Conner (1991), another key postulation of the RBV is that differences 
in resources are affected with the differences in product or service attributes. Social 
complexity is a characteristic that can make firm resources less imitable (Kiessling et 
al., 2008). Examples of socially complex firm resources that are difficult to replicate 
and imitate, include the interpersonal relation within a TMT and the reputation of the 
firm with its suppliers or customers (Kiessling et al., 2008).  
Walsh (1988) argues that the acquiring firm’s management team often take control of 
the target, rather than use the target firm’s capabilities. Managers from the acquirer 
will frequently force the target to make organisational changes such as compelling 
the acquired firm to enforce their managerial tools and then control the 
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implementation of these tools (Capron et al., 1998). Organisational changes, such as 
variations in organisational culture and structure that can have an effect on 
managers’ attitudes, managerial styles, decision making, and organisational success, 
typically take place post-acquisition (Shrivastava, 1986; Krug & Hegarty, 1997). 
Because of these organisational changes, ambiguity is created in the upcoming part 
of the management in the organisation, which can result in managers having 
increased stress, lower job satisfaction and increased chances of leaving (Schweiger 
and DeNisi, 1991). Also, according to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), post-
acquisition changes can affect the target firms’ executives’ dispositional 
characteristics that they use to solve problems and develop opinions.  
2.5.2. Assumptions of the Resource-Based View Theory 
One of the basic assumption of the RBV is that resources are both heterogeneous 
across firms and imperfectly mobile (Barney 1991; Hunt and Morgan, 1995). These 
two characteristics can lead to unique, firm-specific resource attributes, which can 
create a sustained competitive advantage for the firm in the marketplace. This can 
therefore result to superior performance (Capron and Hulland, 1999). 
Resource immobility entails that firms' resources are not commonly, easily, or 
readily exchanged in the market (Mitchell, 1994). Moreover, firms regularly 
encounter difficulties in valuing discrete resources, something that makes resource 
redeployment more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior (Chi, 1994). 
Consequently, if a firm’s resources are not easily tradable in the market, they can 
become potentially “tradable” through a merger and acquisition; indeed this activity 
has become the primary mechanism for acquiring bundles of “non-tradeable” 
resources (Teece et al., 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Further, in spite of managerial 
preferences for exchanging discrete resources on the market, resource immobility 
often drives acquiring firms to buy entire businesses. 
2.5.3. Limitations of the Resource-Based View 
Of course, every theory has its adversaries and, as such, the RBV is disputed in some 
instances. A very powerful criticism has been advanced by Hoopes et al.,  (2003: 
891), who argue that: “the RBV seems to assume what it seeks to explain. This dilutes 
its explanatory power. For example, one might argue that the RBV defines, rather 
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hypothesizes, that sustained performance differences are the result of variation in 
resources and capabilities across firms. The difference is subtle, but it frustrates 
understanding the RBV’s possible contributions.” 
Another issue relating to the RBV and has been identified by several authors 
concerns the lack of commonality of terms (Priem and Butler, 2001; Foss and 
Knudsen, 2003; Hoopes et al., 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004).  The terminology 
that is used to analyse and explain results of the RBV in different studies make it 
difficult to contrast and evaluate results. Some authors have even characterised the 
number of definitions as vast (Coates and McDermott, 2002; Ray et al., 2004). In 
some cases consistency becomes an issue. For instance, there are studies that provide 
distinct meanings for the core terms of the RBV such as resources, competencies and 
capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003), whereas, in other studies the terms are used in 
interchangeably (Ray et al., 2004). As a result, this luck of commonality of terms has 
an effect on the value of the results of RBV research (Nanda, 1996). This vagueness 
of the RBV with respect of the terminologies used is considered as a limitation of the 
RBV research (Hax and Wilde, 2001).  
An additional limitation of the RBV is that studies of firm performance and their 
resources can vary substantially in terms of methodology utilized. Rouse and 
Daellenbach (2002) doubt the bias that exists towards quantitative research methods 
suggesting that such a methodology is not deemed appropriate for RBV research. 
According to Chan (2000) RBV may not be fully understood or comprehended until 
more qualitative research is utilised. 
2.6. Dynamic Capabilities Perspective  
Following the analysis in the previous section, the underpinnings on which the RBV 
is based, is that resources are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and imperfectly 
substitutable. In addition, those resources are heterogeneous across organizations and 
this heterogeneity can sustain over time (Abrosini and Bowman, 2009). RBV theory 
is concerned with how some firms can achieve super-profits in equilibrium and, 
because of that, is considered as a static view (Priem and Butler, 2001; Lockett et al, 
2009). 
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As mentioned before, one of the limitations of the RBV is that the creation of future 
valuable resources is elicit, and how those valuable, rare and unique resources can be 
revitalised in changing environments; this is where the capability perspective comes 
into effect (Amrosini and Bowman, 2009). The dynamic capability perspective is an 
extension of the RBV as their assumptions are similar (Barney 2001b). The RBV, 
according to Teece and Pisano (1994) was not capable of offering explanations in 
how some firms that were successful showed “timely responsiveness and rapid and 
flexible product innovation, along with the management capability to effectively 
coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences” (Teece and Pisano, 
1994, p.537). Also, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that the RBV has not 
explained sufficiently how and why some firms possess competitive advantage in 
conditions of rapid and unpredictable change. It was through the realisation that 
some successful firms in changing environments were not able to adapt successfully 
(Harreld et al 2007) when Teece et al (1997) argued how the dynamic capability 
perspective was able to overcome the limitations of the RBV. 
According to Ambrosini and Bowman, (2009) the dynamic capability perspective is 
based on the recognition of a firm’s survival and growth, thus it draws arguments 
from a series of theoretical perspectives not just evolutionary economics. 
Furthermore, they argue, that the dynamic capability view can be considered as an 
extension of the RBV thinking and the same holds for related theories such as the 
core competence perspective (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) and the knowledge-based 
view (Grant 1996). What they share in common is that they all view the firm as a 
bundle of heterogeneous and path-dependent resources, and they seek to explain how 
sustainable competitive advantage is generated (Lockett and Thompson, 2001). 
2.6.1. Definitions, Assumptions and Typologies 
According to Leonard-Barton (1992) dynamic capabilities help firms to sustain a 
competitive advantage and can help them avoid developing core rigidities that deter 
development and suppress innovation. Core rigidities are the opposite of the 
valuable, rare non-imitable resources; they therefore represent past valuable 
resources that become obsolete and deter development (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2009). There are several authors that have provided a definition of dynamic 
capabilities. The adopted definition in this thesis is that dynamic capabilities 
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represent “the abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner 
envisioned and deemed appropriate by its principal decision-maker” (Zahra et al., 
2006, pp.918). This definition was adopted because it encompasses the concept of 
resource reconfiguration as an integral aspect of dynamic capabilities. Therefore, 
dynamic capabilities can be viewed as the ability of the management team to realise 
opportunities and, subsequently, use these to reconfigure and redeploy existing 
routines or resource configurations. 
To better comprehend the expression dynamic capabilities, according to Ambrosini 
and Bowman, (2009), one has to forget the definition of capability according to the 
RBV, and avoid decomposing the term into two separate words. Therefore a 
“dynamic capability is not a capability in the RBV sense, as it is not a resource. A 
dynamic capability is a process that impacts upon resources” (Abrosini and 
Bowman, 2009, p34).  
Moreover, dynamic capabilities can be viewed as the ability of a firm to generate, 
transform or even broaden its resource base (Helfat, 2007). Therefore the use of 
dynamic capabilities has to be viewed as a deliberate effort to change the firm’s 
resource base. Additionally, their role is to have an impact on the firm’s existing 
resource base and transform it in a way that a new bundle of configuration of 
resources is formed for the firm to sustain or even enhance its competitive advantage 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009).  
According to Bowman and Ambrosini (2003) there exist four main processes of 
dynamic capabilities. a) reconfiguration, which refers to the recombination of assets 
and resources (as in the case of an acquisition) b) leveraging, which refers to the 
replication of a process or a system, or deploying a resource into a new field (an 
existing brand to a new product) c) learning, which involves tasks to be executed 
more effectively and resourcefully after they have been  implemented successfully or 
not, and d) creative integration, which represents firm’s ability to incorporate its 
assets and resources after a new resource configuration. 
Finally, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that acquisitions, alliances and product 
innovation can be characterized as ‘real’ dynamic capabilities as they allow for the 
renewal and reconfiguration of a firm’s resources. They also suggested that often in 
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dynamic markets it is reasonable to use dynamic capabilities to build new resource 
configurations and move into new competitive positions using a “path-breaking 
strategic logic of change” (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, pp.1118). 
Thus using arguments inherent in the dynamic capabilities sustaining long-term 
competitive advantage lies in the recombination of assets and resources, that is 
resource reconfiguration (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Bowman and Ambrosini, 
2003; Abrosini and Bowman, 2009). 
2.7. The Merger’s Cost and Premium, and the Method of Payment  
Before reviewing the literature on the measurements of post-acquisition 
performance, other important issues of interest in the literature on M&As have to be 
presented. Those issues relate to how much bidding firms pay for their targets and 
what method of payment they use to complete the deal. In the following section, 
these issues are discussed and analysed.  
2.7.1. Merger’s Cost and Premium  
The merger’s premium is the difference between the cost of acquiring the target 
and the target’s market value.  
TPremium Cost V= −
 
5.1 
where,  is the market value of the target company. Of course, the cost of the 
acquisition could be expressed either in terms of cash or in terms of stock. 
Essentially, the method of payment in an acquisition (with cash or with stock) 
conveys information about the bidder’s assessment of either its own value or the 
value of the target (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998); managers 
who believe their stock is overvalued (undervalued) pay with stock (cash). 
Most of the times managers overpay in a takeover deal, justifying the high cash price 
(and premiums) paid on grounds of potential synergies that might arise from the 
merger (Damodaran, 2010: 17).  
There are several suggestions as to what triggers this overpayment phenomenon. Roll 
(1986) suggested that the managers of acquiring firms simply make erroneous 
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valuation of the target companies, ending up paying high premia. Then, Graham et 
al., (2008) argued that managers are led to an overvaluation of the target companies 
simply out of overconfidence in their valuation skills.  
In some cases however the merger premium paid is relatively small. For instance, 
when the target firms are large companies, and the competition for their takeover is 
small, the merger premium involved will be rather low (Gorton et al., 2009). This 
result was also corroborated by the study of Alexandridis et al. (2011).  
2.7.2. The Method of Payment  
The method of payment for the acquisition has been found in some studies to impact 
on the wealth of the shareholders. For example, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
found that cash offers yielded abnormal returns close to 10 percent upon the 
announcement of the merger, while stock offers (or equity offers in comination with 
cash or loans) earned investors only 6 percent.  
Some early studies on the issues have presented evidence that cash payments are 
constistenly higher than stock-financed deals (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). However, 
for the US market, the issuance of stock has become the predominant method 
financing an acquisition. For example, in a study conducted by Andrade et al., (2001) 
on a total of 4,300 U.S. deals, it was found that during the 1990-1998 period stock 
financed deals accounted for 57.8% of all sampled acquisition cases, compared with 
27% for cash-financed deals (see Table 2.1, section 2.9.1).  
When it comes to the effect of the means of payment in a M&A deal on post-
acquisition performance, the empirical evidence is mixed. On the one hand, a number 
of studies (Gregory, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) pointed to lower or negative 
abnormal returns for the bidder in case of a stock-financed deal, and higher or 
positive returns for cash-financed deals. Consistent with this evidence, another strand 
of research (Cosh and Guest, 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001) showed that cash bids 
are associated with better performance in both the short run and the long run. Finally, 
Conn et al. (2005) found that bids funded with any method of payment except cash 
lose -0.47% over a period of 36 months after the announcement.  
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On the other hand, Gregory (1997) found negative and significant abnormal returns 
related with cash offers. Complementing the above study, Chang (1998) found 
insignificant excess return for the bidder in cash offers and positive and significant 
excess return in stock offers, while Fields et al. (2007) documented insignificant 
results.  
Various studies state that hostile takeovers and tender offers are more likely to be 
financed with cash, whereas friendly takeovers are more likely to be funded with 
equities (Agrawal et al., 1992; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Travlos, 1987). Various 
studies that focused their research on whether cash offers or equity offers maximize 
value provide evidence that cash bids in the short run (Dong et al., 2005; Draper and 
Paudyal, 1999; Travlos, 1987; and Walker, 2000) and in the long run (Cosh and 
Guest, 2001; Linn and Switzer, 2001) enhance performance. 
Finally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) studied the choice of the payment method in 
M&A deals that took place in 13 European countries, between 1997 and 2000. The 
payment method was classified by the authors in one of the following three 
categories: cash only, stock only (it included stock with full voting rights or inferior 
voting rights), and mixed payment. In the majority of cases studied by the authors, 
the method of payment used involved cash.  
2.8. Measuring the Post-Acquisition Performance 
There are several approaches in measuring the performance of companies in general 
or its performance after the conclusion of an acquisition deal. In order to measure the 
performance of M&As both academics and practitioners have relied on accounting 
figures and/or market data. Nonetheless, strategic management and organizational 
behaviour researchers usually employed manager’s personal valuations (Papadakis 
and Thanos, 2010). 
Zollo and Meier (2008) suggested the use of the following approaches in measuring 
post-acquisition performance: (1) market measures of performance, i.e. the share 
price returns to acquiring and target firm separately and the corresponding returns for 
the combined firm; (2) objective measures of performance, such as accounting ratios; 
(3) subjective measures of performance. Cording et al., (2010), found that the 
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majority of studies on M&A employed market measures and accounting measures in 
order to examine post-acquisition performance.   
This thesis uses the third type of measures to assess company post-acquisition 
performance, since neither accounting nor market measures can be used as valid 
measures of post-acquisition performance. This can be mainly attributed to that it is 
quite difficult for market measures and accounting measures to capture the efficiency 
gains resulting from the operating and financial synergies of an acquisition.  
2.8.1. Market-Based Measures of Corporate Performance   
The most widely cited measure of post-acquisition performance has been the stock 
market reaction to the announcement of the merger (Dodd, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Franks and Harris, 1989).  These measures are predominantly used in event 
studies for examining both the short-run and the long-run reaction of the share price 
(of either the target or acquiring firm) to the announcement of a merger. The 
abnormal return of a company’s share is studied, in the framework of an event study, 
in order to derive conclusions about the post-acquisition performance of either the 
target or the bidder.  
In the typical event-study methodology the date of the merger announcement is the 
relevant event (Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2007). The abnormal return of a share is 
simply the difference between its actual return and the expected  return  over the 
event window, which includes a total of M days distributed prior and after the time 
the event (that is, the announcement of a merger) takes place (Duso et al., 2010) 
(Figure 2.5). The expected return is usually estimated according to an asset pricing 
model, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the Three-Factor Model, 
associated with the work Fama and French (1993), and using observations (i.e. share 
price returns and the returns of a relevant stock-market index) up and including time  
(see Fig. 2.7). Once these returns have been estimated, they are then compared to the 
stock’s actual return over the time interval for the period. In this way, the abnormal 
returns, and the cumulative abnormal returns ( ) are estimated over the event 
window (Duso et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2.5: The Time Line in Event Studies 
 
In an efficient capital market, the change in the share price of the target and the 
acquirer should reflect investors’ expectations (beliefs) concerning the value to be 
created by the merger, and how this added value will be divided between the parties 
of the deal. However, it does not suffice to look at share price returns around the 
merger announcement date. 
More specifically, any market measures, such as the abnormal gains (losses) the 
shareholder may earn (suffer) as a result of an announcement of a merger, cannot 
measure acquisition performance (Montgomery and Wilson, 1986), since these 
changes reflect the capital markets’ “a priory” expectations concerning the merger 
and not the actual value creation (if any) associated with the particular acquisition 
case (Lepetit et al, 2004).  
Further, when using market measures to assess the post-acquisition performance the 
assumption that the market is efficient must hold, so that the share price incorporates 
all relevant information available to investors. Normally, however, investors do not 
have all the necessary information in order to properly assess the effectiveness of an 
announced M&A deal (Oler et al., 2008). Rather, the relevant information is revealed 
to the wider investment public gradually and over time; hence it should be expected 
for the share price to adjust accordingly to the revelation of new information. 
Another problem with the use of market measures in assessing post acquisition 
T
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performance has to do with the fact that the event under study must be fully 
unanticipated. However this is not always true, since most investors and market 
participants are well aware of the business strategy of the firms they follow, and 
hence they know well in advance the company’s future plans. 
2.8.2. Accounting-Based Measures of Corporate Performance   
Accounting measures are related to ratio analysis and the company’s performance 
review process. Ratio analysis, gives an objective financial account into the current 
state of the company, regarding many aspects of business performance in the past. 
This information is valuable to all stakeholders in the firm (Davies and Pain, 2002). 
The standard procedure with accounting measures and ratio analysis is to compute 
some financial ratios prior and subsequent to the merger and look at changes in these, 
before and after the deal. The underlying rationale of this approach is that any 
efficiency gains arising from an acquisition will have to be reflected in the 
company’s financial statements (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). 
One of the most widely used ratios in the M&A literature is the return on assets 
(ROA) (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2011), which is defined as earning before interest 
and tax (i.e. operating income) over total assets (in some cases cash is exluded from 
the denominator of this ratio). There are several problems associated with accounting 
measures of post-acquisition corporate perfomance (Hult et al., 2008). First, these 
measures include the impact of several other factors on corporate performance and, 
hence, it may be difficult to draw conclusions concerning the significance of the 
merger “effect” when using these. Second, accounting measures reflect information 
concerning the past rather the present performance or the expected corporate 
performance in the future. Finally, accounting data could be distorted by 
manipulation.  
2.8.3. Subjective Measures of Corporate Performance  
Subjective measures of performance involve the management’s self-reported 
opinions on the performance of their company. Specifically, managers are asked to 
express their opinion whether the acquisition has achieved its objective or not. 
Normally, the respondents are the executives of the acquiring firm and the target 
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firm. At any rate such measures cannot be used in order to anticipate ex ante the 
possible outcome of an acquisition. 
Dess and Robinson (1984) advocated the use of subjective measures in assessing the 
corporate performance following an M&A activity. Brouthers et al. (1998:349) 
argued “that a better performance measure of acquisition is not an arbitrary 
economic measure of profitability or shareholder value, but is the achievement or 
non-achievement of the original objectives of the merger.” Such measures have been 
used in studies by Brock (2005) and Hayward (2002), although the latter has used 
subjective opinions from external informants on the M&A deal.  
Two main benefits associated with the use of subjective measures in assessing post-
acquisition performance. First, since these measures reflect private information, they 
eliminate the effect of other variables (except from the effect of the merger) on 
corporate, post-acquisition, performance. Second, with subjective measures, the 
researcher can test for the impact of several motives for the M&A. When it comes to 
the disadvantages of subjective measures, the most important one is the possibility 
that the subjective assessment of merger’s success may reflect some kind of bias on 
the part of the respondent- this is the so-called “managerial bias” (Schoenberg, 
2006). Also in order to have an “objective” assessment, the respondents need to be 
quite familiar with the acquisition’s objective (Datta, 1991). 
By using market measures to measure the long-term performance of an acquisition, 
there is a possibility that the merger may be deemed unsuccessful using conventional 
accounting-based measures when actually the manager perceives it as successful. 
However, in most cases, objective and subjective measures of performance are likely 
to lead to similar conclusions (at least on the upside), since subjective measures may 
be influenced by objective performance ratings.  
2.9. The Evidence on the Post-Acquisition Performance  
This section presents the empirical evidence concerning the benefits (and costs) of a 
corporate takeover and their distribution between the parties involved. Specifically, 
sections 2.9.1 and 2.9.2 look at the evidence on the short- and long-term benefits of 
acquisitions from the perspective of bidder and target shareholders. Here, as a 
measurement of performance the effect of the acquisition (announcement) on share 
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price of the bidding and target firm is used; this is the typical event-study 
methodology discussed in the previous section.  Section 2.9.3 looks at the evidence 
concerning the effect of the acquisition on corporate operating performance, where 
financial ratios are used as a measure of operating performance. Section 2.9.4 
provides evidence of the subjective measures of performance and finally, Section 
2.9.5 reviews evidence from Greek research studies. 
2.9.1. The Short-Run Performance of Acquisitions  
In an early survey of the literature, Jensen and Ruback (1983) looked at the share 
price gains and losses earned by companies involved in acquisitions. They found that 
target shareholders earned a 30% abnormal return in successful tender offers, while 
acquisitions were found to produce abnormal returns of 20%. Presumably, the high 
abnormal returns in tender offers reflect the high premium typically paid in such 
cases. In contrast to the shareholders of target firms, the shareholders of bidding 
firms did quite poor; they enjoyed abnormal returns of just 4% in tender offers, and 
0% in acquisitions. 
Andrade et al. (2001) studied US merger activity over the period 1973-1998; a total 
of 4,300 deals took place during this period. Some characteristics of these deals are 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Their research, as depicted in Table 2.1, reports merger deals broken down by decade 
signifying that in those different time periods mergers deals were different in several 
ways.  One major difference is the vast use of stock as a method of payment in the 
period 1990 - 1998 and also, that 70 percent of the deals that took place around that 
time involved stock compensations. Moreover, 58 percent of those deals were 
completely stock financed. That number constitutes a 50% increase than the deals 
that took place between 1980 and 1989. In addition, only 4 percent of the deals 
around the 1990s were hostile bids, whereas in the 1980s it was 14 percent. Andrade 
et al (2001) conclude that in the 1980s the volume of hostile takeover activity was 
exaggerated and one reason for that might be that their sample included all publicly 
traded firms and hostile activity was almost non-existent with smaller companies.  
Furthermore, they found that in the 1990s, merging companies were often in related 
industries taking part in a friendly stock swap. 
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1973-1979 1980-1989 1990-1998 1973-1998 
Number of Deals 789 1,427 2,004 4,256 
Cash-Financed 38.3% 45.3% 27.4% 35.4% 
Stock-Financed 37.0% 32.9% 57.8% 45.6% 
Any-Stock 45.1% 45.6% 70.9% 57.6% 
Hostile Bid at Any Time 8.4% 14.3% 4.0% 8.3% 
Hostile Bid Successful 4.1% 7.1% 2.6% 4.4% 
Own Industry 29.9% 40.1% 47.8% 42.1% 
Abnormal Short-Term 
Return for Target 
[-20,Close] 
24.8% 23.9% 23.3% 23.8% 
Abnormal Short-Term 
Return for Acquirer  
[-20,Close] 
-4.5% -3.1% -3.9% -3.8% 
Combined Short-Term 
Return for Target 
[-20,Close] 
0.1% 3.2% 1.6% 1.9% 
Table 2.1: Basic Statistics of the Deals Analysed in Andrade et al. (2001) 
Table 2.1 shows that for an event window of 20 days prior to the merger 
announcement until the closing date of merger, the average abnormal return for the 
shareholders of target firms consistently (over the three periods under consideration) 
surpassed the corresponding return for the shareholders of acquiring firms, who 
actually suffered short-term losses. Clearly, the winners from the acquisitions, at 
least in the short run, were the shareholders of target firms. Furthermore, the 
combined short-run average abnormal return was very low for the periods 
considered.  
In a study of 302 large acquisitions completed between 1995 and 2001 Henry, (2002) 
found that in 61 percent of the shareholders of the bidding firms suffered losses. 
Specifically, the shareholders of the bidding firms during the first post-merger year 
had average share price return 25 percentage points lower than the returns their peers 
earned from other companies in the same industry.   
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According to Henry’s study (2002) the main reasons for this underperformance were 
the following. First, the acquiring firms often overpaid for their targets, and as a 
result the bulk of the acquisition’s synergies went straight to the target’s 
shareholders. Indeed, according to the study’s results, the shareholders of the target 
companies earned, in two weeks surrounding the merger announcement, on average 
19.3 percent more than their industry peers. Second, the management of the bidding 
firms often overestimated the expected synergies from the acquisition. Third, the 
time period for the integration of the operations between the bidding and the target 
firm was too long, thereby annoying customers and employees alike, and hence 
postponing any gains from the merger. Finally, the study revealed that bidders 
paying with stock had the worst performance.  
Similar results were obtained in a fairly recent survey article by Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, (2007) who concluded that M&A lead to “at best an insignificant [short-
run] impact on shareholders’s wealth.”  
Homberg et al (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 67 M&A studies. The authors 
considered studies on “related” mergers, where the “relatedness” was defined in 
terms of business, cultural, technological, and size aspects. The findings of this meta-
analysis revealed that “positive effects can be expected under specific conditions 
only and have a limited overall impact on acquisition success”. Put differently, 
relatedness in acquisition activity does not seem to be associated with increased 
shareholders’ wealth.   
2.9.2. The Long-Run Effects of an Acquisition  
The general evidence from the long-run performance of an acquisition is that 
acquiring firms tend to under-perform over a long-time period following the 
acquisition.  
Alexandridis et al., (2011), using a sample of 3,691 U.S. public acquisitions 
announced between 1990 and 2007, showed that in the long-run bidding firms taking 
over large firms suffer losses (in terms of stock returns), while bidding firms engaged 
in small acquisitions earned positive abnormal returns for their shareholders. 
Specifically, on the one hand, it was found that acquirers which bought large targets 
experienced a (statistically significant) 12-month abnormal return of -3.40% and a 
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36-month abnormal return of -7.02%. On the other hand, bidding companies that 
bought smaller targets earned a (statistically insignificant) 12-month abnormal return 
of 2.64% and a (statistically significant, at the 10% confidence level) 36-month 
return of 8.64%. These abnormal returns were earned in the relevant time period 
following the month when the acquisition deal was agreed. 
Also, the authors demonstrated that the post-acquisition operating performance of 
acquirers deteriorated only in large deals. Spefifically, they estimated the pre- and 
post-acquisition return on assets (i.e. the ratio of operating income to book value of 
total assets) and they found the following: while acquirers of large targets achieved a 
higher return on their assets (9-12%) compared to acquirers of small targets (3-5%), 
in the wake of the acquisition acquirers of large targets earned a median 9.45% over 
the three years following the large target acquisition compared with a corresponding 
figure of 11.86% for the acquirers of smaller targets.    
2.9.3. Accounting-based Measures of Performance 
This section looks at the evidence concerning the effect of the acquisition on the 
operating performance of the merged firms. The operating performance is usually 
assessed using a number of financial ratios, such as the return on assets or the return 
on equity. In general, studies examining the effects of M&A using accounting based 
measures, provide no clear evidence of post-acquisition performance (Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007, pp.152) 
In an early study, Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) studied 144 UK acquisitions that took 
place over ther period 1977-1990. From their empirical findings, the authors 
concluded that there was no change in corporate profitability of the merged firms for 
the period 1977-1985. For the subsequent period, i.e. for the period 1985-1990, the 
empirical findings of the research revealed a significant improvement in profitability 
to the tune of 13% to 22%, but this improvement was attributed by the authors to 
changes in UK’s tax policy.  
Andrade et al. (2001) studied 2000 US deals between 1973 and 1998. Using as a 
measure of performance the ratio of cash flow to sales, the authors found that merger 
transaction improved the company’s performance relative to its peer companies. 
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However, the authors showed that the operating performance of the target and the 
acquirer was already strong even before the merger. 
Ghosh (2001) examined 315 cases of the biggest US acquisitions that were effected 
during the period 1981-1995, by comparing companies who had at least made one 
acquisition over the aforementioned period with companies that made no acquisition 
during that period. The results of his research showed no difference in the ROA of 
the two groups of firms.  
Martynova et al. (2006) examined the long-term profitability of 155 European cases 
of mergers and acquisitions, which took place over the period 1997-2001; both the 
bidding and target firms in the deals came from Europe or UK. The authors 
employed different measures of operating performance. Their results revealed that 
both acquirers and targets outperform the industry average before the takeover, 
however the “raw profitability” of the combined firms decreases significantly after 
the takeover. 
In some studies the empirical evidence concerning the post-acquisition performance 
when the latter is measured by accounting measures are at best ambiguous. For 
instance, in one such study, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) found a positive 
effect on post-acquisition performance when cash-flow ratios were used in 
measuring such performance, and a negative effect when earnings-based ratios were 
used. 
Alexandridis et al. (2011) calculated pre- and post-acquisition return on assets in 
order to assess the effect of the merger on operating performance. They found that 
large deals cost acquirers in terms of reduced operating performance. 
2.9.4. Subjective Measures of Performance  
Subjective measures of performance as it was mentioned earlier (Section 2.8.3.) 
comprise the management’s self-reported opinions on the performance of their 
company. Benefits associated with the use of subjective measures in assessing post-
acquisition performance include the elimination of the effect of other variables since 
these measures reflect private information. In addition, with subjective measures, the 
researcher can test for the impact of several motives for the acquisition.  
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Papadakis (1998), by using both objective and subjective measures found that long-
term performance seems to be highly related to strategic investment decisions 
processes than short-term performance. The author argued that a major finding is that 
subjective performance measures appear to provide better results and that can be due 
to they are designed to capture the relative significance of each individual 
performance dimension to the specific company. Also, the subjective measures of the 
study converge with the objective measures signifying that the results are valid.  
Capron (1999) examined the long term performance of horizontal acquisitions using 
a sample of 253 horizontal acquisitions in manufacturing in the US and Europe for 
the period of 1988-1992. Subjective measures of post-acquisition behaviour were 
used as readily available financial data were too unrefined to allow for differentiation 
of the different types of value-creating mechanisms. The results showed that both 
asset divestiture and resource redeployment enhance acquisition performance, 
nevertheless a major risk of hurting acquisition performance was found when target 
redeployed resources and divested its assets.  
In a study by Ghobadian et al., (2008) by using subjective measures to assess 
performance, the authors concluded that strategic planning increases a firm’s survival 
chances. Three rationales were considered for using subjective measures. The first 
justification was due to the reluctance of SMEs to disclose financial information. The 
second was the strong correlation between objective and subjective measures of 
performance (Hart and Banbury, 1994). The third was based on the robust arguments 
offered by the literature in favour of using subjective measures when objective ones 
where not readily available or inappropriate (Garg et al., 2003). 
According to Lockett et al., (2009), resources can have a number of different 
functions, which allow them to be employed through a number of different markets 
over time. Consequently it is important for managers to decide the most profitable 
management for the resources at their disposal. Therefore, resource usage is 
influenced by the subjective perceptions of managers. In addition, Homburg et al., 
(2012), argue that subjective key informant responses on performance outcomes have 
a high probability of being accurate.  
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2.9.5. The Evidence from Greece  
In Greece, due to the country’s rigid structure (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2013) 
the emergence of M&A phenomenon considerably delayed compared with what was 
going on globally. Essentially M&As in Greece begun taking place from the mid 
1980s. The Greek economy was populated by small companies, where ownership 
and the exercise of management were to be found in the same person. Also the 
country’s banking system, being heavily controlled and regulated by the Bank of 
Greece until the mid-1980s (Rezitis, 2008), granted relatively easily credit to (some) 
enterprises, while at the same period the stock market being underdeveloped (Katsos 
and Lekkakis, 1991) could not be tapped by the businesses that could not secure bank 
lending.   
In an early study of M&As in Greece, Katsos and Lekakis (1991) found that small to 
medium firms merge only with similar sized firms and that firms tried to combine 
capital assets and marketing networks. Mylonidis & Kelnikola (2005) in their study 
of post-merger performance looking into pre versus post-merger accounting ratio 
comparisons from five bank-deals in Greece found a positive impact on post-merger 
performance. Papasyriopoulos et al., (2007), used an event study methodology to 
look into abnormal returns on stock prices on the day of acquisition announcements 
found that “good news” have a positive effect on abnormal returns and “bad news” a 
marginal negative one.  
Furthermore, in a study looking into the operating performance of fifty Greek 
conglomerate and non-conglomerate mergers listed in the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE) for the period 1998-2002, Eleftheriades et al., (2008) found that conglomerate 
mergers prevailed as more successful in liquidity and viability financial ratios.  
Rezitis, (2008), examining the effect of acquisition activity on the efficiency and 
total factor productivity of ten Greek banks for the period 1993 to 2004 showed that 
the effects are negative.  
Recent studies have shifted more focus on post- acquisition performance. Papadakis 
and Thanos, (2010), investigated corporate acquisition performance based on a 
sample of fifty domestic Greek acquisitions. Their results revealed failure rates of 
M&As that ranged from 50% to 60%.  
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Pazarkis et al., (2011), investigated the post-merger operating performance of 
merger-involved firms in Greece at information technology industry, and at a 
knowledge-intensive industry. Their results showed a negative impact on post-
merger performance regarding firms from a knowledge-intensive industry and no 
changes on any other examined ratios.   
Agorastos et al., (2011) examined the impact of the post-merger operating 
performance of thirty eight Greek firms at domestic and cross-border transactions 
using accounting data for the period 1998-2002. They found that cross-border M&As 
stipulate a better post-merger performance for the acquirer than the domestic ones.  
Alexandrakis et al. (2012) studied the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
on the post-merger operating performance of merger-involved firms at industrial 
goods and services sector of the ASE (Athens Stock Exchange) in Greece. The 
authors used accounting data (financial ratios) in order to measure the post-merger 
performance of a sample of Greek listed companies that undertook (at least) one 
acquisition in the four-year-period from 2004 to 2007. The results revealed that 
M&As had a negative impact on the post-merger performance of the merged firms.  
Pazarkis et al., (2013), examined the impact of M&As on the post-merger 
performance of Greek-merger involved firms by looking into the two profitability 
ratios (ROA and ROE). The sample consisted of seventy two acquirers listed in the 
Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996-2007. Their results revealed that there is 
no significant change of any variable under investigation for the two profitability 
ratios and they concluded that M&As within the Greek sample do not lead to 
enhanced economic profitability. In addition, they argued that since there is no 
profitability enhancement the hypothesis for market power to increase profitability is 
not supported and the same holds for domestic versus international M&As 
Finally, Halkos and Tzeremes (2013) applied a bootstrapped Data envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)-based procedure to investigate the degree of operating efficiency 
gains of 45 possible bank M&As in Greece for the period 2007-2011. Their results 
showed that a year before and after the Greek crisis, most of the potential bank 
M&As were unable to generate short-run efficiency gains. 
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2.10. Summary 
In this chapter, the literature pertinent to M&As was presented, while theoretical 
propositions and empirical evidence were reviewed.  
The thesis’ approach to the underlying motives of the M&A is the neoclassical 
approach, which emphasizes the economic motives behind an acquisition. It 
discusses the various sources of synergies that can be derived when a company takes 
over another; these synergies contribute (or are supposed to) towards attaining the 
goal of profit maximization and shareholders’ wealth maximization. Several sources 
of synergies were identified, such as revenue-based synergies, cost-based synergies, 
tax-based synergies, and cost-of-capital-based synergies. This thesis shall examine 
whether revenue-based synergies contribute to post-acquisition performance.   
Also, this chapter discussed the Resource Based View (RBV) Theory, which stresses 
the importance of the quantity and quality of resources that a firm controls, in order 
to gain a competitive advantage over its competitors. A company has a competitive 
advantage over its competitors when its profitability (i.e. measured by the return on 
invested capital) is greater than the industry’s profitability (Hill and Jones, 2004: 76).  
Once resources of a target firm have been acquired, they can then be either 
redeployed or divested. Thus, issues related to resource redeployment and revenue 
enhancement were discussed, along with the role of asset divestiture in cost savings. 
This is viewed in line with cost efficiency theories that emphasise the role of cost-
based synergies. Since asset divestiture resource redeployment may not be solely 
related to cost savings and increased revenues, respectively, the cross effects of asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment were also considered. Also, the assumptions 
of the RBV along with its limitations as a theory were described.  
So, according to the RBV, the thesis will examine whether acquiring another firm 
and making better use of the acquirer’s or the target’s resources contribute to positive 
post-acquisition performance.  
Issues related to the evaluation and ways of measuring post-acquisition performance 
were put forward, which were broken down to three different kind of measures, 
namely: market-based measures, accounting-based measures and subjective 
measures.  
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Based on market measures of assessing post-acquisition performance a large number 
of studies (in the recent past) have documented consistent gains for target firms and 
no-significant gains for the bidders (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). This pattern was 
also confirmed in most recent studies. This thesis uses the subjective-based measures 
to assess the post-acquisition performance. 
Finally the last section of this chapter presented empirical evidence of the various 
methods of measuring post acquisition performance, other studies on whether 
corporate takeovers are beneficial, and if so how these benefits are distributed 
between the parties involved. Most studies agree that acquisitions do not increase the 
wealth of the target’s shareholders.  
One needs to note that an important factor leading many M&A deals into failure is 
the lack of proper integration of the merged firms corporate culture (Stahl and Voigt, 
2008) 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, looks into the propositions and hypotheses that are 
pertinent to this thesis.  
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3. Propositions and Hypotheses 
3.1. Introduction 
In this Chapter the research hypotheses of the thesis are presented. Figure 3.1 shows 
the theoretical model upon which the study will be based. The model has been 
derived from the work undertaken from Capron (1999) as well as by subsequent 
reviewers and authors (Capron et al., 1998; Capron and Hulland, 1999; Capron et al., 
2001; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Maksimovic et al., 2011). 
Specifically, the thesis examines the effect of the post-acquisition measures taken by 
the management of the acquiring firm, in terms of resource redeployment and asset 
divestiture, on the post-acquisition, long-run, performance of the merged firms. In 
the process, it is assumed that the effect of asset divestiture and resource 
redeployment is transmitted to post-acquisition performance through the two 
mediating variables of cost savings and revenue enhancing capabilities.  
Cost-efficiency theories focus on cost savings resulting from an acquisition. In turn, 
these cost savings are achieved through asset divestiture. According to Capron et al. 
(2001), asset divestiture “is the partial or complete sale or disposal of physical and 
organizational assets, shut down of facilities and reduction of work forces of target 
and acquirer businesses.” So asset divestiture may refer to the extent to which 
merging firms eliminate their physical assets, dispose of inefficient management (and 
management practices) and cut back their personnel in different areas, such as R&D, 
manufacturing, logistics, sales networks, and administrative services.  
In turn, selling excess physical assets, laying off employees, and shutting down 
excess facilities may lead the (merged) firm to sell and produce goods more 
efficiently (Anand and Singh 1997; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Krishnan et al., 
2007), and this improved efficiency, in turn, is translated into cost savings 
(Maksimovic et al., 2011). Note, that improved efficiency essentially implies a better 
allocation of resources, mostly getting rid of inefficient resources.  
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Figure 3.1: The Theoretical Model of the Study Conceptual Framework 
Source: Adopted from Capron (1999) and Capron et al., 2001 
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Alternatively, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (see Section 2-2) 
emphasizes the role of proper resource use, and resource redeployment, in providing 
the firm with a comparative advantage and hence boosts the revenues of the merged 
firm. Resource redeployment refers to “the extent to which a target or an acquiring 
firm uses the other firm's resources,” such as R&D capabilities, manufacturing know-
how, marketing resources, supplier relationships, and distribution expertise (Capron, 
1999, Gary 2005). Note, that resource redeployment can enhance revenue, either by 
increasing market coverage (through geographical extension of the market and 
product line expansion) or by improving innovation capabilities (through design 
cycle and R&D capabilities) (Capron, 1999). 
Aside from the direct effects on the mediating variables (Section 3.2), asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment can have indirect, or cross effects on cost 
savings and revenue enhancement capabilities (Section 3.3). For instance, asset 
divestiture usually refers to changes in organisational, technological or marketing 
resources to generate and sell larger volumes of goods more effectively (Capron, 
1999; Capron et al., 2001). Hence, asset divestiture can be linked to revenue 
enhancement as well. In addition, the process of redeploying resources usually 
generates redundancies and divergences with current resources. The firm then is 
likely to sell extra physical assets, shut extra facilities, and lay off spare employees. 
Thus, resource redeployment may be linked to cost-savings (Capron, 1999; Capron et 
al., 2001).  
Further, the thesis examines how the aforementioned direct and indirect effects of 
asset divestiture and resource redeployment are modified in the presence of certain 
control variables (Section 3.3).  
Finally, as it was discussed in Chapter 2 – section 2.8.2 – and by following Homburg 
and Bucerius (2006), the acquisition’s long-term performance (which is what asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment are supposed to affect) is measured by self-
reported measures of changes in market shares, sales, intrinsic profitability, and 
relative (to the industry’s) corporate profitability. Other measures of assessing long-
term performance include market measures, such as expected returns and realized 
returns (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006), and accounting measures (Zollo and Singh, 
2004). 
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3.2. The Direct Effects of Asset Divestiture and Resource Redeployment 
In Chapter 2 it was discussed that operating synergies are the most significant source 
of gains in an acquisition. Furthermore, it was argued that operating synergies stem 
from revenue-based synergies and cost-based synergies. Cost savings as a source of 
operating synergies consists of economies of scale and scope and asset divestiture. 
Also, revenue-based synergies comprise increased market coverage and innovation 
capability which both can be achieved in an acquisition through resource 
redeployment. In this Section, the creation of synergies through the effects of asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment on the post-acquisition performance of the 
merged firm is discussed.  
3.2.1. Asset Divestiture and Cost Savings (Cost-Based Synergies) 
Capron (1999) argued that in order for economies of scale and scope to be exploited 
in an acquisition process, generally it can happen so through asset divestiture. More 
specifically according to Scherer and Ross (1990), this divestiture would be possible 
without the need for an acquisition to take place, with the condition that the markets 
were efficient enough to regulate businesses into having their assets specialized. In 
particular, they argued that assets should be focussed in one or several activities 
according to their individual efficiency and have them produce competent plant 
investment, specialization or closure choices. 
Additionally, acquisition literature regards asset divestitures as a failure of 
management to reap value from the transaction (Capron, et al., 2001 Haleblian et al., 
2009). According to Haleblian et al., (2009), this viewpoint disregards the presence 
of information asymmetries amongst managers and the market gives minor 
significance to any restructuring. Therefore, they suggest that there are potential 
benefits in investigating under what conditions firms can obtain valuable resources 
from acquisitions even if target assets are subsequently divested.  
In an early study by Weston (1994) it was found that about 35% to 45% of all 
acquisition activities that took place during the period of 1980 to 1990 were 
divestitures of acquired entities by other businesses. Following an acquisition, a 
rigorous restructuring starts taking place that involves (among other things) a 
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significant number of sell-offs and closures of the target’s assets (Maksimovic et al., 
2011).  
In a study conducted by Krishnan, Hitt and Park (2007), using a sample of 174 
related acquisitions which were completed in the period 1992-1998, found firms 
implemented large reductions of their workforce and accompanied by asset 
divestiture did not experience any decline in post-acquisition performance. They also 
argued that the combined firm has to create adequate synergy to produce returns that 
exceed the premium paid to acquire firms and one way of achieving that is by 
reduction in the workforce in order to gain economies and reduce costs. 
According to Lee and Madhavan (2010), theories in management and finance are 
broadly unanimous in predicting that divestiture will lead to positive results. 
Specifically, the authors examined, in a meta-analysis comprising of 94 studies and 
650 effect sizes, conducted over the period 1980-2007, the effect of asset divestiture 
on corporate performance. The authors made use of six moderating variables and in 
their meta-analysis found that divestiture following M&As improves corporate 
performance. Specifically, the weighted average of effect sizes was found to be 11%.  
Furthermore, Maksimovic et al.,, (2011) conducted a study of post-acquisition 
restructuring in the U.S. for the period 1981-2000. They found that while firms tend 
to retain plants in which they have a comparative advantage and improve their 
productivity and they tend to close or dispose all other plants. They concluded that 
on average acquirers recognise that it is beneficial to enter into-post acquisition 
restructuring which results in an improved allocation of resources. 
In this thesis, as it can also be seen from Figure 3.1, value can be created in M&As 
by taking advantage cost-based synergies obtained through acquirer and target asset 
divestiture (Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 2001). Also, by following Haleblian et al., 
(2009) suggestion, asset divestiture can be viewed as an approach to effectively 
assess long-term acquisition performance and because, equally acquirers and targets 
can be subjected to asset divestiture the first set of hypotheses to be tested was 
formulated as follows: 
Following an acquisition 
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• Hypothesis H1a:, the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets improves the 
post-acquisition performance of the merging firms, through the 
achieved cost savings.  
 
• Hypothesis H1b:, the divestiture of the target’s assets improves the 
post-acquisition performance of the merged firms through the achieved 
cost savings.  
3.2.2. Resource Redeployment and Revenue-Enhancing Capabilities (Revenue-
based Synergies) 
As it was argued in Chapter 2 (section 2.6.1) according to the Resource-Based View 
(RBV) of the firm, the resources (tangible and intangible) that a company possesses 
can determine its corporate performance (Newbert, 2007). An acquisition gives the 
acquiring firm the opportunity to shift its own resources or to use the resources of the 
acquired firm in a way to increase the merged firm efficiency. Put differently, 
resource redeployment following an acquisition should, boost revenues. However, 
there are questions concerning the way the newly acquired resources from an 
acquisition are expected to affect corporate performance (Priem and Butler, 2001). 
Two ways of boosting revenues, through resource redeployment, involve (a) 
increased market coverage, and (b) enhanced innovation capability (see Fig. 3-1).  
It was discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.4) that one important motive for an 
acquisition has to do with entering a new market (Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999). 
But by entering a new market, a company increases its market coverage, provided 
the acquisition leads to geographic and product line expansion (Aaker, 1996; 
Srivastava et al., 1998). Expanding across geography enables businesses to sell their 
products to whole new markets and in this way to increase revenues. Further, if the 
merged business deals with the exploitation of the strong reputation of a merging 
business brand, sales network or marketing activities, then the extension of the 
product line can improve profits (Capron and Hulland, 1999).  
Firms, in order to successfully deploy resources so that they can differentiate at the 
product-market level, require marketing capabilities that assist them with conveying 
those benefits to customers (Vorhies et al, 2009). Srivastava et al., (2001), argue that 
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to implement a broad product-market strategy efficiently, high levels of marketing 
capabilities are needed. Thus improved marketing capabilities can increase customer 
value, which can be consecutively turned into premium prices (Capron et al., 1999; 
Barney, 1991; Srivastava et al., 1998; Vorhies et al., 2009).  
Moreover, as it was argued in Chapter 2 – section 2.3.1.1 - firms by strategically 
using innovation, can achieve competitive advantage (Hitt et al.,1998). It was also 
argued in (section 2.7.1) that an acquisition can take place simply for reasons of 
“learning” (Hamel, 1991; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003). In this way, a firm has 
the opportunity, through the process of organizational learning, to improve its 
innovation capabilities when (a) it is exposed (after a successful acquisition) to a new 
corporate culture (Hitt et al., 1996), and (b) makes use of the resources of the other 
firm. Innovation capabilities are further enhanced by technological learning, which 
one firm can acquire from another (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996). However, a 
critical consideration in technological learning has to do with the size of the 
knowledge bases of the two merging firms (Ahuja and Katila, 2001). Also, as it was 
discussed in depth in Chapter 2, international diversification is positively related to 
innovation (Hitt, et al., 1994) and improved innovation capability can result into 
premium prices charged and/or increased sales volume and therefore to higher profits 
(Capron, 1999).  
Despite the evidence in favour of using resources as a way to enhance corporate 
performance, the exact process that links the control of resources and superior 
corporate performance requires further examination (Sirmon et al., 2007; Ndofor et 
al 2011). It is likely that the firm’s actions (other than those of related to selection 
and use of resources) interfere with the final outcome (i.e. with corporate 
performance). Actually, few of the studies included in the meta-analysis of Crook et 
al., (2008) looked into the exact process that translates control of superior resources 
into profitable performance.  
Resource redeployment can be achieved without an acquisition provided that the 
market for resources allows the participating firms to exchange their resources 
(Capron, 1999; Capron and Hulland, 1999). However, because of the presence of 
numerous imperfections, such as immobility, information asymmetries and 
associated moral hazards, causal ambiguity and monopoly, the acquisition can be 
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considered the most “efficient” of acquiring productive resources (Williamson, 1975; 
Wan, et al., 2011). Therefore, because of the market failure one can justify the use of 
M&A activity in order to achieve the goal of resource redeployment. At any rate, the 
second set of hypotheses that will be tested are the following:  
Following an acquisition, 
• Hypothesis H2a: the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the target 
improves the long-term performance of the merging firms through improved 
revenue-enhancing capabilities. 
• Hypothesis H2b:, the redeployment of the target’s resources to the acquirer 
improves the long-term performance of the merging firms through improved 
revenue-enhancing capabilities. 
3.2.3. Testing for Asymmetries between the Target and the Acquirer 
Since post-acquisition resource redeployment and asset divestiture are employed in 
order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the merged firm, it is rational 
to assume that the post-acquisition decisions should be jointly taken by the 
management of the merging firms (Chung et al, 2000).  
However empirical evidence suggests that post-acquisition decisions will depend on 
the relevant position of the merging firms (Song et al, 2005), with acquiring firms 
having the “upper hand” in the decision-making process. Indeed, numerous studies 
have shown that acquiring firms tend to dominate the process of decision making 
(Pablo, 1994; Vaara, 2003; Birkinshaw et al, 2000). So, the process of post-
acquisition decision making cannot be viewed as a joint decision-making process 
between the managers of the two merging firms.  
This domination, observed in the majority of M&A deals involving firms with 
related businesses activities, translates into the acquiring firm’s managers reducing 
inefficiencies, not in their own firm but, in the target company (Walsh, 1988; 
Hambrick and Canella, 1993; Birkinshaw et al, 2000). Further, the acquiring firm’s 
management team will frequently impose on the target the former’s management 
style (Chatterjee et al, 1992; Hambrick and Canella, 1993).  
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All the preceding discussion concerning the differential power of the bidder to the 
target in the decision making process, also applies on the decision of redeploying 
resources. The acquirer seldom chooses to utilise its idle resources in the target and 
by doing so to eradicate its own resources. Therefore, in that process of selling off or 
eliminating the target’s resources, acquiring firms tend to make choices that can have 
a negative effect on the competencies of the acquired firm, having as a result the 
target’s ability to supply the acquiring firms with valuable resources (Ravenscraft 
and Scherer, 1987). 
Based on the previous discussion, it is expected to find evidence indicating a 
differential impact (between the target and the acquiring firm) of post-acquisition 
actions (such as asset divestiture and resource redeployment) on post-acquisition 
behaviour (Capron 1999; Capron et al., 2001) Hence the third set of hypotheses has 
as follows 
Following an acquisition, 
• Hypothesis H3a: the divestiture of the target’s assets has a lower impact on 
cost savings than the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets. 
• Hypothesis H3b: the redeployment of the target’s resources to the acquirer 
has a lower impact on revenue-enhancing capabilities.  
 
3.3. The Indirect Effects of Asset Divestiture and Resource Redeployment 
It was argued in Chapter 2 by using arguments inherent in the dynamic capabilities 
sustaining long-term competitive advantage lies in the recombination of assets and 
resources, which is resource reconfiguration (Abrosini and Bowman, 2009). 
Therefore, in acquisitions asset divestiture and resource redeployment can be viewed 
as parts of a shared process of reconfiguration of the target and the acquirer 
(Burgelman 1994; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Capron, 1999) 
Essentially, the set of research hypotheses H1 and H2 tests whether an acquisition 
can develop into a vehicle for acquiring (though resource redeployment) or selling 
bundles of resources (through asset divestiture) in highly imperfect resource markets, 
mainly for reasons either of control or knowledge (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; 
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Capron, et al., 1998). These resources are mainly non-marketable (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
and intangible in nature, such as intellectual property, know-how, and reputation; it 
is these resources that give the company a sustainable comparative advantage (Hall, 
1993).   
But acquiring new resources is one thing and another is to exploit their potential.  
Indeed, Arikan (2002) showed that firms that acquired valuable intangible assets, on 
average did not fare well in the long-run, compared with bidders that acquired 
valuable tangible assets.  Further, there is evidence to suggest that the value of some 
intangible assets can only be tapped if these resources are combined with other assets 
(Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). 
In a study conducted by VanBeers and Sadowski (2003), a dataset of 2381 firms was 
utilised, that originated from the Dutch community Innovation survey for the period 
1994-1996. Their results indicated that divestiture positively affects the probability to 
innovate when those innovations are “new to the firm”. They argued that in both the 
manufacturing and the services industry a positive correlation exists between 
acquisitions and divestiture. Also, they suggested that acquisitions and in particular 
divestitures should be considered as part of corporate restructuring efforts towards 
innovation. 
Asset divestiture can stimulate or deter a company’s development (McKinley, 1993). 
One the one hand, downsizing enable firms to reduce unnecessary resources, thus 
allowing for a more productive resource allocation (Jensen, 1986). On the other 
hand, asset divestiture might lead to reduced innovation (Dougherty and Bowman, 
1995; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) and hence reduced revenue potential. Also, after a 
divestiture, due to the manager’s being more conservative, this can be the result of 
job security concerns, may result to less internal innovation of the firm (Hitt et al., 
1996). Other potential drawbacks associated with downsizing involve stunting risk 
taking (Staw et al., 1981), and violating employee trust (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988). Hence, the fourth set of hypotheses has as follows:  
Following an acquisition, 
• Hypothesis 4a: the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets has an effect on 
revenue enhancing capabilities (H4a). 
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• Hypothesis 4b: the divestiture of the target’s assets has an effect on revenue 
enhancing capabilities (H4b). 
 
Next, the potential indirect effects of resource redeployment were considered. The 
question whether resource redeployment increases or decreases operating costs 
remains a controversial one (Capron 1999). On the one hand, resource redeployment 
can increase costs, as the merging firms need additional resources, as their customer 
has expanded.  
On the other hand, the exploitation of resource redeployment (through an M&A 
activity) may lead to improvements in cost efficiency (Teece, 1982, Panzar and 
Willig, 1981). For instance, if in the wake of an acquisition certain factors of 
production could be easily accessed (by the bidding firm) and be used in order to 
increase production efficiency, the operating production costs of the merged firm 
will decline.  In all, cost savings arising from resource redeployment constitute a 
“dynamic” source of efficiency, contrary to the more static one due to economies of 
scale (Capron et al., 1999). Hence, the hypotheses have as follows: 
Following an acquisition, 
• Hypothesis 5a: the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the target 
has an effect on cost savings.  
• Hypothesis 5b: the redeployment of the target’s resources to the acquirer 
has an effect on cost savings. 
 
3.4. Control Variables 
Kunc and Morecroft (2010) argued that lack of an explanation in the decision-
making processes in order to develop resources makes it hard to identify the origins 
of heterogeneity in firm performance and for practitioners to employ resource-based 
strategies. Therefore, by following the analysis of the various theories that concern 
and constitute the model and because of the nature of the dataset that is used, 
controls for other sources of possible heterogeneity are included. Those controls 
include payment method, target and bidder relative size, acquisition classification, 
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relatedness, diversification, organisational changes and redundancies of senior 
executives. Each control variable is looked into detail in the following sections. 
3.4.1. Payment Method 
Consistent evidence has shown that cash-financed M&As are associated with better 
performance in both the short run and the long run (Cosh and Guest 2001; Linn and 
Switzer 2001; Loughran and Vijh 1997). The reasoning behind that might be that 
acquirers decide on the method of payment according to their expectations for higher 
or lower performance in the forthcoming period. Therefore the method of payment 
will be cash if the acquirers believe their shares are undervalued and equity if they 
consider their shares as overvalued   
Also, cash payments may provide an indication to the market that the management of 
the acquiring firm anticipates an increase in the value of the firm over the post-
acquisition period (Myers and Maijluf, 1984).  
Mitchell et al., (2004) in their work stated that business deals paid with equity will 
have as an outcome the break-up of the share price as the volume of outstanding 
shares raises, at the same time as the value of the firm stays the same until the 
anticipated synergies come into effect. One of the few studies which state positively 
significant announcement profits from equity transactions is the one by Chatterjee 
and Kuenzi (2001). They found that takeovers which took place between their study 
period (1990 - 1999) were dictated by bids for high technology firm. In addition they 
argued that in cases where equity payments occurred, they served as an incentive 
instead of a valuation indication to the market.  
Furthernore, evidence reported from a sample of 179 successful British bids from 
Antoniou and Zao (2004), showed that equity bids have a tendency to under achieve 
considerably in the first and second years after the bid took place. Also there were no 
substantial abnormal returns for a combination of shares and cash and cash-only bids. 
Another view to the matter is taken by Moeller et al,. (2004), where they take into 
consideration the effect of size when evaluating the announcement effect of equity 
and cash bids. If large acquirers of public targets are paid with cash lose -0.75%, 
where as if they are paid with equity they lose -2.45%. The same holds for small 
acquirers, as there is a gain of 2.84% if they pay cash but if they pay with shares they 
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lose -0.42%. Bids funded with any method of payment except cash, lose -0.47% over 
a period of 36 months after the announcement (Conn et al., 2005). Bids therefore 
funded with cash, experience trivial losses.  
• Hypothesis H6:  In general, the existing evidence in the literature suggests 
that payment method in any form, (i.e. cash, equity) affects the relationship 
of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-
acquisition performance. 
3.4.2. Target and Bidder Relative Size 
The performance of acquisitions could also be affected by the size characteristics of 
the target and the bidder firms. A number of reasons that might result in enhanced 
post-acquisition performance by acquiring larger targets have been put forward by 
researchers. First of all according to Bruner (2002), the economic effect of buying 
larger targets is likely to have a greater effect on the post-acquisitions bid 
performance of the merged firm. Secondly as indicated by Roll (1986) larger targets 
are trickier to be incorporated into a combined merged organization, so the number 
of prospective buyers is anticipated to be smaller. Therefore acquirers might end up 
being able to buy these large targets on more beneficial terms. Finally, dissimilarities 
that exist in studies analysing the effect of size are present, due to the various levels 
of carefulness implemented by smaller bidders in the acquisition procedure (Moeller 
et al., 2004).  
Furthermore, Franks et al., (1991) constructed a sub-sample in relation to relative 
acquirer and target size and concluded that post- acquisition performance is 
considerably higher for bidding firms that acquire large targets.  
O’ Sullivan and Wong (1998) along with Powell (1997), further confuse the matter 
by stating that hostile acquisitions have a substantial larger capitalization instead of 
friendly targets. In these circumstances hostility may also to a certain extent explain 
the relative size effect found in the literature. Following Capron (1999) and Seth 
(1990b) there is an expectation that the relative size of acquirers and target favours 
the exploitation of operational synergies. 
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• Hypothesis H7: The relative size of the target and the acquirer affects the 
relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities 
with post-acquisition performance. 
3.4.3. Acquisition Classification 
As it was argued in Chapter 2 – section 2.2.2 - acquisitions are usually classified as 
being hostile of friendly. In friendly takeovers, the board of an acquiring firm has 
agreed to commend the approval of the bid to the shareholders. On the other hand 
when the situation is different, the commendation never happens in the first place, 
hostile bids arise.  
Earlier studies on takeovers (Jensen 1988; Weisbach 1993) and then later in 
O’Sullivan and Wong (2005), suggested that managerial hostility (on the part of the 
target firm) toward an acquisition deal was likely to be motivated by managerial self-
interest. In particular, it was suggested that managers resisting a bid were those who 
had underperformed in the past, and they were more likely to be replaced following a 
successful bid (Jensen, 1993; Manne, 1965). As a result, hostile takeovers were 
viewed as disciplinary device for target companies, whose top management had 
failed to achieve adequately the standard shareholder objectives (Tuch and Sullivan, 
2007). Moreover, it seems that the relevance of hostile bids has decreased over time, 
as friendly acquisitions tend to be greater in number. In a study conducted by 
Andrade et al. (2001) on a total of 4,300 US acquisitions that took place in the period 
1973-1998, it was found that hostile bids at any point fell from 14.3% of all cases in 
1980-1989 to just 4% in the period 1990-1998. 
Using the analysis in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2) different acquisition classifications 
will affect post-acquisition performance, thus acquisition classification was 
examined as a control variable. 
 
• Hypothesis H8: Different classifications of acquisitions affect the relationship 
of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-
acquisition performance. 
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3.4.4. Relatedness and diversification  
Prospective synergies between acquirer and target are a great incentive for 
acquisition activity, because they could eventually make available positive gains for 
shareholders.  
In the case of acquisitions with dissimilar business activities it is more difficult for 
synergies to be detected. Singh and Montgomery (1987) state in their study that 
related acquisitions cater for larger economies of scale and scope, whereas unrelated 
ones are prone to end up with financial and administrative synergies. It is 
complicated to evaluate the performance of managers in diversified business 
structures. Studies can be found for both the short-run and the long-run. Earnings 
according to Morck et al., (1990) tended to be higher for the period of 1980s than 
that of 1970s for related acquisitions. Their results provide weak support that 
diversifying acquisitions were considered to be more suitable during the 1970s. 
Furthermore, Seth (1990b) argued that the possible synergistic gains are greater in 
large related acquisitions than in large unrelated ones. In addition congruent lines of 
business that exist within a firm have the ability to generate competitive advantage 
by allowing resource sharing (D’Aveni et al., 2004). Therefore, opportunities for cost 
savings can be achieved through divestiture of redundant assets, as the degree of 
relatedness increases and from redeploying resources into new areas that can be more 
productive and potentially combining them with new resources (Capron et al., 1998; 
Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980, 1982). 
Recent studies, dispute the idea that the performance effects of diversifying 
acquisitions are of such significance. The reason is that in earlier studies some 
support for a positive effect on wealth creation is found, through a better strategic fit 
between the target and the acquirer.  
Additionally, Markides (1992, 1995) suggested that firm’s benefit of diversification 
tend to decrease as they diversify further away from their core businesses. Pehrsson 
(2006) argued that a great degree of relatedness among firms has a negative 
performance. Firm’s diversification beyond their optimal level according to Lee and 
Madhavan (2010) can be due to two reasons; first, managers pursue their own 
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interest and second, decrease of optimization level of diversification due to loss of 
control and information and market volatilities. 
Moreover, in line with D’ Aveni, Ravenscraft and Anderson (2004) reasoning, this 
thesis considers that sources of synergy that can create competitive advantage does 
not only stem from economies of scope  but also from the same lines of business and 
congruent resources of the firms.  Therefore two propositions can be formulated: 
• Hypothesis H9: Different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer and 
the target affect the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. 
• Hypothesis H10: Different degrees of diversification affect the relationship 
of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-
acquisition performance. 
3.4.5. Organisational Changes 
As it was argued in Section 2.5.1, one of the key elements in enhancing post-
acquisition performance of the acquirer is the top management team (TMT) of the 
target. According to the literature, the importance of the TMT stems from the 
possession of critical knowledge to the firms’ current operations. As such, the 
removal of TMT managers can increase the level of disruption and ambiguity in the 
firm after the acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan et al., 1997; 
Singh and Zollo, 1998). Organisational changes, such as in the composition of the 
acquired firm’s TMT, can have a negative impact on post-acquisition performance of 
the firm (Kiessling et al., 2008). Cannella and Hambrick (1993) argue that losing 
members from the TMT from the target will have a negative effect on the post-
acquisition performance of the acquirer. 
This thesis considers five types of organisational changes. These are a) post-
acquisition organisational network changes, b) post-acquisition organisational 
knowledge changes, c) retention of the acquired firm’s management team, d) formal 
organisational changes and, e) redundancy of senior executives. 
According to Achrol, (1997), interpersonal networks of the managers’ add value. In 
addition, Kiessling et al., (2008) argued that successful companies have embedded 
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external and internal relationships of the management’s network and signify a major 
contribution of sustained firm success. Undeniably, according to (Hakansson and 
Johansson, 1993) the multifaceted and flexible configuration of firms represent a 
network and personal interrelationships add value to the business. These interaction, 
are managed by the TMT by selecting suitable partners and looking after the 
relationships (Kiessling et al., 2008). 
Several authors dispute that knowledge and the capabilities that rely on it are 
considered as the key factor in establishing a firm’s current and future value 
(Drucker, 1993; Grant, 1996; Hamel, 2000; Thurow, 1996). According to Grant, 
(1996) and Kiessling et al., (2008), knowledge has become known as one of the 
major strategic resources of the firm. Therefore, the TMT has implicit knowledge 
with regards to strategy, industry and the strengths and weaknesses of the firm. 
Furthermore in management literature the significance of the TMT of the target and 
its effect on performance has been well documented (Fiol, 1991; Kiessling et al., 
2008; Lado and Wilson, 1994; Lee & Miller, 1999; Volberda, 1996). According to 
several studies the differentiation in culture and management approaches can have a 
major negative impact on acquisition performance (Buono, et al., 1985; Chatterjee, et 
al., 1992; Datta, 1991; Sales and Mirvis, 1984). In addition, differences in corporate 
cultures frequently result in distress and hostility during the post-acquisition phase 
and in particular when monitoring mechanisms are imposed by the acquirer 
(Kiessling  et al., 2008). In a study by Datta (1991) it was shown that differences in 
top management approaches have a negative impact on performance in both high and 
low levels of post-acquisition integration. 
Therefore, given that organisational changes can have different effects on post-
acquisition performance:  
• Hypothesis H11: Organisational changes affects the relationship of cost based 
synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance. 
3.4.6. Redundancies of Senior Executives 
It was argued, that losing members of the management team from a target will lower 
post-acquisition performance. According to Kiessling et al., (2008) comprehending 
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the reasons of how the disruption of the TMT with redundancies seem to hurt the 
development of new objectives and affect the target performance in the future. In 
addition, Grant, (1996) by borrowing from the knowledge-based theory argues that 
the management team builds up rules and directives to assist knowledge integration. 
Also, employees maintain knowledge assets that are not readily transferable. The 
redundancies of the target’s executives have a negative effect on post-acquisition 
performance (Hambrick and Cannella, 1993). Therefore, it is disputed that the larger 
the number of redundancies of the management team the less effective the TMT will 
perform.  
• Hypothesis H12: Changes in the number of senior executives made redundant 
affects the relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement 
capabilities with post-acquisition performance. 
3.5. Summary 
In this Chapter the research hypotheses of the thesis were presented. Fig. 3-2 depicts 
the theoretical model upon which the study was based along with the all the research 
hypotheses that shall be tested. Essentially, this chapter presented the hypotheses that 
were formulated in order to examine the effect of post-acquisition behaviour 
(adopted by the management of the acquiring firm), in terms of resource 
redeployment and asset divestiture, on the post-acquisition (long-run) performance of 
the merged firms. In the process, it is assumed that the effect of asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment is transmitted to post-acquisition performance through the 
two mediating variables of cost savings and revenue enhancing capabilities along 
with seven control variables (payment method, relative size, acquisition type and 
classification, relatedness and diversification, organisational change and number of 
executives made redundant). 
In the next Chapter, issues relating to the design of the study and the data collection 
process were looked into, issues related to the research design, and the design for the 
data collection process. Finally, in the next chapter the sampling methods for 
obtaining the sampled data, and the methods of analysis used to analyse the collected 
data are discussed. 
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Figure 3.2: The Theoretical Model of the Study Hypothesised Framework 
Source: Adopted from Capron (1999) and Capron et al., 2001 
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All of the previous hypotheses are summarised in Table 3.1 which presents all of the 
hypotheses concerning the latent variables (H1 to H5) along with the control 
variables of the study (H6 to H12). 
Hypothesis Description 
H1a Following an acquisition the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets improves the post-acquisition performance through cost savings 
H1b Following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets improves the post-acquisition performance through cost savings 
H2a 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the 
target  improves the post-acquisition performance through revenue-enhancing 
capabilities 
H2b 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s resources to the 
acquirer  improves the post-acquisition performance through revenue-
enhancing capabilities 
H3a Following an acquisition, the divestiture of the target’s assets has a lower impact on cost savings than the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets 
H3b Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s resources to the 
acquirer has a lower impact on revenue-enhancing capabilities 
H4a Following an acquisition the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets has an effect 
on revenue enhancing capabilities 
H4b Following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets has an effect on 
revenue enhancing capabilities 
H5a Following an acquisition, the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the target has an effect on cost savings 
H5b Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s resources to the 
acquirer has an effect on cost savings 
H6 Payment method affects the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance 
H7 
The relative size of the target and the acquirer affects the relationship of cost 
based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance 
H8 
Different classifications of acquisitions affect the relationship of cost based 
synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance. 
H9 
Different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer and the target affect the 
relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities 
with post-acquisition performance 
H10 
Different degrees of diversification affect the relationship of cost based 
synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance 
H11 Organisational changes affects the relationship of cost based synergies and 
resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance 
H12 
Changes in the number of senior executives made redundant affect the 
relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities 
with post-acquisition performance 
Table 3.1: The Research Hypotheses of the Study 
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4. Empirical Approach: Research Design and Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the research model along with its associated variables 
and constructs as well as a number of propositions and hypotheses. Chapter 3 
focused on the methodology and the empirical approach used in the study which set 
the foundations for the research and methodology necessary to examine the 
conceptual model of the thesis. This chapter addresses issues relating to the research 
design of the study and the data collection process. Specifically, section 4.2 presents 
topics regarding the theoretical foundations of business research. Section 4.3, 
reviews and presents survey methods, research design approaches, scales and data 
sources commonly employed by the literature. Section 4.4 presents the web survey 
process and methods for obtaining the data. Section 4.5 discusses the creation of the 
thesis’ questionnaire with its pre-testing stages, the sampling frame and statistics 
regarding the response rate.  Finally, section 4.6 discusses the methods of analysis 
used for the data, along with the methodological framework adopted for the purposes 
of the statistical analysis. 
4.2. Theoretical Foundations of Business Research  
This section considers a number of philosophical issues pertinent to research projects 
in social science and, more particularly in the field of business and management. 
Therefore, subjects relating to epistemology, scientific theories and their creation, 
will be examined, along with a short introduction on the notion of constructs and 
variables and their associations in research models. 
Given that the process of undertaking a research project involves exploring 
something novel, or aims to confirm or refute something old (either natural or 
social), subsequent concepts and construct are needed that can explain the event 
being surveyed. Several approaches for classifying research with the most direct 
being the dichotomy of empirical versus theoretical (Miller and Tsang, 2010) 
Empirical research is based on observations or experiments, while, on the contrary, 
theoretical research can be described as an intellectual interpretation of constructs 
and their relationships. Despite the fact that purely theoretical or empirical research 
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approaches are rather rare, the former is the prevailing approach in the business field. 
At this point, it should be pointed out that there is no data collection exercise 
(empiricism) without a corresponding theoretical framework. As such, the 
classification of research into the approaches mentioned above – empirical and/or 
theoretical – mainly based upon the perspective that the researcher is taking to 
analyse the social phenomena. 
Even though the aim of this thesis in not to discuss in detail what Philosophy is, it is 
important to point that different positions in the philosophy of science can be 
classified with respect of how the deal with questions of meaning (ontology) and 
knowledge (epistemology) (Kilduff et al., 2011).  Ontology, according to Corbetta 
(2003) is the part of philosophy that studies the essence of being; its roots derive 
from two Greek words “ontos” (to be, being) and “logos” (account or theory). 
The definition of epistemology derives from the two Greek words “episteme” 
(science or knowledge) and “logos” (account or theory). According to Kilduff et al 
(2011 pp.299) epistemology concerns how one gains access to knowledge and the 
relationship between knowledge and truth. 
According to Miller and Tsang, (2010), the most important philosophies of science in 
management studies that a researcher can employ are the critical realism, positivism, 
constructivism, interpretivism and pragmatism.  
Critical realism is considered as an expanding advancement altering the intellectual 
scene (Fleetwood, 1999; Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Critical realism is based according 
to Tsang and Kwan (1999) on three assertions. Firstly, instead of empirical events, 
the reality that scientific theories principally aim to represent is the structure and 
mechanisms of the world. In this instance, structures are defined as groups of 
internally related objects and instruments as means of acting (Sayer, 1992). At the 
same time, objects are internally connected to a structure in a way that their identity 
lays upon their relationship with other components of the structure (Tsang and Kwan, 
1999). Secondly, the principal structures and mechanisms are only liable to occur, in 
relation to observable empirical events, but not with certainty. Thirdly, even though, 
scientific knowledge of reality can be unpredictable, there is still a possibility of 
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acquiring such knowledge via creative construction and critical testing of theories 
(Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
Positivism, according to Corbetta (Corbetta 2003, pp.13) is:  
“the study of social reality employing the conceptual framework, the 
techniques of observation and measurement, the instruments of mathematical 
analysis and the procedures of inference of the natural sciences”. 
Also, positivism can be viewed as the pursuit of regularities and causal relationships 
between basic components and that is usually realised through the methodological 
procedures of quantitative data collection and statistical analysis (Shah and Corley, 
2006). It is argued, that the only way for social science to be able to reach the 
accomplishments of natural science in explanation, prediction and control is by 
enforcing the methods of natural science (Lee, 1991). In the positivistic paradigm, 
criteria of validity and reliability are employed ‘to measure the extent to which our 
theories and instruments correspond to objective reality’ (Sandberg, 2005, p. 43). 
Constructivism is considered as a school of philosophical thought disputing that 
research is essentially theory-dependent (Mir and Watson, 2000). The theoretical 
view that is considered by researchers as it is argued by constructivists directs their 
basic position but at the same time predetermines  what is being interpreted as a 
research problem, what theoretical procedures are utilised and what creates 
observation and evidence (Boyd, 1991, pp.202). Constructivism, therefore questions 
the notion that research is performed by impartial detached, value-neutral subjects, 
that pursue to uncover clear distinct objects or phenomena (Mir and Watson, 2000). 
Constructivism, according to Mir and Watson (2000), does not question the presence 
of phenomena, it questions however the researchers ability to comprehend them 
without a specific theory of knowledge. 
Interpretivism refers to a school of thought that believes that people, and the 
physical and social artefacts they generate, are in effect dissimilar from the physical 
reality investigated by natural science (Lee, 1991). In intrepretivism the objective of 
theory building is to create descriptions, perceptions and explanations of events so 
that the system of interpretations and meaning and the methods of organizing and 
structuring are revealed (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). In addition, using the interpretive 
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paradigm researchers, try to represent phenomena with as less a priori ideas as 
feasible (Gioia and Pitre 1990). As in the positivistic paradigm, for interpretive 
approaches criteria for validity and reliability exist even if they are different, 
however their recognition and status are nowhere near the prestigious position held 
in the positivist research (Heil and Whittaker, 2007) 
Pragmatism’s interpretation according to Wick and Freeman, (1998), lies in accord 
with the anti-positivists, that it rejects the privileged status of science. Even, though 
that science is very useful and powerful, is viewed as only one more technique for 
dealing with the world (Wicks and Freeman, 1998). According to Powell’s (2002) 
meaning of the pragmatist theory: 
“if a strategy proposition stimulates results on the dimensions we value, then 
we make it our own” (Powell, 2002, pp.879).  
Constructing theory is viewed as an on-going pragmatic process of “puzzling out” 
and of resolving problems that utilises ways of understanding what the phenomenon 
“is a case of” (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012; Winship 2006). 
Following the analysis of the philosophical paradigms in management science, it is 
clear that each one has different virtues and vices. However, deciding and laying 
down the ground of the epistemological paradigm of the thesis is vital because it 
embodies the philosophical basis of knowledge that the researcher is pursuing, so 
that the research questions can be answered. Given this thesis empirical and 
ontological framework, this thesis is based on principles of positivism since it seeks 
to test a number of relationships among the principal constructs. In addition, because 
of the M&As are considered external realities that exist in the world and these 
realities are considered as the drivers to examine this phenomenon the primary 
ontological assumption of the study is critical realism. 
Considering the above, it is crucial to analyse the importance of theory generation, 
growth and development; the latter being the main exercise of the following section. 
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4.2.1. Matter of Science, Theory, and Theory Development  
 
Prior to analysing the various theory building research approaches usually applied in 
management and human resources development, an effort should be made to provide 
working definitions of the key terms and concepts that are pertinent to these 
approaches. 
4.2.1.1. Definitions of Theory and its concepts 
 
For the purposes of the current discussion the thesis opts for the definition offered by 
Shapira (2011, pp.1313), namely: 
“theory is commonly defined as an analytic structure or system that attempts to 
explain a particular set of empirical phenomena” 
This definition mirrors the etymology of the word from the Greek “thea” (view) and 
“oros” (seeing). From Dubin’s (1976) perspective, theory building in applied fields is 
usually conducted in a deductive manner. According to Dubin, a theory’s origin must 
start with the real world (“observation and description of the real world are the 
essential points of origin for theories in applied areas”) and continue with a theory-
to-research, or “theory-then-research” (Reynolds, 1971) strategy for theory 
development and verification.  
Also, Dubin (1978) argued that it is a necessity for theorists and practitioners to have 
a positive working association in order to develop and exercise the theory since they 
have different perspectives. For theoreticians the main area of concern is to make 
sense of the unknown, while practitioners need to provide a solution to the problem 
Storberg-Walker (2003).  
Whetten (1989) has proposed an alternative representation for the theory 
development side.  Specifically, a complete theory must comprise four essential 
elements: 
1. What, i.e. which factors (variables, constructs, concepts) logically should be 
considered as part of the explanation of the phenomena of interest. The 
factors should meet two criteria: comprehensiveness and parsimony.  
87 
 
2. How. Having identified a set of factors, the researcher’s next question is, how 
they are related. Such a step adds order to the conceptualization by explicitly 
delineating patters. In addition, it typically introduces causality. The 
combination of the What and How elements constitutes the domain or subject 
of the theory. 
3. Why. Refers to the identification of the underlying psychological, economic, 
or social dynamics that justify the selection of factors and the proposed causal 
relationships. This rationale constitutes the theory’s assumptions – the 
theoretical glue that welds the model together. 
4. Who, where, when. These conditions place limitations on the propositions 
generated from a theoretical model. These temporal and contextual factors set 
boundaries of generalizability, and as such constitute the range of the theory.    
4.2.2. Constructs and Variables  
Construct Measurement is of major importance to strategic management researches. 
(Boyd et al., 2013). Constructs can be defined as abstract theoretical formulations 
about phenomena of interest (Edwards and Bagozzi, 2000; Morgeson and Hofmann, 
1999). Nevertheless, a construct commonly is formulated so it can be measured, its 
main purpose is to describe a domain of attributes that can be operationalized and 
preferably quantified as variables (Gioia et al., 2013). Also, even though the 
conception of a variable is employed in other disciplines such as mathematics and 
statistics, is a relatively simple idea and essentially is the contrary of a constant.  
Figure 4.1 presents an association between constructs and variables. This figure 
which was adopted from Boyd et al., (2013: pp.6) the upper portion of the figure is a 
combination of Blalock’s (1979) and Bacharach (1989) framework for examining 
social processes.  
The process is broken down to three components. The upper side of the diagram 
indicates the first stage where propositions are used to combine two or more 
constructs, while hypotheses are used to associate two or more variables. This is 
represented by the path between the two constructs (Hypothesis Proposed). As such 
this process takes place at a theoretical level and it is not tested directly. The second 
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stage takes place at the indicator /variables level and is the operational link between 
the constructs. This is depicted in the diagram with the path between the two 
indicator/variables (Hypothesis Tested). The third stage involves around the 
relationship between the constructs and the indicator/variables. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Components of a Theory 
Adopted from Boyd et al. (2013), Bacharach (1989:499), Blalock (1979) and Venkatraman and Grant 
(1986) 
 
Conventionally, one the hand indicators are presumed to be driven by constructs 
which are known as reflective indicators. On the other hand, indicator can shape the 
construct, identified as formative indicators (Boyd et al., 2013).  
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In the definition provided by Edwards and Bagozzi, (2000), construct is a conceptual 
term that researchers delineate to illustrate a real phenomenon and is unobservable 
by nature. Therefore, a problem arises in reference to the predictive validity 
framework (Hamman et al, 2013). Two levels are identified within this framework, 
the conceptual level and the operational level (Bisbe et al, 2007). For the conceptual 
level relationships between constructs through propositions are rationalised 
theoretically, whereas for the operational level, these propositions are empirically 
tested (Hamman et al, 2013). Consequently the link between constructs and 
indicators needs to be carefully established in order for empirical findings at the 
operational level to be applied to test theoretical propositions established at the 
conceptual level. 
Also, Venkatraman and Grant (1986) and Venkatraman (1989) were critical 
involving most aspects of construct measurement in strategic management studies. 
Specifically, they raised their concerns about reliance on categorical variables, use of 
single indicators, inadequate assessment on reliability and ambiguity regarding levels 
of measurement (Boyd et al, 2013). Moreover, Schwab (2005) argued that construct 
validation or measurement research revolves around the relationship “between the 
results obtained from measures and the concepts or constructs the measures are 
purported to assess”.  
Therefore, validity assessment for the purpose of integrating strategy concepts with 
their measures is of major significance (Boyd et al 2005a). Table 4.1 presents the 
main components of construct validity as they were portrayed in Figure 4.1 on the 
lower box within the figure. 
 
Construct Validity Description Relevant techniques / 
analytical framework 
Content or Face                
Validity 
Extent to how closely an 
indicator engages with the 
theoretical framing of a 
construct 
Review by "experts” and 
analyses of the extent of 
consistency among them 
Internal Consistency 
 
    Dimensionality 
 
 
 
Extent to which the items 
reflect one underlying 
 
 
Exploratory factor analysis; 
Confirmatory factor 
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           Reliability 
 
construct 
 
Absence of measurement 
error in cluster score 
analysis.  
 
Cronbach alpha; Reliability 
coefficient of structural 
equation models 
 
Convergent Validity 
 
Different measures of the 
same construct show 
similar patterns of 
behaviour 
 
Correlation analysis  
Structural equation 
methodology (SEM) - 
confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Discriminant Validity 
 
Extent to which a 
concept differs from other 
concepts 
 
Correlation analysis;  
Structural equation 
methodology. 
 
Nomological   
(Predictive Validity) 
 
Degree to which 
predictions from a 
theoretical network are 
confirmed 
 
Correlation;  
Regressions;  
Causal modeling 
   
Table 4.1: Key Components of Construct Validity 
Adopted from Venkatraman & Grant (1986:79) 
 
Content or face validity refers to the extent that empirical measurement reflects a 
specific construct (Venktraman and Grant, 1986). Validity in this study, was 
achieved by communicating, during the pre-testing phase, all the relevant proposed 
items to managers and experts in their field, whom in turn provided remarks and 
comments on these. Evidence of that are presented in Section 4.4.2.4 
Internal consistency comprises two significant components; dimensionality and 
reliability. Dimensionality is concerned with the extent to which the various items 
reflect one underlying construct. Validity check has been taken into account by 
carrying out exploratory factor analysis, which is presented in detail in Chapter 6. 
As far as reliability assessment is concerned, in the strategy and marketing literature, 
the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient has commonly been used as a test,. If Cronbach’s 
Alpha is above or close to the 0.7 threshold it is suggested that all of the items are 
reliable and the entire test is internally consistent (Cronbach 1951, Hair et al 2010). 
The results are presented in detail in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4). 
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Convergent validity refers to the extent that different methods of measuring the same 
concept yield similar results (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986). In order to assess 
convergent validity construct loadings and average variance extracted (AVE) are 
examined. Those results are also presented in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.1) 
Discriminant validity is concerned with the extent to which a concept differs from 
other concepts. AVE estimates should be greater than the square of the correlation 
between that factor and other factors to provide evidence of discriminate validity.  
Results of discriminant validity are presented in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.1) 
Nomological (predictive, criterion, concurrent or pragmatic) is concerned with the 
degree to which predictions from a theoretical network are confirmed. Correlations 
regarding nomological or predictive validity are presented in Chapter 6 in detail. 
The way in which theories and models are assessed is an issue of great importance. 
The fact that researchers and theorists, constantly attempt to improve existing 
theories gives rise to the complex question of truth and the criteria for evaluation of 
theories. According to Bacharach (1989), ‘falsifiability’ and ‘utility’ ought to be the 
two criteria that theory is evaluated by. On the one hand falsifiability holds that 
theories are stated in such a way that their empirical examination is feasible. Utility, 
on the other hand, is concerned with how practical a proposed theory can be, which 
is ultimately associated with the explanatory and predictive power that the theory 
possesses. 
4.3. Research Design  
According to Churchill (2005) the research design refers to an overall strategy that 
facilitates the process of data collection and their subsequent analysis. The three 
main types of research design in social sciences are the exploratory, the descriptive, 
and the causal (Ghauri et al., 2005).  
The exploratory research design is predominantly used in situations where primary 
ideas and insights to a research problem are necessary. This kind of research 
approach is particularly useful for clarifying concepts when they are poorly 
understood or developed, yet is not suitable for testing hypotheses. Exploratory 
approach designs appear often in a basic form of research that might use literature 
92 
 
and/or experience surveys as a source of preliminary understanding of researchers 
(Kidder, 1991; Aaker and Day, 2007). 
The descriptive research design is used in instance that that a study tries to a) 
portray the characteristics of a one group or various groups, b) approximate a 
percentage of subjects behaving in a particular way or, c) predict results in some 
way. Assuming that these designs can be organised, descriptive studies can be 
implemented for hypothesis testing to lay the ground of theory building (Dubin, 
1978). Also, descriptive approaches can be classified in relation to their longitudinal 
or cross-sectional design. Taking into consideration the work of Churchill, (2005) 
and Kinnear and Taylor, (1996) longitudinal criteria are dynamic and are based upon 
approaches where data derive from a fixed sample of estimates and are constantly 
measured. At the same time, pattern that are cross-sectional are static and related to a 
section of units from a population that is measured over a period of time. 
Finally, the causal research design aims at separating cause(s) and determining the 
extent to which such cause(s) relate to effect(s). Furthermore, the causal approach 
design dictates that the researcher uses one or more independent variables to measure 
the effect(s) of the former on the dependent variable(s) (Kerlinger, 1986; Nagel, 
1961; Popper, 1955; Stolzenberg and Land, 1983). 
This study examines how value is created in acquisitions, and, in particular, analyses 
the impact of post-acquisition asset divestiture and resource redeployment on the 
post-acquisition performance. Thus, the most appropriate research design for the 
purposes of this study is considered to be the combination of descriptive and causal 
research approach.  
4.3.1. Time frame employed in Research Design Approach 
An additional property that can characterize a research design and therefore 
categorize it, is the time frame employed. There essentially exist two major methods; 
cross-sectional and longitudinal. Whilst there are several strong reasons that 
longitudinal design can cater for an enhanced perception of the phenomena under 
investigation, because of time and budget restrictions in addition to career pressures 
have forced the majority of the researchers to adopt a cross-sectional approach 
(Churchill, 2005).  
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4.3.2. Deciding over the Research Design Approach 
The conceptual model of the thesis (Chapter 2), as well as the hypotheses of the 
study (Chapter 3) was considered when selecting an appropriate research design. 
This study investigates how value is created in acquisitions, and, in particular, 
analyses the impact of post-acquisition asset divestiture and resource redeployment 
on the post-acquisition performance. Thus, the most appropriate research design for 
the purposes of this study is considered to be the combination of descriptive and 
causal research approach. In addition, the type of descriptive study employed is a 
cross-sectional one. 
4.3.3. Data Collection Process 
Another area where attention is deemed necessary is the data collection process. 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 depict the various approaches that are available to a 
researcher for collecting primary data.  
Data sources are usually divided into two major types, the primary and secondary 
data. Primary sources of data refer to the generation of data that specifically relate to 
the research question, whereas secondary sources of data can be described as data 
that has already been generated and published for research purposes other than the 
research question at hand (Tull and Hawkins, 1990). Churchill (2005) provides a 
comprehensive list of potential secondary sources such as central and local 
government reports, reports of institutions and departments, and any kind of 
published material. Secondary data seem to have obvious potential advantages; yet, 
this study uses primary data as no sources of data are readily available and those that 
exist are not sufficient to fulfill the data requirements needed by our empirical 
research.  
Primary data can be collected by utilizing three types of sources; respondents, 
analogous situations and experimentation (Kinnear and Taylor, 1996). As far as the 
thesis is concerned, the analogous situation and the experimental design sources were 
disregarded because of the existence of a number of methodological limitations and 
their perceived lack of effectiveness. Therefore the respondent source of data was 
considered as the most suitable source of data. 
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Gathering primary data from respondents requires the adoption of an accepted 
collection method. The main methods for collecting primary data from respondents 
(Figure 4.2) involve observation techniques, interviews (personal and telephone), and 
questionnaires sent through post or web surveys (Dillman et. al. 2009). On the one 
hand, observation techniques involve the recording of an event of behaviour as it 
occurs; in this case the respondent is considered to be passive, as he/she does not 
interact with the investigator in a direct way, whereas, in interviews and 
questionnaires the respondents are directly questioned and have an active role in the 
data generation process (Parasuraman, 1986). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Research Approaches for Primary Data 
Adopted from Dillman et al 2009 
 
Observation and interviews are the two methods that can be employed by the 
researcher for primary data collection. When the observation method is to be used, 
both human and mechanical techniques can be employed. Thus, by using this 
approach, the researcher  has the option of engaging in laboratory experiments where 
artificial conditions are created for the event under investigation or the field approach 
can be employed, where the observation take place whilst the phenomena is 
occurring.  
Laboratory Field Laboratory Field 
Mail Phone Personal Mechanical Human Web 
Surveys 
Observations Interviews 
Primary data 
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Table 4.2 provides a detailed account of the various advantages and disadvantages of 
some of the communication methods used in collecting primary data. In this thesis 
the chosen method for collecting primary data was the web survey.  The rationale 
behind the adoption of both approaches is the complementarities they produce. For 
example, the web-survey method is inappropriate when respondents have limited 
access to the internet or to a computer. 
 
Interviews Disadvantages Advantages 
MAIL Non -response bias 
Several Questions unanswered 
Low response rate 
 
Money and time savings 
No-interview bias 
Greater assurance of anonymity 
A great deal of respondents can 
be reached 
WEB 
SURVEYS 
No internet access 
Low response rate 
Shorter transmitting time 
Decreased delivery costs 
Additional design options 
Reduced data entry time 
PHONE 
 
Potential Sample Bias 
Negative Impact of Demanding 
Nature 
Limited Interview Length 
Inability to Show, Display 
Materials 
Imperative Nature of the 
Telephone 
Interviewer Control 
Sample 
Response Rate 
Speed & Interviewing Costs 
PERSONAL Demand a skilled and cautious 
interviewer 
Problem of interviewer’s 
objectivity 
Accurate and clear picture of 
respondent’s position or 
behaviour 
 
Table 4.2: Advantages & Disadvantages of collecting Interview Data 
 
Taking into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of the different data 
collection methods, the theoretical model, the hypotheses developed and finally the 
research objectives, a descriptive, cross-sectional approach with primary data, 
through the use of a web survey was adopted.  
An additional major issue relating to the data collection approach concerns the type 
of data the researcher is trying to gather. In this respect, two main approaches have 
been adopted in the literature; the subjective and the objective (Sathe, 1978; Boyd et. 
al, 2013).  
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The subjective approach is based on the perceptions held by the respondents in 
relation to the organisational phenomena, whereas, the objective approach is based 
on information acquired through documents, or available statements. Considering the 
limitations of both approaches, Sathe (1978) proposed that the objective approaches 
should be renamed to institutional and the subjective approaches from subjective to 
questionnaire. 
According to a literature review conducted by Meglio (2009), there occurs a 
polarization around quantitative studies based on small and large samples where 22 
of them involve the use of secondary data and only 8 include a survey. Additionally, 
seven qualitative studies discuss findings from within and cross-case analysis. The 
author also affirms that mixed method research remains rare in M&As. Moreover, 
Boyd et al, (2013) argue that taking into consideration the readily available archival 
data sources and combining with the difficulties of obtaining original data from top 
executives, it is normal that qualitative designs are seen less frequently in strategic 
management studies.  
Nonetheless, it has not yet been irrefutably suggested by researchers that one 
approach is more reliable or preferable over another. In this study the questionnaire 
(or the subjective) approach is adopted due to the nature of the constructs. 
4.3.4. Scales 
In addition to considering the testing of the hypotheses, the measurements of the 
variables also need to be considered.  The reason being is that the levels at which the 
variables are measured govern the statistical test used for analysing the data. Two 
categories of data according to their attributes/characteristics are recognised; 
nonmetric (qualitative) and metric (quantitative). There are four types of scales that 
exist in the literature, nonmetric measurement scales are the nominal and ordinal 
scales and for the metric measurement scales are the interval and ratio scales (Ho 
2006; González-Rodríguez, 2012). Therefore, there are different forms of 
measurement precisions for each scale type.  
The nominal scale is the simplest level of measurement and classifies the variable 
under investigation into one of a number of discrete categories (Ho, 2006). Although 
the allocation of numbers can be used to describe categories, they are only used to 
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label these categories and they do not possess any quantitative value with respect of 
magnitude (Allen and Seaman, 2007).  
The ordinal scale involves ordering or ranking the variable to be measured. Even 
though, ordinal scales rank differently the variables under examination they cannot 
determine how much of a that difference really occurs in the measured variable 
between ranks (i.e. the intervals within those ranks have no meaning) (Ho 2006) 
The interval scale specifies how far apart two stimuli are on a given dimension. An 
interval scale is used when subjects vary in an amount or degree on a particular 
attribute (Hair et al 2010). 
The ratio scale, substitutes the arbitrary zero point of the interval scale with a true 
zero as a starting point (Ho 2006). The only distinction between interval and ratio 
scales it that interval scales use an arbitrary zero point, while ratio scales include an 
absolute zero point.  
The nominal scale produces the least accurate measurement and the most precise is 
provided with the ratio. Likert (1932) developed one of the most widely used scales 
in research. His technique involved an increase in the variation in the probable scores 
that a respondent had to choose from. According to Bailey (1982), researchers have 
always been using the Likert scale as an interval approximation, even though it is an 
ordinal one. Osgood (1957) developed an analogous method labelled Semantic 
Differential. This method utilises a seven point scale using a range between two 
extremes while at the same time the middle is viewed as neutral point. In most cases, 
the two extremes do not range from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, but 
possess points that can describe various situations.  
Furthermore, as far as the number of points is concerned, it should be mentioned that 
the use of five or seven point scales did not produce conclusive results (Dillman, 
(2009). According to Churchill and Peter (1993) improved reliability and validity 
could be achieved by increasing the number of rating points, while as indicated by 
Boote, (1981) and Lehman and Hulbert (1972), there is a concern regarding the 
increase of the number of the rating points. Also, according to Dillman (2009) for 
scales that measure different levels of intensity (i.e. very, somewhat) the optimal 
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number of response categories is five or seven, because it allows for two or three 
levels of differentiation on either side of the middle or neutral category. 
Taking into consideration the relevant literature as mentioned above and the 
guidelines proposed by Dillman (2009) as well as the findings and recommendations 
from the pre-testing phase, a five point scale was used for the questionnaires. In the 
thesis, a descriptive approach was used, on the primary data with a five point scale 
(both Likert and Semantic) and the use of the subjective (questionnaire) approach 
was employed.  
4.4. The Web Survey  
This section, discusses certain issues pertaining to web surveys as a method of 
collecting primary data. In particular, delves into areas such as the choice of the web 
survey process, the content of the pre-notification emails and reminders, signature 
and affiliations, the length, wording and sequence of the various questions. 
The use of surveys has been employed by scholars and agencies in order to gather 
data for a long time. Online/web surveys have increased in number in recent years. 
One of the reasons for the increase can be attributed   to   the relatively low cost at 
which they can be carried out at and within a shorter time frame than their paper-
based or telephone equivalents (Sauermann and Roach, 2013).  
Web surveys have to be designed with different operating systems and browsers in 
mind and prevent multiple submissions (Yun & Trumbo, 2000). In addition, question 
in web surveys have to be presented in a logical or adaptive manner, if needed 
(Kehoe & Pitkow, 1996), and must provide the respondent with several opportunities 
for saving the completed answers (Smith, 1997). Moreover, Web surveys should 
provide options for both quantified selections option and narrative type answers (Yun 
& Trumbo, 2000), and, present the respondent with a section for feedback and a 
section for “thank-you” upon completion of the survey (Smith, 1997). Finally, the 
format of web survey can accommodate the guideline of paper questionnaire design 
(Dillman, 2009; Preece et al, 2002). 
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4.4.1. Web survey process 
At first, many aspects of web survey implementation appear rather similar to those 
used for mail implementation. Nevertheless, the two methods employ different 
technologies and thus web implementation has to be handled in a different manner 
than mail. Figure 4.3 shows that there are four basic steps in the process of carrying 
out a web survey. 
The first step is the web survey development (Section 4.4.2) which is concerned with 
the web survey design and development as well as the process of uploading the web 
survey to a website. This step includes the development of the questionnaire and the 
pretesting procedures. 
 
Figure 4.3: The Web Survey Process 
Adopted from Fan and Yan (2010) 
 
The second step is the web survey delivery (Section 4.4.3) and deals with the process 
used by surveyors to produce a sampling method, make contact with potential 
participants and convey the web survey to the respondents. In this step the pre-
notification/invitation emails are a vital part of the delivery process. 
The third step, web survey completion (Section 4.4.4) has to do with the actions that 
the surveyors take in order to confirm respondents received the survey 
announcement, logged into the website the survey is hosted, filled in and submitted 
the questionnaire and logged out. In this step the reminder is an important 
component.  
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The final stage, web survey return, (Section 4.4.5) revolves around the process of 
downloading web survey data in various formats for analysis. 
 
4.4.2. Web Survey and the Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire’s construction and development phase lasted approximately six 
months; from mid-January 2010 to mid-June 2010. More than 14 versions through 
revisions were produced in order for the questionnaire to take its final form. This 
section provides an account on the physical properties of the questionnaire, such as 
the length, colour structure, font types and the type of questions used. 
4.4.2.1. Length of the Questionnaire 
In the literature it is observed that the size of a survey has a negative linear relation 
with response rates in both mail and web surveys, even though the size of those 
effects span from strong to very weak (Cook et al., 2000; Edwards et al., 2002; 
Walston et al., 2006). Also, it was examined among two studies conducted with 
college students that thirteen minutes or less for the completing the survey was 
deemed as the ideal time frame to obtain a good response rate (Asiu, et al., 1998; 
Handwerk, et al., 2000). According to Dilmann (2009) web questionnaires of up to 
12 pages have no adverse effect on response rates.  
The questionnaire used in the thesis (see Figure I.1, Appendix I) consists of a total of 
10 pages and contains seventy three items; based on approximate value produced by 
the website (www.surveymonkey.com) the questionnaire takes an average time of 
twelve minutes to complete. The first page included the title of the project, and 
approximately nine lines of text explaining the main objectives of the study, offering 
broad guidelines to the respondent and reinforcing the sensitive issue of 
confidentiality. Page nine (last page) of the questionnaire provided free text space in 
the case that respondents wished to provide additional comments, as well as a 
textbox to allow respondents to a) attach their business cards and/or b) to provide 
their address. Finally, the questionnaire concluded with some words of gratitude for 
the respondents’ invaluable support. To structure the first and the last page of the 
questionnaire, the guidelines of Dillman (2009) were followed. 
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4.4.2.2. Types of Questions  
The questionnaire used in this thesis predominately used closed-ended questions with 
ordered answered choices. Five - point (5) scales (Likert and Semantic) were used 
throughout the questionnaire. In order for the questionnaire to be well structured and 
maintained, the wording of the questions was an important factor, thus the 
questionnaire was structured so as to avoid using leading questions, generalisations 
and ambiguous expressions (LaGrace and Kuhn, 1995; Greer et al., 2000). The 
sequence of the questions was developed with the thesis’s research model in mind 
and following the suggestions of the pre-testing interviews. 
 
Element Aim Guidelines 
Survey 
Invitation 
 
 
First Page 
 
 
 
 
Last Page 
Includes the uniform resource locator (URL) 
and instructions of how to access it. 
 
 
 
Should contain:  
Graphic Illustration, Confidentiality 
Directions, 
Study Title, Sponsor name  
Contact information 
Should not contain; 
Questions 
 
Should contain: 
Encouragement for comments, 
A Thank you note, plenty of writing 
space 
 
 
Format 
 
 
Should provide clues of the worthiness of the 
questionnaire 
Should: 
Consistent page layout across screens 
Should not contain: 
Writing in capital letters, using 
acronyms 
Questions 
 
 
 
First 
Question 
 
 
 
 
 
 Remaining 
Questions 
Should provide respondent with a guide of 
the questionnaire, communicate an 
impression of orderliness and ease of 
completion 
 
 
 
Should: 
Be in relation to the survey topic, Be 
easily answered, Convey a sense of 
neutrality, Applicable to everyone 
Should not: 
Be an innocuous Ice-Breaker 
 
Should: 
Be ordered in descending social 
usefulness, grouped by content and 
type, end with most potentially 
objectionable questions 
Should not: 
Require constant mental switching 
between question types 
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Page Format 
 
Should motivate completion and appear easy 
to do so 
 
Should Contain: 
Plenty of White Space, Have 
Directions in Parenthesis, Vertical 
Flow, Identify answer categories with 
Numbers, ask only one question at a 
time 
Should not Contain; 
Pre-coding Information 
 
Table 4.3: Selected Elements of the Total Design Method 
Based on Dillman (2009) 
 
4.4.2.3. Bilingual Procedure 
The original survey instrument was an English version based and adopted from 
Capron (1999). A modified version was used in order to produce the web-survey 
questionnaire consisting of 10 pages and 73 items. Both the English version (Figure 
I.1) and the Greek version (Figure I.2) of the questionnaire are presented in 
Appendix I. The bilingual author of this article and the bilingual supervisor of the 
thesis independently translated and produced the questionnaire into Greek and 
differences were reconciled. Attaining both insider’s and outsider’s perspectives 
together can assist in identifying if any problematic issues exist (Schaffer and 
Riordan, 2003). Therefore in the pre-testing phase the questionnaire was scrutinized 
by Greek speaking reviewers (see section 4.4.2.4) for ambiguity or difficulty in 
understanding and in order to enhance the validity of the instrument. Also, 
monolingual members of the unfamiliar culture (in this instance the English 
language) have reviewed the questionnaire as the language from the other culture 
would not influence their speech patterns (Erkut et al., 1999). 
4.4.2.4. Pre-testing Procedures 
Pre-testing according to Dillman et al., (2009) is the point at which questionnaire 
design and survey implementation begin to intersect. The stage of pre-testing 
requires consultation with a variety of different people whose areas of expertise are 
likely to be significantly different. Having a systematic approach to obtain feedback 
from a variety of knowledgeable people on a complete draft of the questionnaire is 
vital for evaluating probable survey design problems. 
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Key informants, CEOs and academics were contacted and interviewed in order to 
pre-test all of the survey’s instruments (pre-notification, sequence, reminder and 
questionnaire) and to establish both content and face validity. 
Key informants, CEOs and academics were contacted and interviewed in order to 
pre-test all of the survey’s instruments (pre-notification, sequence, reminder and 
questionnaire) and to establish both content and face validity.  
All of the informants that were used for the pre-testing purposes held key managerial 
positions in various companies and were knowledgeable about the subject. The 
respondents were asked to test the adequacy of the various aspects of the survey 
package such as e-mail notification, questionnaires’ format, size, order and 
coherence of the questions and general comments of the questionnaire.  
Also, further refinements were made to the survey instruments following a review by 
two CEOs, of major companies that operate in Greece made available through 
personal contacts. Both of the two contacts were executives experienced in 
acquisition implementation employed by large corporations in Greece. Their initial 
thought was that the subject of post-acquisition performance was really intriguing 
and that it would be interesting to see the outcome of the study. Following their 
review, the principal recommendations that emerged, involved around the clarity of 
the questions of the questionnaire along with its length in order to maintain it as brief 
as possible. Another point they highlighted was the assurance of the participants that 
responses would be anonymous and confidential and that no sensitive information 
was going to be made public.  
Conclusively, the supervisor overseeing the thesis along with lecturers who had used 
the same kind of survey instrument before, examined the questionnaire and provided 
comments on the whole procedure. The researcher then used the comments obtained 
from the reviewers to make the necessary modifications to the questionnaire (i.e. 
adding or deleting items, order of the questions, paraphrasing), a detailed account is 
provided in section 4.4.2.5. 
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4.4.2.5. Comments 
The majority of the reviewers commented on the order of the questions in the 
questionnaire. In the first draft of the questionnaire the order of the sections were as 
follows: 1) Post-acquisition divestiture measures, 2) Post-acquisition resource 
redeployment measures, 3) Value creating mechanisms, 4) Acquisition performance, 
5) Organisational Changes and 6) Control questions. The reviewing panel believed 
that the survey should start with the most important questions, namely the value-
creating mechanisms and acquisition performance. Then move to the control 
questions and organisational changes and finally place the post-acquisition resource 
redeployment and divestiture measures last. Therefore, the order of the questionnaire 
changed to reflect their suggestions. The final order of the sections was as follows: 1) 
Value creating mechanisms, 2) Acquisition performance, 3) Control questions, 4) 
Organisational Changes, 5) Post-acquisition resource redeployment measures and 6) 
Post-acquisition divestiture measures. 
The section regarding the post-acquisition divestiture measures (Section 6) and 
especially the order of the questions and their importance appeared to raise concerns 
with the reviewers. Thus, after having the items rated their order of how they showed 
changed.  Consequently, the resulting order was: 1) Manufacturing, 2) Distribution, 
3) Sales networks, 4) Administration and 5) R&D). 
Regarding the first page of the survey they felt that there should be a brief synopsis 
of the survey, a small guideline of how to answer the questions and provide 
respondents reassurance about the confidentiality of all the information obtained. 
Also concerning the Greek version of the questionnaire, paraphrasing was discussed 
in order to change items and wordings to their most accurate representation in the 
Greek language. Questions 2, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 20, page 3 and page 8 section 
titles were changed to reflect the comments made by the reviewing panel. Versions 
of the questionnaire can be provided by the author upon request.  
4.4.3. Web Survey Delivery 
At the onset, it seems that many features of a web-survey are quite similar to those 
used for mail surveys however due to the use of different technologies; the web 
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implementation issue has to be approached in a somewhat different manner (Dillman 
et al., 2009). 
4.4.3.1. Content of the invitation email 
The basic aim of the invitation (pre-notification) email is to inform recipients about 
the purpose and the importance of the study and persuade them to complete the 
questionnaire. Various rewards have been suggested in the literature, such as money, 
gift cards, or even electronic gift certificates through services such as PayPal in order 
to induce responses (Birnholtz, et al., 2004). Incentives have been shown to modestly 
increase response rates compared to no incentive (GÖritz 2006). Nevertheless, the 
provision of such incentives requires the surveyor to use a mode of delivery other 
than the web to contact respondents in order to receive the incentive (Dillman et al 
2009). In addition a deadline was set for the questionnaire because the deadline as a 
device has been shown to yield increased responses in the initial stages of the 
research (Dillman et al 2009).  
Another issue of great importance is the anonymity of respondents and confidential 
treatment of their details and responses. The initial e-mail invitation as well as the 
first and last page of the questionnaire clearly stressed the fact that the responses will 
be treated in a confidential manner and that anonymity would be guaranteed. 
Furthermore, the respondents were given the option to decide whether or not they 
wished to receive a complementary report concerning the major findings of the 
survey. This seems justifiable as a reward and can help to establish a good 
relationship among researchers and practitioners. 
Thus, in the four emails sent (Pre-notification, Follow-up email 1, Follow-up email 
2, and Final reminder) the importance of the study for M&As and the 
competitiveness of Greek corporations was stressed. 
4.4.3.2. Personalisation 
Personalisation has been argued to increase response rates in both the mail surveys 
and the web surveys (Cook et al., 2000; Dillman et al., 2009; Heerwegh et al., 2005). 
The effects of personalisation on mail survey response rates have long been studied 
by researchers.  In a paper by Pearson and Levine (2003) by varying the level of 
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personalisation, it was observed that personalisation, in any shape, did not enhance 
the response rate as the increase was not statistically significant.  
However, in a study by Heerwegh et al. (2005) it was reported that personalisation 
increased the web survey response rate considerably by 8.6%. One explanation for 
this positive relationship was provided by Dillman (2009) who argued that 
personalisation can cause the recipients an enhanced sense of importance and value. 
Therefore, a positive consideration is shown to the recipient, which in turn has some 
reward value. Dillman, (2009) reports that personalization in general public mail 
surveys increases response rates from 5 to 11%. Also a number of authors reported 
an increased response rate when personalisation was applied (Boser, 1988; Dodd and 
Markwiese, 1987; Heerwegh et al., 2005). 
Also, as an additional persuasive indication, for the respondent, is that he/she 
receives a more personal attention with individual e-mails, instead of getting bulk e-
mails (Dillman, 2009). Sending group invitations has been found to reduce the 
number of response rates in a web survey compared to the approach of sending 
individual e-mails (Barron and Yechiam, 2002). 
However, despite of the positive effect on response rates, personalising invitations 
can have an adverse effect on the obtained data. In the case of an increased level of 
personalisation being used, respondents might feel more confidence in the privacy of 
the questionnaire and are more likely to have a social desirability response 
predisposition, particularly they are faced with sensitive questions (Heerwegh, 2005).  
This study followed Dillman (2009) and Heerweg (2005) and addressed the e-mail 
directly to the individual i.e. Dear Mr. Smith, and thus, expected a higher response 
rate.  
Finally, a potential risk with personalisation is the possibility that the recipient may 
have moved to another company. As a matter of fact, a number of e-mails (12 in 
total) bounced back shortly after the notification letters were sent out indicating that 
key informants had either moved or their email address was wrong. Consequently, 
new contact details of the key informants were obtained and the mailing list was 
updated accordingly. 
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4.4.4. Web Survey Completion 
4.4.4.1. Follow-up emails and reminders 
A major difference between the two designs is that mail surveys require delivery of 
the questionnaire to respondents, whereas in web-survey’s respondents are asked to 
obtain the questionnaire themselves. Typically this will result in a lower response 
rate. One way to increase response rates is by sending multiple contacts (emails) to 
potential web survey respondents (Cook et al., 2000). In a study made by Wygant et 
al., (2005) four follow up letters were used in a study of college undergraduates, 
which resulted in a 37% increase in response rate relative to only one survey 
invitation and no follow-ups. Nonetheless, as insufficient research has been carried 
out on the optimal combination of contacts to use, a slightly modified sequence from 
a postal mail survey may be appropriate to employ (Dillman et. al. 2009). The 
chosen combination for the thesis web-survey mail implementation was a pre-
notification email, followed by three reminder follow-up emails.  
Reminders and follow-up emails have been widely believed to considerably improve 
response rates.  Following the total design method introduced by Dillman et al 
(2009) four e-mails were sent to the respondents. A week after the initial e-mail shot 
a reminder email was sent to the respondents who had not sent back the 
questionnaire. According to Dillman et al (2009) a week is considered to an 
appropriate time interval, and is not seen as too aggressive.. Following the first 
reminder a second follow-up email was sent, two weeks later and finally the last 
measurement scales reminder was sent after three weeks stating that a short amount 
of time is left to complete the survey and the importance of responding. 
The process of gathering the questionnaires was performed in two rounds. As it can 
been seen from Table 4.4 the first round of e-mails produced 53 and 68 usable and 
non-usable questionnaires respectively. The second wave produced 83 usable and 32 
non-usable responses (a more detailed account is given in section 4.5.4). Thus a total 
of 136 usable questionnaires versus a 100 non-usable questionnaires were gathered. 
 
 
108 
 
Email Waves Usable Questionnaires Non-Usable 
Initial E-mail 1st wave 15 (12.4%) 24 (19.83%) 
First Follow-up 1st wave 11 (9.09%) 18 (14.88%) 
Second Follow-up 1st wave 12 (9.92%) 17 (14.05%) 
Final Reminder 1st wave 15 (12.4%) 9 (7.44) 
Total 1st Wave 53 68 
Initial E-mail 2nd wave 21 (18.26%) 4 (3.48%) 
First Follow-up 2nd wave 31 (29.96%) 9 (7.83%) 
Second Follow-up 2nd wave 21 (18.26%) 14 (12.17%) 
Final Reminder 2nd wave 10 (8.70%) 5 (4.35%) 
Total 2nd Wave 83 32 
Total 136 100 
 
Table 4.4: Returned Questionnaires First and Second Wave 
4.4.5. Web Survey Return 
Following the completion of the collection phase the final step is the web survey 
return. In this final stage the researcher screens the data for missing values and 
codifies the answers from the questionnaires. This process consists of assigning a 
code number to each answer category so that these answers are transformed 
electronically and stored in the computer. Consequently, after the answers had been 
codified, using an appropriate statistical package (SPPS, SAS, Minitab, Eviews) 
statistical analysis could be performed.  Each variable was then coded and was input 
onto the SPSSR for WindowsTM (Release 17.1) statistical package (SPSS Inc., 2007) 
which was used for further statistical analysis. 
4.5. Sampling Issues 
This section sets out to discuss issues relating to sample size and selection, key 
informants, reminders and response rates, pre-testing procedures as well as non-
response bias.  
4.5.1. Population and Frame 
The population consisted of acquisitions from Greek companies operating in the 
same or different industries. In doing so, a country level research was conducted. The 
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period of 2005-2009 was chosen, in order to exclude a) recent acquisitions where 
post acquisition restructuring had not yet led to asset divestiture or resource 
redeployment and b) older acquisitions for which managerial turnover would make it 
difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition activities (Capron 
1999; Capron and Guillén 2009). In this study the population frame was chosen so as 
to satisfy the following criteria. Firstly, the organisation should operate in Greece. 
Secondly, the acquisition should have been completed. Thirdly, a member of the top 
management team should be easily identifiable (i.e. position in the company, email). 
After having established the objectives concerning the population of the study, a 
sampling frame that fulfilled the above requirements was determined. A number of 
prospective published materials were examined. Sources for information included 
the: 
 Athens Stock Exchange, The Athens Stock Exchange or ASE or ATHEX is a stock 
exchange located in Athens, Greece. Companies listed on the exchange are regulated 
by the Hellenic Capital Market Commission. Companies that were listed on the 
Athens stock exchange were obtained.  
From the Greek Ministry of Regional Development and Competitiveness, 
individual list and company numbers were acquired for companies that have 
participated in an acquisition in the desired time frame. 
ICAP Group, (www.icap.gr) through its subsidiaries and joint venture it provides a 
wide range of services that are grouped in the following 4 Service Lines: Credit Risk 
Services, Marketing Solutions, Management Consulting and People Solutions. For its 
marketing solutions it offers business directories and marketing lists through its own 
ICAP Databank that were used to obtain lists of companies. 
Thomson Financials, Thomson One and DataStream, provide access to global 
market data and news, including company accounts, shareholder information, IPO 
data and information on Mergers and Acquisitions. Data is provided by leading 
financial sources including Thomson Financial, Compustat and Worldscope. 
DataStream offers access to a set of historical financial content.  
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For the period 2005 – 2009 a total number of 510 companies were drawn from these 
directories. 
4.5.2. Procedures and Sample Size 
The process of choosing the sample used in this study was rather straightforward.  
All the Greek companies that were involved in a domestic or cross-border acquisition 
were chosen. The period of 2005-2009 was chosen, in order to exclude a) recent 
acquisitions where post acquisition restructuring had not yet led to asset divestiture 
or resource redeployment and b) older acquisitions for which managerial turnover 
would make it difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition 
activities.  
In this study the population frame was chosen so as to satisfy the following criteria. 
First, the organisation should operate in Greece. Second, the acquisition should have 
been completed. Third, a member of the top management team should be easily 
identifiable (i.e. position in the company, email). Fourth, acquisitions that 
participated in the acquiring company for less than 100% were excluded. Reasons for 
not including less than half of the companies in the sample, involved unknown Chief 
executive or being unable to easily identify contact information about the top 
management team of those companies. The resulting number of companies that were 
selected for this study was 310. A more detailed account is given in section 4.5.4. 
4.5.3. Key Informants  
A multiple respondent approach provides certain advantages (Venkatraman and 
Grant, 1986; Glick et al, 1990) but it was decided for the purpose of this thesis, the 
use of one key informant approach. Key informant surveys are a vital data source in 
marketing and management research (Homburg et al. 2012). According to Glick et 
al., (1990) the key informant should supply descriptive information about the 
organisation rather than play the role of the respondent that reacts to questions 
regarding his or hers perceptions. 
the advantages of this approach are: 
• There is a high probability that the informant that is the most knowledgeable in 
each organisation will respond to the survey (Kiessling et al., 2008) 
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• Low variation in informational and motivational biases across organisations 
(Seidler, 1974) 
• Accurate and an effective technique for management research (Golden, 1992) 
• an increased number of organisations can be included in the sample given a  
fixed budget 
In order to decrease the chance of any potential measurement error, the key 
informant approach requires careful consideration of certain issues (Huber and 
Power, 1985). Following their suggested guidelines, the following issues were 
tackled: identification of the most informative person, recognition of the role of  the 
person’s emotional involvement with the subject, attempt to motivate informants to 
co-operate with the study seriously, minimise elapsed time, assessing the impact of 
alternate framing of questions and, finally, use of pre-tested and structured questions 
(Kiessling et al., 2008).  The highest level of a top full time manager in each 
company was carefully chosen as a single key informant in order to describe the 
changes that took place after the acquisition in his or her company. Also, as 
reliability is linked to the informant’s hierarchical position and tenure, informants in 
high hierarchical positions with a longer tenure are more reliable (Homburg et al., 
2012). Consequently, the Managing Director or the Chief Executive officer of the 
firms in our sample was targeted as the most knowledgeable informants.  
4.5.4. Non –Respondents 
Examining in depth individuals that have not completed surveys can be a difficult 
and inconsistent task (Rogelberg et al. 2003). Some of the companies (12) that were 
used for the study replied with an e-mail explaining the reason they were not taking 
part in the survey. Table 4.5 presents the main reasons of non-response. Partial 
answers (45) and no reason provided (43) explained mainly the non-response. 
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Overall number of sampling units 310 
Overall number of responses 236 
Overall number of eligible responses 136 
Overall number of ineligible responses 100 
Partially answered 45 
No reason provided 43 
Policy of non -participation in surveys 12 
Table 4.5: Reasons for non-response 
 
A summary of the methods for estimating non-response bias are presented below 
(Table 4.6). Nine methods were found to be in use (Armstrong and Overton, 1977; 
Rogelberg et al 2003, Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007): 
Approach Details 
1. Archival Analysis Compare respondents to non-respondents on variables 
contained in an archival database 
2. Follow-up approach Resurvey non-respondents 
3. Wave analysis (Extrapolation) Compare late respondents to early respondents 
4. Passive nonresponse analysis Examine the relationship between passive nonresponse 
characteristics and standing on the key survey topics 
being assessed 
5. Interest-level analysis Assess the relationship between interest in the survey topic in question and standing on the key survey topics 
being assessed 
6. Active nonresponse analysis Assess percentage of purposeful, intentional, and a 
priori nonresponse using interviews 
7. Worst-case resistance Use stimulated data to determine robustness of 
observed findings and relationships 
8. Benchmarking analysis Use measures with known measurement properties 
normative data so that observed data can be cross-
referenced 
9. Demonstrate generalizability Replicate findings use a different set of research 
methods 
 
Table 4.6: Non-response Bias Impact Assessment Strategy 
Adopted from Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007 
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In this thesis the wave approach (Linear Extrapolation Method, Armstong and 
Overton, 1977) was chosen in order to evaluate non-response bias because as it 
offers certain advantages. a) It is a commonly used method b) it is inexpensive c) it is 
not time consuming and d) the data requirements are low. The extrapolation method 
is based on the assumption that the “less readily” (Pace, 1939) respondents are 
comparable to non-respondents.  
Armstong and Overton (1977) within the extrapolation method proposes three 
different types of extrapolations, namely the successive waves, time trends and 
concurrent waves. The selected technique in this thesis was extrapolation method 
over successive waves of the questionnaire, where wave refers to the responses 
produced through a stimulus. A stimulus in this instance was the reminders and the 
follow-up emails.  
Therefore, each questionnaire was categorised by the date it was received for both 
rounds and subsequently was split in four quartiles. The first one comprised early 
respondents and the last one late respondents. A Mann–Whitney test was run 
between these two groups of 136 cases to test the null hypothesis of similarity in all 
variables across the early and late respondents.
 
No significant differences were found 
among the variables used. Thus, non-response bias was not an important issue and 
the data were unlikely to be biased by non-response errors.
 
4.6. Data Analysis and Methodologies 
The next step in data analysis - following the completion of the collection 
phase - is to codify the questionnaires. A total of 136 questionnaires via a web-
survey were received which constitutes a response rate of 44%.  Subsequently, after 
having codified our answers while inputting the raw data into SPSS eye screening 
was employed to identify completeness and quality of the questionnaires. The 
process of eye screening revealed that all of the 136 questionnaires were usable. 
Consequently each variable was then coded and was inputted onto the SPSSR for 
WindowsTM (Release 18) statistical package (SPSS Inc., 2007) for further statistical 
analysis. 
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4.6.1. Classification and Choice of Statistical Techniques 
The literature on research methodology proposes that three categories of data 
analysis exist and can be classified in accordance to the amount of variables and type 
of data they entail (Howell, 1987; Bryman and Cramer, 1994; Hair et al 2010). The 
methods of data analysis are commonly known as univariate, bivariate and 
multivariate. 
The first method of data analysis, univariate, is mainly used in cases where from a 
sample of measures a single measure exists and also, when the object is going to be 
analysed alone even if there are several measures of the sample of objects. Popular 
univariate techniques include the measures of central tendency, such as mean, 
median, mode and dispersion, such as standard deviation and relative/absolute 
frequencies. Those techniques can be used in accordance with statistical tests such as 
the t-test and the z-test. 
The second method of data analysis is the bivariate one. The difference from the 
univariate measures lies in that they allow researchers to investigate interaction 
between two measures from a given sample simultaneously. Tests that lie within 
bivariate group of analysis are the U-test and the correlation analysis. 
Moving on to the third method of data analysis are the multivariate techniques. In 
this case simultaneous analysis is needed if more than two measures of each object in 
a sample are present. Here, two methods of multivariate data analysis can take place. 
The primary method in order to analyse multivariate data is the dependent type. This 
method is employed when one or more variables are identified as being associated 
with a set of independent variables. In order to analyse such cases, several statistical 
techniques exist such as multiple linear regression analysis, multivariate analysis of 
variance and covariance, multiple discriminant analysis, automatic interaction 
detection and conjoint analysis (Hair et al., 2010; Crayen et al., 2011). The second 
method to analyse multivariate data is the interdependent type. This method is used 
when a variable is not selected as a dependent variable. Consequently, that signifies 
that independent variables are not defined but more accurately this procedure permits 
the analysis of all variables equally. The statistical techniques used to analyse 
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interdependent multivariate data involve principal component analysis, cluster 
analysis, multidimensional scaling and correspondence analysis (Hair et al., 2010).  
Many researchers have emphasised on the significance of three criteria in the 
selection process of the appropriate statistical technique(s). The first criterion states 
that the level of measurement ought to be taken under consideration. Several 
techniques require that the nature of the data have to be of a specific type before it 
can be used in performing statistical tests. The second criterion dictates that 
knowledge of the research design is important because it can determine that 
dependency of the measures, measures per object and number of groups being 
analysed. Finally, the assumptions that underlie various techniques can be 
inappropriate for research (Pacheco et al 2013). 
Table 4.7, presents all the measurement scales that have been used for one or more 
constructs/variables. All the same, the study utilised extensively ordinal scales 
(semantic differential and Likert type) in its strictest sense. Going into more detail, it 
should be mentioned that the constructs, dimensions, indicators and finally the 
study’s variables were nonnumeric by nature. Even though integer scoring was used 
to capture the respondent’s opinion, such as the 1 to 5 point Likert scale, the intervals 
between the adjacent points (1 to 2 or 4 to 5) of the scale cannot automatically be 
taken as equal. In that case the criterion of interval scale is not fulfilled and therefore 
the scale is ordinal. In spite of the above line of reasoning researchers within the 
social science field treat Likert type scales as good approximation of interval 
measures (Churchill, 2005; Flora and Curran, 2004; González-Rodríguez et al. 
2012). 
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Constructs Dimensions Indicators Measurement Scale 
Acquisition Performance 
 
 
Market Share 
Sales 
Intrinsic Profitability (EBITDA/Capital 
Employed) 
Relative Profitability (to industry average) 
Reflective 
 
 
 
 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals  
 
 
 
Cost-Based Synergies 
 
 
Cost Reduction 
 
 
Product Costs 
Input Prices 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals  
 
 Revenue-Based Synergies 
 
 
Market Coverage 
 
 
 
 
Innovation Capability 
Extension of Product Lines 
Broadening of Geographical Coverage 
 
 
Product Innovation Capabilities 
Development of design cycle 
 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
 
Asset Divestiture 
R&D 
Manufacturing 
Logistics 
Sales Network 
Administrative Services 
 
 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
Resource Redeployment R&D Capabilities 
Manufacturing Know-How 
Marketing Resources 
Supplier Relationships 
Distribution Expertise 
 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
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Constructs Dimensions Indicators Measurement Scale 
Organizational Changes Post-acquisition organizational network 
changes  
Post-acquisition organizational knowledge 
changes 
Retention of the acquired firm’s management 
team 
Formal organizational changes affected from 
the retention of the acquired firm 
Senior Executives made redundant 
 Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Open Ended 
 
Control Variables Relatedness 
 
Similarity of products and technologies 
Similarity of customers, geographic markets and 
the degree of direct competition between the 
target and the acquirer 
Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
Geographic Scope Domestic versus cross-border Binary Variable 
Relative Size  Five point- Equally appearing 
Intervals 
Diversified Acquirer  Three point scale 
Payment Method  Open Ended 
Acquisition Classification 
 
Friendly versus hostile Binary Variable 
Acquisition Rationale 
 
Itemised Rating Scale 
 
Table 4.7: Measurement Scales 
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Considering the above and, more specifically, the available statistical techniques, the 
most appropriate techniques were selected to be used for the data analysis as Table 4.8 
Illustrates. 
 
Constructs analysed using descriptive statistical tests (Mean & Standard deviation   
(Chapter Five) 
 
Factor Analysis performed to detect for any potential underlying relationships within 
the model’s constructs (Chapter Six) 
 
Principal Components Analysis on selected variables within each construct (Chapter 
Six) 
 
Scale indices constructed from the extracted factors (Chapter Six) 
 
Structural Equation Modelling (Chapter Seven) 
 
Table 4.8: Statistical Techniques deployed for Data Analysis 
 
4.6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
It has already been mentioned that descriptive statistics are used to describe and 
summarise raw data. On account of the descriptive findings that are given in the thesis, 
analyses of these data is provided with the use of percentage frequency scores, along 
with measures of central tendency and dispersion in order to primarily explore the 
survey findings. Therefore, in Chapter 5 an initial exploration of the data set is given, for 
the variables which were measured by a five-point scale. It has been argued that this 
scale is widely seen as a satisfactorily interval approximation (Churchill, 2005; Nunnally 
and Bernstein, 1994). For the variables measured by open-ended questions the number 
of observations, relative frequencies and the mode are presented. 
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4.6.3. Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is needed, because according to Boyd et al, (1989) it assists in 
measuring the strength of a relationship between two variables. Also, scatter diagrams 
have the ability to present the form of the relationship but can be unclear to the 
interpretation and present to the researcher a subjective bias. Therefore, the most 
effective method of evaluating the strength of a relationship between two variables is 
quantitative analysis producing a correlation coefficient (ρ). According to Baggaley 
(1981) if the bivariate relationship is a perfect positive correlation the r would be equal 
to +1.00, if it is a perfect negative correlation then ρ would be equal to -1.00 and if ρ is 
found 0 in linear form then no correlation exists.  
In that sense, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients will be calculated for the 
variable relationships such as between asset divestiture and resource redeployment and 
organizational changes on the post-acquisition performance. The purpose of conducting 
a correlation analysis will be to examine the strength of relationships within each 
construct to determine whether to proceed toward subsequent analyses by using a data 
reduction technique. The formulation of the correlation matrices will be conducted in 
line with the previous rationale in accordance with the advocacy of good practice (Hair 
et al, 2010). The purpose of conducting correlation analysis (see Chapter Six) was to 
determine whether the strength of relationships within each of the model’s constructs 
was appropriate in order of a data reduction technique to be employed in the next step 
(Boyd et al, 1989). Thus, both Rho (Spearman’s) coefficient of rank-order correlation 
for the variables measured by non-metric scales and Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficients for the variables measured by metric scales were calculated.   
4.6.4. Factor Analysis 
Taking the previous under consideration, it is likely that an incremental decision 
sequence will be undertaken with the application of factor analysis. Factor analysis is a 
generic label that has been created in order to describe a family of multivariate statistical 
methods that can be used for data reduction and summarization (Stewart, 1981; 
DeVellis, 1991). The objective of factor analysis is to condense the data gathered on a 
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number of original variables, into a smaller set of composite groups established by a 
correlation structure. Therefore, factor analysis seeks and identifies the dimensions that 
underlie the original variables and the data reduction ability being one of the main 
reasons why factor analysis is so popular among researchers (Gorsuch, 1997; Kerlinger, 
1986).  Furthermore, various variants of the factor analysis technique exist such as 
unweighted least squares, maximum likelihood, generalized least squares and one of the 
most frequently used the principal components analysis type of factor modeling 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1994).  
In short, the decision of which type of factor analysis to be employed rests on the 
objectives of the factor analysis and a priori knowledge about the variance in the 
variables (Hair et al, 2010). Principal component analysis has the strong advantages of 
being free of distributional assumptions and of being less prone to improper solutions 
than maximum likelihood (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Despite the varied opinions among 
researchers regarding which type is more appropriate, this analysis employed principal 
component analysis. Thus, the objective to achieve the minimum amount of factors 
which “were accounted for the maximum portion of the variance represented in the 
original set of variables (Hair et al, 2010, pp.109)” was achieved. 
The next decision pertaining to factor analysis is the number of factors to be extracted. 
Since there is not an exact quantitative approach for deciding the number of factors to be 
retained in the factor solution, researchers are usually adopting the latent root criterion, 
the scree test and the percentage of variance explained (Hair et al, 2010; Churchill, 
2005). The rationale of the latent root criterion or eigenvalue or as alternatively known 
Kaiser’s (1958) criterion is that any “individual factor should account for the variance of 
at least a single variable” and as such only the “factors having eignvalues greater than 1 
are considered significant (Hair et al, 2010)”. The rational of a scree test is to identify 
the optimum numbers of factors that can be extracted before the amount of unique 
variance begins to dominate the common variance structure (Cattell, 1966). By plotting 
the latent roots against the number of factors in their order of extraction, and by 
identifying the point in which the resulting curve begins to straighten out, we have an 
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initial solution of the maximum number of factors to be extracted.  In the present study 
both the latent root criterion and the scree test were used. 
It was decided that variables with factor loading over 0.40 and occasionally 0.50 were 
considered significant. Taking into account the effects of size on the significance of the 
factor loading (Hair et al, 2010), that is, the larger the sample size the lower the factor 
loading can be, (Bryman and Cramer, 1994; Kim and Mueller, 1978). 
Finally, a decision on the kind of rotation procedure is a necessary step and should be 
considered. Two of the most well-known rotational techniques are: the orthogonal and 
the oblique. In orthogonal rotation, the factors are constrained to be uncorrelated and in 
oblique rotation, the factors are allowed to intercorrelate (Brown, 2006).The former 
computes the extracted factors so that their axes are maintained at 90°. Also, each factor 
is independent and the correlation between them is determined to be 0. The latter permits 
factor axis orientations of less than 90°. Due to the development of appropriate computer 
packages the orthogonal techniques more widely used. Also, because of the perception 
that orthogonally rotated solutions are more easily interpreted as the factor loadings 
represent correlations between the indicators and the latent factors (Brown 2006). 
Additionally it is preferable when the research aim is to utilise the factor results in a 
subsequent analysis (Dillon and Goldstein, 1984; Bryman and Cramer, 1994).   
Having determined that the orthogonal rotation technique was appropriate for our 
research, it was decided that amongst the existing approaches (Quartimax, Varimax, and 
Equimax), which are available within the orthogonal technique, the Varimax approach is 
most preferable since it produces a clearer separation of the factors (Kaiser, 1970; 
Kaiser, 1974). 
As a final remark on the above discussion, it should be said that whereas factors loading 
were split across one or more factors, the variable was considered as part of the factor in 
which it carried the highest loading. In the case, that factor loadings were nearly equal 
across one or more factors the variable was included as part of the factor to which was 
conceptually relevant. Factor analysis is presented in detail in Chapter 6. 
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4.6.4.1. Construction of Scale indices 
It has been mentioned earlier that one of the objectives of the factor analysis is to reduce 
the number of variables measuring the same concept into a single variable, which in turn 
will form the basis for a subsequent statistical analysis. Therefore, additive scales, also 
known as cumulative, or summated, were constructed by calculating the composite 
factor mean of the variables with a loading greater than 0.40 (Crawford and Lomas, 
1980; Gerbing and Anderson, 1988; Baggozi, 1980). 
4.6.4.2. Assessing the Summated Scales 
As it has been already discussed in section 4.2, a content (conceptual or face) validity, 
internal consistency (unidimensionality and reliability), discriminant validity, 
convergent validity and nomological validity should be used for testing the newly 
constructed summated scales.  
Face validity was taken into account when the questionnaire was developed and the 
variables for inclusion had to correspond with the construct examined. The rationale for 
internal consistency is that the individual items of the scale should all be measuring the 
same construct and thus be highly inter-correlated (Hair et al, 2010; Churchill, 2005). 
Both the dimensionality and the reliability of the scale’s items used to assess internal 
consistency. The test of dimensionality is used to ascertain that the summated scales 
consist of items loading highly on a single factor (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Hattie, 
1985). Reliability refers to the degree of consistency between multiple measurements of 
the variable (Ho, 2006). Both the item-to-total correlation, that is the correlation of the 
item to the summated scale score, and the Cronbach alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951), 
which assess the consistency of the entire scale, were used. Nunnaly’s (1967) threshold 
level of acceptable reliability being an alpha coefficient of 0.50 or greater was adopted. 
Finally, correlation analysis was used for assessing the discriminant validity, which 
means that the summated scale sufficiently differs from other similar concepts (scales) 
and nomological validity was taken into account through a rigorous literature review. 
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4.6.5. Hypothesis Testing by Product –moment Correlation Analysis 
The next step in the statistical analysis was to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
3. Descriptive statistics, as it has been already disputed are used to provide a general 
illustration of the data, whereas inferential statistics are primarily used to infer the truth 
or falsity of a hypothesis. 
Even though, the hypotheses may not be able to be proved conclusively (see section 
4.2), it can be said that they might be able to prove or disproved them within a specified 
margin of error.  It is widely accepted that, “it is much easier to estimate our error of 
incorrectly rejecting a true hypothesis than to estimate our error of incorrectly accepting 
a false one (Bailey, 1994)”. Therefore researchers are developing two mutually 
exclusive hypotheses. The first one is called the null hypothesis and specifies statistical 
independence (ρ=0), which means that there is no relationship between the variables. 
The second hypothesis is the proposed one, and as such it assumes that there is a 
relationship between the variables (ρ≠0). The former is symbolised by Ho and the latter 
by Ha: 
Ho: ρ=0 
Ha: ρ≠0 
Although Ha is the hypothesis that needs to be confirmed, instead of attempting to do so 
directly, an attempt is made to reject the null hypothesis (Ho) by setting an acceptable 
level of error (either 0.05 or 0.01). As such, by succeeding in rejecting the null 
hypothesis the assumption exists that the alternative hypothesis, that is, the Ha is true.  
Also, depending on the scales used (nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio), various 
measures of association have been developed such as phi coefficient (for two nominal 
variables), gamma (for ordinal scales) rho for (ranked ordinal variables) and Pearson’s 
product moment correlation coefficient (for interval scales). Because of the interval 
nature of the scales used, the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were 
calculated to determine the nature, strength and significance of the hypothesised 
associations between the variables. Nonetheless, a mere calculation of the value of r is 
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not sufficient. A test of the statistical significance of r must be performed. As such, the t-
statistic was calculated, which tests the null hypothesis, that is, the two variables under 
investigation are linearly independent. Finally it should be mentioned that the following 
assumptions should be valid in calculating the r: 
• Both variables are intervally measured 
• The two variables are distributed in a bivariate normal distribution 
• The relationship is linear 
• The sample is of adequate size (over 30) to assume normality 
 
4.6.6. Choice of Multivariate Technique 
A researcher uses multivariate techniques in order to expand his explanatory ability and 
statistical efficiency (Hair et al 2010). Multivariate techniques include multiple 
regression analysis, factor analysis (discussed in detail in Section 4.6.4), multivariate 
analysis of variance are some of the techniques that provide the researcher with tools to 
tackle with managerial and theoretical questions. All of these though share one common 
limitation; they can only examine a single relationship at a time (Hair et al 2010). 
4.6.7. Structural Equation Modelling 
Structural equation modelling (SEM from henceforward) is a family of statistical models 
that tries to find relationships among multiple variables (Hair et al., 2010).  SEM is a 
multivariate technique that is described as a combination of both factor analysis and path 
analysis (Ho, 2006). In doing so it examines the structure of interrelationships expressed 
in a series of equations, similar to a series of multiple regression equations. These 
equations depict all of the relationships among constructs (the dependent and 
independent variables) involved in the analysis. Constructs are unobservable or latent 
factors represented by multiple variables (much like variables representing a factor in 
factor analysis). SEM can be thought of as a unique combination of both types of 
multivariate techniques (interdependence and dependence), because its foundation lies in 
two familiar multivariate techniques: factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. 
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SEM models are able to be tested in different ways, all structural equation models are 
distinguished by three characteristics (Hair et al 2010): 
1. Estimation of multiple and interrelated dependence relationships 
2. An ability to represent unobserved concepts in these relationships and 
account for measurement error in the estimation process 
3. Defining a model to explain the entire relationships. 
SEM requires a large sample relative to other multivariate approaches. There exist 
different opinions relating to the minimum sample size (MacCallum et al., 2001). The 
sample size for SEM includes five considerations: 1) multivariate normality of the data. 
As data diverge more from the assumption of multivariate normality, then the ratio of 
respondents to parameters needs to increase. 2) Estimation technique. The most common 
SEM estimation procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). MLE can provide 
valid results with sample sizes as small as 50. Minimum sample sizes to ensure stable 
MLE solution increase when confronted with sampling error (MacCallum 2003). 3) 
Model complexity. The more complex a model can be, there is a need for larger 
samples. 4) Amount of missing data can complicate the testing of SEM models and the 
therefore the researcher should plan for an increase in sample size to offset any problems 
that might occur from the missing data (Hair et al., 2010). And 5) average error variance 
among the reflective indicators. Models containing multiple constructs with 
communalities less than 0.5 also require larger sizes for convergence and model stability 
(Enders and Bandalos, 2001).  
SEM in its most general form consists of two parts: the measurement model and the 
structural equation model. The measurement model specifies involves the rules of how 
the latent variables are measured in terms of the observed variables and it describes the 
measurement properties of the observed variables. The structural equation model is a 
flexible, comprehensive model that specifies the pattern relationships among 
independent and dependent variables, either observed or latent. It incorporates the 
strengths of multiple regression analysis, factor analysis and multivariate ANOVA 
(MANOVA) in a single model that can be evaluated statistically. Several statistical 
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programs exist and are convenient for performing SEM (LISREL, EQS, Mplus, 
AMMOS and CALIS). The statistical package chosen is AMOS as it comes as a package 
with SPSS and because of the graphical interface that provides which make it easier for 
the analysis. The SEM model and its consequent analysis are presented in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
4.7. Conclusion 
This Chapter has presented various issues relating to the empirical approach of this 
study. As such an account was given on a number of epistemological themes underling 
the empirical study, the adopted research design approach, sampling procedures, as well 
as issues relating to survey implementation. 
An account of what constitutes theory and the theoretical foundations of business 
research was presented. Definitions for ontology and epistemology were provided along 
with descriptions of the most important philosophies of science in management studies 
which are the critical realism, positivism, constructivism, interpretivism and 
pragmatism. This thesis empirical and ontological framework, this thesis is based on 
principles of positivism and the primary ontological assumption of the study is critical 
realism. 
In addition the main components of contruct validity were presented along with their 
relative techniques for analysis. Validity in this study, was achieved by communicating, 
during the pre-testing phase, all the relevant proposed items to managers and experts in 
their field. Validity check has been taken into account by carrying out exploratory factor 
analysis. As far as reliability assessment, convergent, discriminant and nomological 
validity and are concerned the results are presented in Chapter 6. 
The most appropriate research design for the purposes of this study is considered to be 
the combination of descriptive and causal research approach. Because of time and 
budget restrictions in addition to career pressures have forced the majority of the 
researchers to adopt a cross-sectional approach. 
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In this thesis, a descriptive approach was used, on primary data with a five point scale 
(both Likert and Semantic) and the use of the subjective (questionnaire) approach was 
employed.  
Furthermore, the web survey process was described, along with the development of the 
questionnaire, the bilingual and pre-testing procedures. Also, the population, sample size 
key informants and non-respondents were discussed. Finally a classification and choice 
of statistical technique was made. The chosen techniques were, descriptive statistics, 
factor analysis, principal components analysis, scale indices and structural equation 
modelling (SEM).   
In the following chapter, the descriptive findings will be presented and discussed. 
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5. Descriptive Research Findings 
5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 4 discussed issues related to the methodology and the essential elements of an 
empirical research project. This chapter delves into the analysis of the data collected, 
with the use of descriptive statistics. Items that will be presented and analysed include, 
but are not limited to, the sample description, response frequencies, mean values and 
standard deviations of all response values. The frequency tables for all the research 
questions are presented in Appendix III. 
5.2. Sample Description 
5.2.1. Industry 
The sample in this study comprises Greek acquirers that were involved in M&A activity 
during the period 2005 to 2009. Table 5.1 presents the distribution of the sample of 
M&A deals on the basis of the industry the companies in the sample data operate in. 
There are a number of different classification systems available that facilitate the 
identification of the industry in which companies operate. The most widely known are 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS)1 and the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) and the 
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE). 
NACE is similar in function to the SIC and NAICS systems. Therefore, using the 
NACE, there were a total of 15 major industries identified in the sample out of the 136 
companies that responded to the questionnaire.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 NAICS has to a large extent replaced the SIC system. Note however that the SIC codes are still 
being used by certain government departments and agencies, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
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Code Industry Frequency (%) Cumulative (%) 
D Manufacturing 36 26.47% 26.47% 
J Financial Intermediation 32 23.53% 50.00% 
K 70 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  10 7.35% 57.35% 
G 52 Retail Trade 8 5.88% 63.24% 
A Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry 7 5.15% 68.38% 
G 51 Wholesale Trade 7 5.15% 73.53% 
K74.15 Management activities of holding companies 7 5.15% 78.68% 
L 75.12 Health Care and Social Assistance 6 4.41% 83.09% 
H 55 Hotels and Restaurants 6 4.41% 87.50% 
J63.1 Information 5 3.68% 91.18% 
M Professional, Scientific and Technical Services  4 2.95% 94.12% 
C 23 Construction 3 2.21% 96.32% 
I 63 Transportation and Warehousing  3 2.21% 98.53% 
CB 14 Mining 1 0.74% 99.26% 
F42.2 Utilities  1 0.74% 100.00% 
 
Total 136 100% 
 
 
Table 5.1: Classifications of Sample Industries  
The statistics reported in Table 5.1 indicate that the majority of companies that 
participated in the study (50%) fall under the Manufacturing (26.47%) and Finance and 
Insurance (23.53%) industries, respectively. Other industries that are represented in the 
sample include Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (7.35%), Retail Trade (5.88%), 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (5.15%), Wholesale Trade (5.15%) and 
Management of Companies and Enterprises (5.15%). The above industries represent 
78.68% of the sample in this study. 
5.2.2. Relative Size 
Figure 5.1 presents the distribution of the relative size of the target to the acquirer – on 
the basis of their annual sales (this is formulated as the ratio  of Target Sales to Acquirer 
Sales). For the majority of the deals (60.3%), the relative size ratio was below 25%, 
while only 2.9% of the sampled deals exhibited a ratio above 100%. This indicates that 
the sampled deals mainly represent cases where large firms acquire smaller ones. 
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This is in line with an early study of M&As in Greece, (Katsos and Lekakis, 1991) 
which found that small to medium firms merge only with similar sized firms and that  
firms tried to combine capital assets and marketing networks. According to Gorton et 
al., (2009) there are difficulties in acquiring larger companies (i.e. raising larger funds to 
finance the acquisition) and that might explain the why in most acquisitions the acquirer 
tends to be substantially larger than the target. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Relative size of the target to the acquirer 
 
5.2.3. Relatedness  
Table 5.2 presents data on the degree of relatedness between the targets’ and the 
acquirers’ business. The statistics indicate that for the majority of companies there was a 
relatively high degree of business relatedness, since the percentage of managers who 
responded “a lot” or “absolutely” in the questionnaire was above 50%. For example, in 
questions concerning the similarity of the products/services, 46.3% and 25.7% of the 
surveyed managers responded that their products display “a lot of” or “absolute” 
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similarity with the products of the merging firm, respectively. As far as similarities in 
technology are concerned, 39.7% of the managers identified their technologies as being 
“a lot similar” to those of the target firm. In addition, according to 50.7% and 15.4% of 
the respondents, the type of customers they sold their products to, were “a lot similar” 
and “absolutely” similar, respectively.  
Furthermore, in most cases, the companies were not direct competitors, with 68.4% of 
the respondents indicating a range of responses between “not at all” to “neutral”. Finally, 
their products/services were in most cases classified as being complementary (34.6%). 
Nature of Relatedness Not at 
all 
Some Neutral A  
lot 
Absolutely Mean SD 
Your products/services were 
similar 
13 
9.6% 
17 
12.5% 
8 
5.9% 
63 
46.3% 
35 
25.7% 
3.66 1.25 
Your technology was similar 10 
7.4% 
29 
21.3% 
21 
15.4% 
54 
39.7% 
22 
16.2% 
3.36 1.19 
Your geographical markets 
were similar 
18 
13.2% 
19 
14% 
20 
14.7% 
57 
41.9% 
22 
16.2% 
3.34 1.27 
The types of customers to 
which you sold were similar 
17 
12.5% 
14 
10.3% 
15 
11% 
69 
50.7% 
21 
15.4% 
3.46 1.22 
You were direct competitors 37 
27.2% 
19 
14% 
37 
27.2% 
27 
19.9% 
16 
11.8% 
2.75 1.36 
Your products/services were 
complementary 
23 
16.9% 
18 
13.2% 
31 
22.8% 
47 
34.6% 
17 
12.5% 
3.13 1.28 
 
Table 5.2: Nature of Relatedness N=136 
According to Seth (1990b), the possible synergistic gains are greater in large related 
acquisitions than in large unrelated ones. Different degrees of relatedness can have 
different effects on value creation and therefore on acquisition performance (Lee and 
Liebermand, 2010). In addition congruent lines of business that exist within a firm have 
the ability to generate competitive advantage by allowing resource sharing (D’ Aveni et 
al., 2004). As such, opportunities for cost savings can be achieved through divestiture of 
redundant assets, as the degree of relatedness increases and from redeploying resources 
into new areas that can be more productive and potentially combining them with new 
resources (Capron, et al.,, 1998; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980, 1982).  
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Since the sample contains companies that engage mostly in related acquisitions, 
according to the managers responses, there is a possibility of a positive effect on post-
acquisition performance. 
5.2.4. Geographical Scope 
Next, the geographical scope of the deals is considered. Figure 5.2 depicts the 
geographic distribution of the sampled acquisitions and separates them into domestic vs. 
cross-border ones. Domestic acquisitions constitute the overwhelming majority (80%) of 
the sampled cases, whereas cross-border acquisitions only account for 20% of the 
sample. It has long been disputed that cross-border acquisitions help acquirers improve 
their capabilities by obtaining access to diverse resources and environments (Hitt et 
al.,1997, 1998;  Nadolska and Barkema, 2007).  
Another strand of literature contends that cross-border acquisitions are mainly driven by 
the acquirer’s desire to redeploy its excess resources and to use the target’s location 
specific resources in order to cater for the redeployment of other resources (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Hennart, 1982; Morck and Yeung, 1992; Anand et al., 
2005).  The resource based view argues that firms often seek complex and difficult to 
imitate resources and capabilities through acquisitions rather than contractually through 
discrete factor markets (Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Capron and 
Chatain, 2008;  Kunc and Morecroft, 2010).  
 
Figure 5.2: Acquisitions Geographic Scope 
 
80%
20%
Domestic
Cross-Border
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Furthermore, given the large number of financial institutions in the sample, there was an 
expectation of a smaller number of cross-border acquisitions, as in many studies, 
international acquisitions tend to be less efficient than domestic ones (Buch and Delong 
2004). In addition, Berger et al. (2001) suggest that efficiency barriers (geographical, 
different languages, different cultures) impede cross-border activity and therefore offset 
some of the gains of cross-border consolidation. Also, according to Fang et al (2007), 
marketing knowledge resources can have a direct application in the same geographic 
setting, while technological knowledge resources might yet require time to be adapted 
for advantage in the new business line. Finally, Danbolt (2004) suggests that target 
shareholders may gain more in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions if acquiring 
companies share cost savings with target shareholders. 
5.2.5. Target’s Home Country 
Figure 5.3 presents the distribution of the target’s home country. It is clear that the 
majority of the targets are domestic 110 (81%), while 22 cases (16%) represent 
acquisitions of targets from Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Cyprus, 
Ukraine and Poland) and the remaining 4 (3%) come from Asia and Africa (Turkey and 
Egypt). Home country and industry interactions can have a significant effect because of 
country specific resources, culture, and institutions that stimulate the development of 
specific industries over others (Tallman & Li, 1996; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & 
Peng, 2005; McGahan, A. M., & Victer, R. 2009).  
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Figure 5.3: Target’s Home Country 
5.2.6. Type of Diversification 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the type of diversification the acquirer aimed to achieve through 
the M&A deal. The type of acquisition, and, more specifically, focus vs. diversification, 
has received great attention in strategy research, yet there is little agreement on the 
relationship between diversification and performance (Palich et al., 2000; Teece, 1982). 
According to Ng (2007), the reasons behind the diversification of an organisation into 
unrelated businesses are not well understood in strategy research. It is evident in Figure 
that most of the companies in the sample (42.6%) diversified into related business, 
23.5% focused on one main business, and 33.8% were conglomerates that diversified 
into unrelated business. Wan et. al. (2011) show that, diversification contributes to 
superior performance and therefore firm value increased to the point where resources 
become too complex to manage or business units become unrelated. 
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Figure 5.4: Acquirer Diversification Type 
 
5.2.7. Type of Payment 
Next the thesis turns to the examination of the type of payment that was used for the 
acquisition. The method of payment entails information about the acquirer’s assessment 
of either its own value or the value of the target (Loughran and Anand, 1997; and Rau 
and Vermaelen 1998) and it can imply that managers who believe their stock is 
overvalued (undervalued) pay with stock (cash).  
Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of methods of payment used by the acquiring firms to 
acquire the target companies. It is clear that cash was used as the preferred means of 
payment in majority of cases (79%), followed by securities (10.1%), securities exchange 
(6.5%), and a combination of cash and securities (4.3%). This evidence is in line with 
the results obtained by Faccio and Masulis (2005), who studied M&A deals that took 
place in 13 European countries, over the period January:1997- December: 2000; the 
authors found that out of 3,667 cases studied, 80.23%, were settled with cash. Other 
similar studies they exhibit a number of interesting results, for example, Conn et al. 
2005 found that bids funded with any method of payment except cash lose -0.47% over 
a period of 36 months after the announcement. Further on, evidence reported from a 
32%
44%
24%
Conglomerate diversified into
unrelated businesses
Firm diversified into related
businesses
Firm focused on one main
business
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sample of 179 successful British bids from Antoniou and Zao (2004), showed that equity 
bids have a tendency to under achieve considerably in the first and second years after the 
bid took place. 
  
Figure 5.5: Type of payment 
Many studies using empirical evidence point to lower or negative bidder abnormal 
returns for stock-financed acquisitions, while higher or positive for cash-financed 
acquisitions (Alan, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). On the other hand, Alan (1997) 
reports negative and significant abnormal returns related with cash offers,  Fields, Fraser 
and Kolari (2007a) find insignificant results, and Chang (1998) finds insignificant bidder 
excess return for cash offers and positive and significant bidder excess return for stock 
offers. Consistent evidence appears in their work, that cash bids are associated with 
better performance in both the short run and the long run (Cosh and Guest 2001; Linn 
and Switzer 2001; Loughran and Vijh 1997). Bids funded with any method of payment 
except cash, lose -0.47% over a period of 36 months after the announcement (Conn et 
al,. 2005). In general, the existing evidence suggests that cash bids outperform equity 
bids. Thus, payment method is expected to have an effect on post-acquisition 
performance given the large number of cash financed acquisition in the sample. 
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5.2.8. Acquisition Classification 
Figure 5.6 presents the classification of acquisitions into hostile and friendly ones. The 
large majority of cases (95.7%) reviewed in this study, are classified as friendly 
acquisitions. Weir and Laing (2003) used a sample consisting of 104 friendly M&As in 
1998 and an equal number of hostile deals and concluded that friendly acquired 
companies turned out to be more efficient, to use their assets more effectively, and to 
have a lower market-to-book value ratio, compared with target companies in hostile 
bids. 
 
Figure 5.6: Acquisition Classification 
Even though the hostile takeovers comprise only a small number of the sample (N=6) a 
comparison of the means was conducted and the results are summarised in Table 5.3 
Comparing the means from the two sub-samples (Friendly versus Hostile) it is evident 
that there are no significant differences between the two. The hostile cases have a greater 
mean in both the resource redeployment to the target and from the acquirer. In addition 
greater means are observed on product cost, input prices and product line. Interestingly, 
the retention of the management team and the formal organisational changes have a 
higher mean in the hostile takeovers.  
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Measures 
Friendly 
N=130 
Hostile N=6 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviat
ion 
Mean 
Std. 
Devia
tion 
Resource 
Redeployment of the 
Target 
Use of acquired business’s product innovation 
capabilities 2.65 1.293 3.00 1.414 
Use of acquired business’s know-how in 
manufacturing process/ services 2.63 1.162 3.17 1.472 
Use of acquired business’s marketing expertise 2.52 1.143 2.83 1.169 
Use of acquired business’s supplier’s 
relationship 2.80 1.074 3.50 0.837 
Use of acquired business’s distribution expertise 2.87 1.254 3.00 1.095 
Resource 
Redeployment of the 
Acquirer 
Transfer of product innovation capabilities 3.08 1.327 3.17 1.835 
Transfer of know-how in manufacturing 
process/ services 3.18 1.338 3.17 1.835 
Transfer of marketing expertise 3.32 1.410 3.50 1.378 
Use of your existing business’s supplier 
relations 3.38 1.296 3.50 1.378 
Transfer of distribution expertise 3.18 1.389 3.50 1.517 
Asset Divestiture of 
the Target 
Manufacturing Facilities and Workforce 2.01 1.340 2.17 1.125 
Distribution facilities and personnel 2.19 1.408 1.83 1.033 
Sales facilities and personnel 2.18 1.402 1.67 1.080 
Administrative facilities and personnel 2.48 1.545 1.75 0.822 
R&D facilities and personnel 2.09 1.465 1.75 0.935 
Asset Divestiture of 
the Acquirer 
Manufacturing Facilities and Workforce 1.38 0.582 1.00 0.000 
Distribution facilities and personnel 1.48 0.710 1.08 0.204 
Sales facilities and personnel 1.39 0.575 1.08 0.204 
Administrative facilities and personnel 1.36 0.616 1.17 0.258 
R&D facilities and personnel 1.33 0.527 1.17 0.258 
Innovation Capability 
R&D Capabilities 3.97 0.818 3.58 0.801 
Design Cycle 3.98 0.782 3.67 0.817 
Cost Savings 
Product Cost 4.03 0.750 4.08 0.801 
Input Prices 4.03 0.753 4.33 0.817 
Market Coverage 
Product Line 3.97 0.810 4.25 0.758 
Geographical Coverage 4.18 0.807 4.17 0.983 
Post-Acquisition 
Performance 
Market Share 4.02 0.670 3.67 1.033 
Sales 3.92 0.794 3.33 1.033 
Intrinsic Profitability 3.78 0.860 3.25 1.782 
Relative Profit 3.70 0.714 3.00 1.549 
Organisational 
Changes 
Organisational network changes 4.05 0.806 3.33 1.033 
Organisational knowledge changes 3.95 0.806 3.83 1.169 
Retention of the Management team 3.68 1.058 3.83 1.472 
Formal organizational changes 3.62 0.875 4.17 0.983 
Table 5.3: Classification of the acquisition 
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Those results even though inconclusive due to the small number of hostile acquisitions 
seem to follow the literature. The increased resource redeployment mean values for the 
hostile cases seem to be consistent with the literature that argues that corporate renewal 
is a two stage process; first managers maximise the individual businesses and then 
integrate them (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). In addition regarding the organisational changes increased mean values 
in combination with the lower post-acquisition performance mean values, might be due 
to greater hostile takeover premiums paid. 
A larger proportion of the acquirer’s wealth might be applied on the acquisition itself 
and this can have as a result a negative effect on post-acquisition performance (Tuch and 
Sullivan, 2007). In addition, acquisitions are dependent on the process of learning and 
value creation especially in the post-acquisition integration phase (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Therefore, an efficient post-acquisition transition is critical to avoid upsetting 
management structures and teams and provide improved integration of the resources 
(Kumar, 2009; Zollo and Meier, 2008). Finally, Sun et al., (2012) suggested value in the 
transaction and the smooth transition of management teams can be created only by 
friendly negotiation with the target firm to reach a friendly takeover. Thus, taking into 
consideration the large number of friendly acquisitions, their classification is expected to 
have an effect on post-acquisition performance. 
5.3. Acquisition Rationalisation 
In Table 5.4 the statistics on the rationalisation of the acquisition are presented. In 
particular, the table shows the managers’ attitude toward the importance of one of the 
following five reasons to go on with an acquisition: market share increase, geographical 
expansion, expansion in new product lines, cost efficiency and eliminate/reduce 
competition; the responses vary in scale from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the highest rank 
(most significant) and 5 the lowest (least significant). As such, the N/A section includes 
the number of respondents that did not provide a ranking for each respective 
rationalisation reason.  
140 
 
 
N/A Most 
significant Significant Neutral 
Less 
significant 
Least 
significant Mean SD 
Market share 
increase 
15 
(11%) 
49 
(36%) 
29 
(21.3%) 
13 
(9.6%) 
17 
(12.5%) 
13 
(9.6%) 2.31 1.401 
Geographical 
expansion 
20 
(14.7%) 
28 
(20.6%) 
15 
(11%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
21 
(15.4%) 2.97 1.435 
Expansion in 
new product 
lines 
16 
(11.8%) 
22 
(16.2%) 
35 
(25.7%) 
20 
(14.7%) 
21 
(15.4%) 
22 
(16.2%) 2.88 1.391 
Cost efficiency 24 
(17.6%) 
25 
(18.4%) 
16 
(11.8%) 
30 
(22.1%) 
28 
(20.6%) 
13 
(9.6%) 2.89 1.391 
Eliminate/redu
ce competition 
35 
(25.7%) 
11 
(8.1%) 
12 
(8.8%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
16 
(11.8%) 
36 
(26.5%) 
3.53 1.368 
Table 5.4: Acquisition Rationalisation N=136 
The percentages for each rationalisation are also presented below. The main motive 
behind the rationalisation for the acquisition according to 49 out of 121 respondents was 
to increase market share (36%).  
On the contrary, the motive that ranked last according to the questionnaire answers was 
to eliminate or reduce competition, where, out 101 respondents, 36 of them considered it 
as the as the least significant reason (26.5%).  
The second most significant rationale was geographic expansion, as indicated by 20.6% 
of the respondents. Because of the expectation of increased post-acquisition performance 
given the larger number of domestic acquisitions in the sample and by taking into 
account Danbolt (2004) who argued that economies of scale may be easier to achieve in 
domestic than in cross-border acquisitions, it makes sense that managers chose the 
geographical expansion as an important motive. 
 Expansion in new product lines ranked 3rd among responses, where 22 out of 120 
(18.3%) respondents consider it as the most significant motive, and 35 (29.2%) viewed it 
as a significant rationale for an acquisition.  
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As far as cost efficiency is concerned, 25 out of the 112 respondents (22.3%) consider it 
as a significant motive while 30 (26.8%) gave it a score of 3 (neutral), which renders it 
4th. 
5.4. Organisational Changes 
Table 5.5 presents the statistics regarding the impact of organisational changes that took 
place within the business/es after the acquisition. Four items/ variables were used to 
capture these changes, namely post-acquisition network changes, post-acquisition 
knowledge changes, retention of the acquired firms’ management team and formal 
organisational changes affected from the retention of the management team. 
In the first item, the post-acquisition organisational network changes, has a mean of 
4.01, which means that the 56 out of 136 respondents considered the network changes as 
a “positive Impact”. It was previously argued in Chapter 2 that interpersonal networks 
add value (Achrol, 1997) and the Top Management Team’s (TMT) network of internal 
and external affiliations in which a successful firm is rooted can play a significant role to 
the continuation of its success (Kiessling et al (2008).  
Looking at the responses related to organisational knowledge change, 39.7% (54) rated 
these changes as “somewhat positive” and 28.7% (39) as “positive”. Several authors 
argue that knowledge and the competencies built on this platform are the main factor in 
determining an organisation’s current and future value (Thurow, 1996; Hamel, 2000). 
Organisational knowledge is considered as one of the most important resources of the 
organisation (Grant 1996; Kiessling et al., 2008) from a strategic point of view.  
Shifting the focus to the organisational changes affected from the retention of 
management team from the acquired firm, 36% (49) of the respondents viewed them as 
“neutral” and 29.4% (40) as “positive”. Differences in culture and management 
techniques can have a major negative impact on acquisition performance (Chatterjee et 
al 1992; Datta 1991).  
 Finally, 32.4% (44) of the respondents viewed the formal organisational changes 
affected from the retention of the acquired firm as “somewhat positive”. Differences in 
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top management styles have a negative impact on post-acquisition performance (Datta 
1991). In addition, differences in culture and management styles can have significant 
negative impact on acquisition performance (Chatterjee et al 1992; Datta 1991).  
 Negative 
Impact 
Somewhat 
Negative 
Neutral Somewhat 
Positive 
Positive 
Impact 
Mean SD 
Post-acquisition 
organisational network 
changes 
0 
 
4 
(2.9%) 
33 
(24.3%) 
56 
(41.2%) 
43 
(31.6%) 4.01 0.82 
Post-acquisition 
organisational knowledge 
changes 
0 
 
3 
2.2% 
40 
29.4% 
54 
39.7% 
39 
28.7% 3.95 0.81 
Retention of the acquired 
firm’s management team 4 2.9% 
11 
8.1% 
49 
36 % 
32 
23.5% 
40 
29.4% 3.68 1.07 
Formal organisational 
changes affected from the 
retention of the acquired 
firm 
2 
1.5% 
5 
3.7% 
59 
43.4% 
44 
32.4% 
26 
19.1% 3.64 0.88 
Table 5.5: Organisational Changes N=136   
Given that one important organizational change is the retention (or not) of the target’s 
top management team, respondents were asked to indicate the number of senior 
executives (i.e. chairman, president, CFO) that were made redundant following the 
acquisition. Table 5.6 shows that for 49.3% of the cases examined, no executive was 
made redundant, followed by 11.6% of deals, where two executives from the top 
management team were made redundant following the acquisition. Finally, no 
information regarding the senior executives that were made redundant (N/A) was 
provided in 6 cases (4.3%). 
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Executives Left Frequency Percentage % 
None 67 49.3 
One 12 8.8 
Two 16 11.8 
Three 16 11.8 
Four 6 4.4 
Five 9 6.6 
Six 1 0.7 
Seven 2 1.5 
Ten 1 0.7 
N/A 6 4.4 
Total 136 100 
Table 5.6: Senior Executives made redundant 
The departure of an acquired firm’s top managers, and the consequent loss of their 
knowledge and skills, is thought to be an important determinant of poor post-acquisition 
performance (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Therefore, a negative relationship with the 
senior executive redundancies and post-acquisition performance is expected. 
5.5. Post-acquisition Divestiture Measures 
This section presents the statistics of the respondent’s answers to questions regarding 
their assessment of the rationalisation and restructuring measures that have been 
implemented following the acquisition. After the acquisition a vigorous restructuring 
starts that involves a significant number of sell-offs and closures of the target firm’s 
assets (Maksimovic, 2011). The managers responded to the questions from two different 
perspectives that of a) the acquired business and, b) existing business. 
Table 5.7 presents statistics on the responses related to the targets’ degree of 
consolidation and restructuring across five functions, namely: manufacturing, 
distribution and services, sales networks, administrative services and R&D. Those 
functions were also divided into two parts: a) consolidation/restructuring of physical 
manufacturing facilities and/or points of services, and, b) reduction in 
manufacturing/services workforce following the acquisition. Five thresholds were 
defined in order to capture to what percentage the assets and the personnel were affected 
(0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80% and 81-100%). 
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Acquired Business 
 
0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 
81-
100% 
% of physical manufacturing facilities/ points of 
services closed or resold 
73 
(53.7%) 
24 
(17.6%) 
14 
(10.3%) 
8 
(5.9%) 
17 
(12.5%) 
% of manufacturing/services workforce cut 74 (54.4%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
15 
(11%) 
7 
(5.1%) 
14 
(10.3%) 
% of physical distribution facilities closed or resold 63 
(46.3%) 
30 
(22%) 
16 
(11.8%) 
5 
(3.7%) 
22 
16.2% 
% of distribution personnel cut 63 
46.3% 
34 
25% 
15 
11% 
6 
4.4% 
18 
13.3% 
% of sales networks closed or resold 62 
45.6% 
33 
23.9% 
18 
13% 
1 
0.7% 
22 
15.9% 
% of sales personnel cut 65 
47.8% 
27 
19.6% 
20 
14.7% 
7 
5.1% 
17 
12.5% 
% of administrative services closed 57 
41.9% 
24 
17.6% 
16 
11.8% 
9 
6.6% 
30 
22.1% 
% of administrative personnel cut 58 
42.6% 
27 
19.9% 
14 
10.3% 
13 
9.6% 
24 
17.6% 
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold 74 
54.4% 
25 
18.4% 
10 
7.4% 
3 
2.2% 
25 
17.6% 
% of R&D personnel cut 76 
55.9% 
24 
17.6% 
10 
7.4% 
7 
5.1% 
19 
14% 
Table 5.7: Consolidation and Restructuring of Acquired Business N=136 
The statistics illustrate that the degree of post-acquisition asset divestiture varies across 
the five functions and the various levels. Specifically, the extent of asset divestiture was 
concentrated in the 0-20% threshold of assets divested for the majority of cases. 
Specifically, in 54.4% of the deals the acquisition resulted in closing down or reselling 
up to 20% of the Physical R&D facilities of the acquired firm; this could be explained 
by the fact that a further R&D consolidation of the acquired business would risk 
damaging the innovative capabilities of the acquired firm. 
Similar observations can be made on distribution, services and sales networks, with 45% 
to 47% divesting only 0-20% of their assets, as the commercial presence and image of 
the firm could easily be hindered. 
Also it is worth noting that for the administrative services 42% of the companies’ 
divested 0-20% of their assets. Also, 20% to 22% of the acquirers divested above the 
81% threshold of their assets, because the firm can easily undertake divestiture measures 
with a lower risk of damaging performance (Capron, 1999) 
145 
 
Table 5.8 presents the respondents’ indication of the percentage of consolidation and 
restructuring that took place for the existing business across five functions 
(manufacturing, distribution and services, sales networks, administrative services and 
R&D).  
Existing Business Percentage 0-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 
% of physical manufacturing facilities 87 (64%) 
40 
(29.4%) 
7 
(5.1%) 
2 
(1.5%) 0 
% of manufacturing/services workforce cut 102 (75%) 
30 
(22%) 
2 
(1.5%) 
2 
(1.5%) 0 
% of physical distribution facilities closed or resold 79 
58.1% 
48 
35.3% 
6 
4.4% 
2 
1.5% 
1 
0.7% 
% of distribution personnel cut 92 
67.6% 
36 
26.5% 
5 
3.7% 
1 
0.7% 
2 
1.5% 
% of sales networks closed or resold 86 
62.3% 
46 
33.3% 
5 
3.6% 
1 
0.7% 0 
% of sales personnel cut 101 
74.6% 
28 
20.3% 
6 
4.3% 
1 
0.7% 0 
% of administrative services closed 92 
67.6% 
38 
27.9% 
4 
2.9% 
1 
0.7% 
1 
0.7% 
% of administrative personnel cut 100 
73.5% 
31 
22.8% 
4 
2.9% 0 
1 
0.7% 
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold 95 
69.9% 
34 
25% 
6 
4.4% 
1 
0.7% 0 
% of R&D personnel cut 102 
75% 
31 
22.8% 
3 
2.2% 0 0 
Table 5.8: Consolidation and Restructuring of Existing Business (N=136) 
Consistent with the structure of the above question, those functions were divided to two 
parts: a) consolidation/restructuring of physical manufacturing facilities and/or points of 
services, and, b) reduction in manufacturing/services workforce following the 
acquisition. The results indicate that for the most cases, the acquirers divested their 
assets less than or equal to 20% across all of the five functions. 
Having analysed the results for both the target and the acquirer a comparison of the 
extent of asset divestiture of the target and acquiring firms were made. For example, 
looking into the 61% and above threshold (61% to 100%) of the assets divested 
following the acquisition, a total of 18.4% (=12.5% + 5.9%) was reported as far as the 
reduction in the physical manufacturing facilities and/or points of services closed of the 
target firm was concerned; the corresponding figure for the acquiring firm was 1.5% 
(=1.5%+0%). The same held across all functions. Therefore, the target’s assets were 
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divested in greater numbers than the acquirer’s assets. Of course, the fact that the 
target’s assets are more likely to be divested than the acquirer’ is a finding consistent 
with those in the literature (see Capron et al., 2001; Maksimovic, 2011). 
Figure 5.7 shows the estimates for the relevant ratio across other types of assets. It is 
clear that asset divestiture involves mainly the target’s assets.  
Figure 5.7: Extent of Asset Divestiture across Acquiring and Target Firms 
According to Capron (1999), one can effortlessly undergo asset divestiture measures 
with a decreased risk of impairing the innovative capabilities of the business, its 
commercial presence or even its image on the market. The statistics in Table 5.7 and 
Table 5.8 suggest that post-acquisition divestiture measures have a differential impact 
upon the acquirer and the target. The data indicate therefore that the target’s assets are 
more likely to be divested than that of the acquirer’s something which is consistent with 
the literature (Capron et al 2001; Maksimovic, 2011). 
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5.6. Post-acquisition Resource Redeployment Measures 
This section presents the post-acquisition resource redeployment measures. A firm’s 
ability to deploy resources through organisational capabilities may be more important 
than absolute resource levels in driving performance (DeSarbo, et al, 2007).  
 In the survey managers were asked questions related to the transfer of resources, 
knowledge and capabilities across the acquired business and the existing business in 
order to capture the two means of enhancing revenues. Scales from 1 to 5 were used to 
assess the extent to which people have been collaborating and resources have been 
transferred, where 1 was “not at all” and 5 being “to a very large extent”. 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 report the extent of resource redeployment across five resource 
categories of the target.  Specifically, Table 5.9 presents the redeployment of resources 
from the target in order to assist the existing business. The descriptive statistics revealed 
that across all five categories the majority of the respondents reported that their 
businesses redeployed resources to “some extent”. For instance, R&D was mostly 
redeployed to “some extent” (33.1%), manufacturing was 27.9%, marketing (28.7%), 
supplier relationship (36%) and distribution expertise (26.5%). The above statistics are 
consistent with (Capron 1999), who states that redeployment from the target to the 
acquirer is rather uncommon. 
Across all five categories the majority of the respondents reported that their businesses 
redeployed resources to “some extent”. Also it is clear that redeployment "to a large 
extent" or to “a very large extent” was less common for the resource redeployment from 
targets to acquirers. R&D was mostly redeployed to “some extent” (33.1%), 
manufacturing was 27.9%, marketing (28.7%), supplier relationship (36%) and 
distribution expertise (26.5%). The above statistics are consistent with (Capron 1999), 
who states that redeployment from the target to the acquirer is rather infrequent. 
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Acquired Business 
Not at all Very 
Little 
To Some 
Extent 
To a 
Large 
Extent 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
Mean Sd 
Use of acquired 
business's product 
innovation capabilities 
31 
(22.8%) 
23 
(16.9%) 
45 
(33.1%) 
25 
(18.4%) 
12 
(8.8%) 
 
2.74 
 
1.24 
Use of acquired 
business's know-how 
in manufacturing 
process/services 
26 
(19.1%) 
38 
(27.9%) 
38 
(27.9%) 
25 
(18.4%) 
9 
(6.6%) 
 
2.65 
 
1.17 
Use of acquired 
business's marketing 
expertise 
30 
(22.1%) 
38 
(27.9%) 
39 
(28.7%) 
23 
(16.9%) 
6 
(4.4%) 
2.54 1.14 
Use of acquired 
business's supplier 
relationship 
19 
(14%) 
29 
(21.3%) 
49 
(36%) 
34 
(25%) 
5 
(3.7%) 
2.83 1.07 
Use of acquired 
business's distribution 
expertise 
24 
(17.6%) 
29 
(21.3%) 
36 
(26.5%) 
34 
(25%) 
13 
(9.6%) 
2.88 1.24 
N=136 
Table 5.9: Use of Resources from the acquired business to assist existing business 
 
Table 5.10 presents the findings related to the redeployment of resources from the 
existing business to the target. Conversely, looking into the descriptive statistics for 
redeployment of resources from the acquirer in order to assist the target revealed that 
across all five categories the majority of the respondents reported that their businesses 
redeployed resources to “a larger extent”. Specifically, it was observed for R&D 
(27.9%), manufacturing (36%), marketing (30.1%), supplier relationship (30.1%) and 
distribution expertise (30.9%). Again, those statistics are consistent with Capron (1999), 
and Capron et al., (2001) who showed that redeployment from the acquirer to the target 
is frequent. 
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Existing Business 
Not at 
all 
Very 
Little 
To 
Some 
Extent 
To a 
Large 
Extent 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
Mean Sd 
Transfer of product 
innovation capabilities to 
the acquired business 
24 
(17.6%) 
23 
(16.9%) 
29 
(21.3%) 
38 
(27.9%) 
22 
(16.2%) 
3.08 1.345 
Transfer of know-how in 
manufacturing process/ 
services to the acquired 
business  
23 
(16.9%) 
23 
(16.9%) 
19 
(14%) 
49 
(36%) 
22 
(16.2%) 
3.18 1.355 
Transfer of marketing 
expertise to the acquired 
business 
23 
(16.9%) 
16 
(11.8%) 
23 
(16.9%) 
41 
(30.1%) 
33 
(24.3%) 
3.33 1.404 
Use of your existing 
business’s supplier relations 
by the acquired business 
16 
(11.8%) 
18 
(13.2%) 
31 
(22.8%) 
40 
(29.4%) 
31 
(22.8%) 
3.38 1.294 
Transfer of distribution 
expertise to the acquired 
business 
26 
(19.1%) 
16 
(11.8%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
42 
(30.9%) 
26 
(19.1%) 
3.19 1.391 
N=136 
Table 5.10: Use of Resources from the Existing Business to assist acquired business 
Figure 5.8, presents a comparison of the extent of resource redeployment across the 
acquiring firm and the target yielded some interesting results. In order to calculate the 
degree of redeployment, the percentages of the responses “to a large extent” and “to a 
very large extent” for the acquiring firm and the target firm were summed up. A total of 
27.2% (=18.4%+8.8%) of the respondents declared there was redeployment of R&D to 
the acquiring firm; that is, the acquiring firm used the target firm’s product innovation 
capabilities “to a large extent” or “to a very large extent”, whereas, a total of 44.1% 
(=27.9%+16.2%) of the respondents believed that the target firm used the acquiring 
firm’s product innovation capabilities “to a large extent” or “to a very large extent”.  
 The extent of redeployment to target (i.e. the movement of resources from the acquirer 
to the target) was greater than the extent of redeployment to the acquiring firm. Thus, in 
the sampled cases of M&A activity, resources moved from the acquirers to the target 
companies. The above findings are consistent with Capron (1999) who stated that larger 
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redeployment from the acquirer to the target is commonly used in order to enhance post-
acquisition performance   
Figure 5.8: Extent of Resource Redeployment across Acquiring and Target Firms 
 
5.7. Value-creating Mechanisms 
Tables 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 present the statistics regarding the impact of the acquisition 
(cost savings, market coverage and innovation capability) on the acquired, existing 
business and consolidated business. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2 the model in this 
thesis considers three ways of improving revenues:  
First, opportunities for cost savings (product costs and input prices), achieved through 
divestiture of redundant assets, which can significantly be enhanced as the degree of 
relatedness increases and as the redeployment of resources into new areas takes place 
(Capron et al., 1998; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980, 1982). 
Second, is the increased market coverage (broadening of product line and geographical 
coverage). According to Aaker (1996) and Srivastava et al. (1998) market coverage can 
be increased in acquisitions through the geographic and product line expansion. 
Expanding across geography enables businesses to sell their products to whole new 
markets, which may result in increased revenues. 
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Third, enhanced innovation capability (R&D capabilities and design cycle) (Capron, 
1999).  Innovation capability can be converted into price premium and/or increased 
volume, resulting into higher profits (Capron and Hulland, 1999).  The reason being that 
the exploitation of these revenue-based synergies (increased market coverage and 
innovation capability) is usually realized through resource redeployment. 
Acquisitions can be seen as means to enhance performance by providing businesses with 
the opportunity to obtain preferential access to resources that cannot be purchased in a 
competitive market (Peteraf, 1993; King et. al 2008). Therefore, acquisitions can create 
value and enhance revenues by redeploying resources from the target to the acquirer 
and/or, from the acquirer to the target, respectively (Capron 1999). 
The questionnaire was divided into two sections (A and B) for these questions in order 
to capture all of the three cases. Section A referred to the acquired and existing business 
and Section B to the consolidated one. Out of the 136 respondents, 59 (43.5%) answered 
Section A and 77 (56.5%) answered Section B.  
Table 5.11 reports the impact of acquisition on the acquired business. The majority of 
respondents reported a “positive impact”. Specifically, regarding innovation capability 
(R&D and Design Cycle) the percentages of responses registering a “positive impact” 
were 45.8% for the R&D capabilities and 42.4% for the design cycle.  
Regarding Cost Saving (Product Costs and Input Prices) the percentage that responded 
that there was a “positive impact” was 49.2% for the product costs and 47.5% for the 
input prices.  
Finally, as far as market coverage (Broadening of Product Line and Geographical 
Coverage) was concerned, the percentage of the respondents that replied with a “positive 
impact” was 33.9% for the broadening of the product cycle and 62.7% for the 
geographical coverage. 
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Acquired Business 
Negative 
Impact 
Somewhat 
Negative 
Neutral Somewhat 
Positive 
Positive 
Impact 
Mean Sd 
R&D capabilities 
- 
2 
(3.4%) 
14 
(23.7%) 
16 
(27.1%) 
27 
(45.8%) 
4.15 0.906 
Design cycle  
- 
1 
(1.7%) 
14 
(23.7%) 
19 
(32.2%) 
25 
(42.4%) 
4.15 0.847 
Product costs 
- - 
15 
(25.4%) 
15 
(25.4%) 
29 
(49.2%) 
4.24 0.837 
Input Prices 
- - 
12 
(20.3%) 
19 
(32.2%) 
28 
(47.5%) 
4.27 0.784 
Broadening of 
product line - - 
17 
(28.8%) 
22 
(37.3%) 
20 
(33.9%) 
4.05 0.797 
Geographical 
coverage - - 
12 
(20.3%) 
10 
(16.9%) 
37 
(62.7%) 
4.42 0.814 
N=59 
Table 5.11: Impact of the Acquisition on the position of the acquired business 
(Section A) 
 
Table 5.12 presents the statistics regarding the impact of the acquisition on the position 
of the existing business. The majority of the respondents’ reported that for the existing 
business the impact ranged from “neutral” to “positive impact”.  
Specifically, regarding innovation capability (R&D and Design Cycle) the percentage of 
responses that indicated a “neutral impact” was 45.8% of the responses for R&D 
capabilities and 44.1% for the design Cycle. 
Nevertheless, for cost savings (product costs and input prices) the answers indicated a 
“somewhat positive” impact for the product costs (40.7%) and for the input prices 
(45.8%). 
Finally for market coverage (Broadening of Product Line and Geographical Coverage) 
indicated that for the broadening of the product cycle 44.1% indicated a “somewhat 
positive” impact, whereas, for geographical coverage the responses indicated a positive 
impact with a 54.2%. 
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Existing Business 
Negative 
Impact 
Somewhat 
Negative 
Neutral Somewhat 
Positive 
Positive 
Impact 
Mean Sd 
R&D capabilities - 2 (3.4%) 
27 
(45.8%) 
17 
(28.8%) 
13 
(22%) 
3.69 0.856 
Design cycle  - 1 (1.7%) 
26 
(44.1%) 
21 
(35.6%) 
11 
(18.6%) 
3.71 0.789 
Product costs - - 24 (40.7%) 
23 
(39%) 
12 
(20.3%) 
3.8 0.761 
Input Prices - 1 (1.7%) 
19 
(32.2%) 
27 
(45.8%) 
12 
(20.3%) 
3.85 0.761 
Broadening of 
product line - - 
17 
(28.8%) 
26 
(44.1%) 
16 
(27.1%) 
3.98 0.754 
Geographical 
coverage - - 
14 
(23.7%) 
13 
(22.1%) 
32 
(54.2%) 
4.31 0.836 
N=59 
Table 5.12: Impact of the Acquisition on the position of the existing business 
(Section A) 
 
Table 5.13 portrays the impact of the acquisition on the position of the consolidated 
business. Most of the respondents indicated that for the consolidated business the 
impacted extended from “neutral” to “positive”.  
So, regarding innovation capability (R&D and Design Cycle) it was reported that for the 
R&D capabilities 33.8% indicate a “somewhat positive” impact and for design cycle 
33.8% a positive impact. 
 For cost savings (product costs and input prices) the answers indicated “somewhat 
positive” impact for product costs (40.3%) and a “positive” impact (35.1%) for input 
prices.  
For market coverage (Broadening of Product Line and Geographical Coverage) a 
“somewhat positive” impact was reported (37.6%) for the broadening of the product line 
and finally the respondents indicated a “positive impact” for the geographical coverage 
(37.7%).  
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Consolidated Negative 
Impact 
Somewhat 
Negative 
Neutral Somewhat 
Positive 
Positive 
Impact 
Mean Sd 
R&D capabilities - 1 (1.3%) 
25 
(32.5%) 
26 
(33.8%) 
25 
(32.5%) 
3.97 0.843 
Design cycle  - 1 (1.3%) 
25 
(32.5%) 
25 
(32.5%) 
26 
(33.8%) 
3.99 0.851 
Product costs - 2 (2.6%) 
18 
(23.4%) 
31 
(40.3%) 
26 
(33.8%) 
4.05 0.826 
Input Prices - - 24 (31.2%) 
26 
(33.8%) 
27 
(35.1%) 
4.04 0.818 
Broadening of 
product line - 
1 
(1.3%) 
25 
(32.5%) 
29 
(37.6%) 
22 
(28.6%) 
3.93 0.818 
Geographical 
coverage - - 
26 
(33.8%) 
22 
(28.6%) 
29 
(37.7%) 
4.04 0.85 
N=77 
Table 5.13: Impact of the Acquisition on the position of the consolidated business 
(Section B) 
 
It is evident that in all of the three cases (acquired, existing and consolidated business) 
that the impact of the acquisition was viewed as positive by the managers in the sample. 
Taking into consideration, that value is created through the acquisition, it is anticipated 
that post-acquisition performance will be enhanced. 
5.8. Acquisition Performance 
The respondents were asked to rate the long-term performance of the acquisition by 
providing self-reported figures of changes in market share, sales, intrinsic profitability 
and relative profitability compared to the industry average since the acquisition.  
The questionnaire was divided into two sections (A and B) to distinguish between the 
two types of post-acquisition integration. Specifically, section A referred to the acquired 
and existing business and section B to the consolidated one. So, 43.5% of the 
respondents answered the section regarding the Section A and whereas the remaining 
56.5% answered the section regarding the consolidated business Section B. As above, 
the valid percentages are presented below each item. Tables 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 present 
results on the acquisition performance for the acquired and existing business (Section A) 
and on the consolidated business (Section B). 
155 
 
Table 5.14 depicts the change of the acquisition performance for the acquired business. 
The respondent’s answers ranged from some increase to a significant increase for the 
best part of the data. Regarding the market share, 50.8% reported “some increase” and 
27.1% reported a “significant increase”; something consistent with the figures for sales, 
whereas the figures for intrinsic profitability are almost similar.   
Acquired Business 
Significa
nt 
Decline 
Some 
Decline 
No 
Change 
Some 
Increase 
Significa
nt 
Increase 
Mean Sd 
Market share - 2 (3.4%) 
11 
(18.6%) 
30 
(50.8%) 
16 
(27.1%) 
4.02 0.777 
Sales - 6 (10.2%) 
7 
(11.9%) 
30 
(50.8%) 
16 
(27.1%) 
3.95 0.899 
Intrinsic profitability 
(Profit/capital 
employed)  
1 
(1.7%) 
4 
(6.8%) 
5 
(8.5%) 
30 
(50.8%) 
19 
(32.2%) 
4.05 0.918 
Profitability relative to 
industry average 
1 
(1.7%) - 
10 
(16.9%) 
40 
(67.8%) 
8 
(13.6%) 
3.92 0.677 
N=59 
Table 5.14: Acquisition Performance Acquired Business (Section A) 
 
Table 5.15 represents the change of the acquisition performance for the existing 
business. The majority of the respondent’s answers reported “some increase”. In regards 
to market share 57.6% reported some increase, the same holds for sales (61%), intrinsic 
profitability (62.7%) and profitability (55.9%).  
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Existing Business 
Signific
ant 
Decline 
Some 
Decline 
No 
Change 
Some 
Increase 
Signific
ant 
Increase 
Mean Sd 
Market share - 2 (3.4%) 
15 
(25.4%) 
34 
(57.6%) 
8 
(13.6%) 
3.81 0.706 
Sales - 5 (8.5%) 
12 
(20.3%) 
36 
(61%) 
6 
(10.2%) 
3.73 0.762 
Intrinsic profitability 
(Profit/capital employed)  
1 
(1.7%) 
7 
(11.9%) 
9 
(15.3%) 
37 
(62.7%) 
5 
(8.5%) 
3.64 0.866 
Profitability relative to 
industry average 
1 
(1.7%) 
3 
(5.1%) 
18 
(30.5%) 
33 
(55.9%) 
4 
(6.8%) 
3.61 0.766 
N=59 
Table 5.15: Acquisition Performance Existing Business (Section A) 
 
Finally, Table 5.16 depicts the change of the acquisition performance for the 
consolidated business. Most of the answers reported “some increase”. Regarding the 
market share 58.4% reported “some increase”, the same holds for sales (53.2%), 
intrinsic profitability (54.5%) and profitability (50.6%).  
Consolidated 
Significa
nt 
Decline 
Some 
Decline 
No 
Change 
Some 
Increase 
Significa
nt 
Increase 
Mean Sd 
Market share - 3 (3.9%) 
9 
(11.7%) 
45 
(58.4%) 
20 
(26%) 
4.06 0.732 
Sales 1 (1.3%) 
5 
(6.5%) 
11 
(14.3%) 
41 
(53.2%) 
19 
(24.7%) 
3.94 0.879 
Intrinsic profitability 
(Profit/capital 
employed)  
5 
(6.8%) 
3 
(3.9%) 
15 
(19.5%) 
42 
(54.5%) 
12 
(15.6%) 
 
3.69 
1.003 
Profitability relative to 
industry average 
2 
(2.6%) 
5 
(6.4%) 
23 
(29.9%) 
39 
(50.6%) 
8 
(10.4%) 
3.6 0.862 
N=77 
Table 5.16: Acquisition Performance Consolidated Business (Section B) 
It is clear from the previous tables, that across all businesses (acquired and existing 59 
out of 136, and consolidated 77 out of 136) managers’ report “some increase” on post-
acquisition performance. Drawing from the resource-based theory of the firm and given 
the descriptive statistics presented in this chapter the expectation of an increased post-
acquisition performance holds true. 
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5.9. Summary 
This chapter’s aim was to document and present the descriptive findings generated from 
the data collected. Therefore, descriptive statistics for all the variables, dimensions and 
constructs that are part of the study’s research model were presented. An adequate 
distribution of responses was found to exist for all relevant measures employed for the 
purpose of the empirical part of the study.   
 By looking into the classifications of the sample industries a better comprehension was 
achieved for the kind of companies that were in the sample and that operate in Greece. 
Also, Following Capron (1999) and Seth (1990b) there is an expectation that the relative 
size of acquirers and target favours the exploitation of operational synergies and 
therefore an enhanced acquisition performance is expected taking into account the 
number of the small targets in the data.  
In addition, according to the responses that the managers provided, the statistics 
indicated that the majority of the companies were related. Considering the geographic 
scope of the firms, and given the business sectors and the large number of the domestic 
number in the sample, there is the expectation that the acquisition geographic scope will 
enhance post-acquisition performance. The underlying motives that will prompt a 
company to acquire related or unrelated businesses have received great attention in 
strategy research, yet little agreement on the relationship between diversification and 
post-acquisition performance exists (Palich et al., 2000; Teece, 1982). In theory, 
diversification must contribute to superior performance to the point where resources 
become too complex to manage or business units become unrelated (Wan et al., 2011). 
The majority of the targets are domestic and originated from Greece, the home country 
and industry can have a significant effect on the fate of an acquisition, because of the 
presence of country specific resources, culture, and institutions that stimulate the 
development of specific industries over others (McGahan, and Victer, 2009; Tallman 
and Li, 1996; Wright, et al., 2005). 
Moreover the vast majority of the respondents indicated that cash as the medium of 
financing the deal, and in general, the existing evidence suggests that cash acquisitions 
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outperform equity bids. Almost all of the cases reviewed in this study, are characterised 
as friendly acquisitions and taking into consideration that substantial majority, there is 
an expectation of an increased post-acquisition performance. 
Organisational changes are viewed as positive from the sample therefore the expectation 
exists for an enhanced acquisition performance. Furthermore given that the majority of 
the businesses in the sample had none to a very small amount of top management team 
redundancies, a greater post-acquisition performance is expected. 
The statistics illustrated that the degree of post-acquisition asset divestiture for the target 
varies across the five functions and the various levels. Specifically, the extent of asset 
divestiture was concentrated in the 0-20% threshold of assets divested for the majority of 
cases. In addition, the statistics for the respondents’ indication of the percentage of 
consolidation and restructuring that took place for the existing business across the same 
five functions the results indicated that for the most cases, the acquirers divested their 
assets less than or equal to 20% across all of the five functions. Therefore, the target’s 
assets were divested in greater numbers than the acquirer’s assets the fact that the 
target’s assets are more likely to be divested than the acquirer’ is a finding consistent 
with those in the literature. 
The descriptive statistics regarding the redeployment of resources from the target in 
order to assist the existing business revealed that across all five categories the majority 
of the respondents reported that their businesses redeployed resources to “some extent”. 
As far as the post-acquisition measures are concerned, the data indicated that the target’s 
assets are more likely to be divested than those of the acquirer’s, something consistent 
with the literature (Carpon 1999). This increases the probability of enhanced post-
acquisition performance. Conversely, looking into the descriptive statistics for 
redeployment of resources from the acquirer in order to assist the target revealed that 
across all five categories the majority of the respondents reported that their businesses 
redeployed resources to “a larger extent”. Therefore, the extent of redeployment to target 
(i.e. the movement of resources from the acquirer to the target) was greater than the 
extent of redeployment to the acquiring firm. 
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It is evident that in all of the three cases (acquired, existing and consolidated business) 
that the impact of the acquisition was viewed as positive by the managers in the sample. 
Therefore, taking into consideration, that value is created through the acquisition, it was 
anticipated that post-acquisition performance will be enhanced. 
Finally, the findings showed, that across all businesses (acquired, existing and 
consolidated) managers’ report “some increase” on post-acquisition performance. 
As far as the post-acquisition measures are concerned, the data indicated that the target’s 
assets are more likely to be divested than those of the acquirer’s, something consistent 
with the literature (Carpon, 1999). This increases the probability of enhanced post-
acquisition performance.  
Having analysed the descriptive statistics of the sampled data, further statistical analysis 
is needed in order to better understand the relationships among asset divestiture, 
resource redeployment, cost savings, market share, innovation capability and post-
acquisition performance. 
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6. Factor Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the factor analysis process is going to be explored. In this section all the 
relevant tables concerning factor analysis are presented. The first set of tables presents 
the results of performing factor analysis on all the variables of the model. All the factors 
and latent variables that were hypothesised in Chapter 3 and 4 are recognised in the 
following factor analysis. Therefore the process of structural equation modelling follows 
on Chapter 7 along with the corresponding results. All of the factor analysis outputs are 
depicted in Appendix IV. 
6.2. Factor analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there exist two basic methods for obtaining factor solutions. 
Those are the Principal Components analysis and the Common Factor analysis 
(maximum likelihood). The choice between these two basic methods of factor extraction 
lies with the objective of the researcher. For the purpose of analysis in this thesis the 
Principal component analysis was used because it has the strong advantages of being 
free of distributional assumptions and of being less prone to improper solutions than 
maximum likelihood (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Also, principal components analysis was 
chosen because the objective is to obtain the minimum number of factors and understand 
whether these perceptions can be “grouped” into factors that explain the underlying 
perceptions of the theory. 
Having decided on the method the next decision is the number of factors to be extracted. 
The solution to determining the number of initial unrotated factors is the latent root 
criterion (Eigenvalues) and the Scree test criterion (Hair et al., 2010; Ho, 2006).  
Factor analysis can identify the structure of a set of variables as well as provide a 
process for data reduction. In this instance, the perceptions of post-acquisition 
performance on 34 attributes are examined in order to understand whether these 
perceptions can be “grouped” and whether the 34 variables can be reduced to a smaller 
number. Either or both objectives may be found in a research question, making factor 
161 
 
analysis applicable. Also, all the variables are metric and constitute a homogenous set of 
perception appropriate for factor analysis. 
Another important aspect in factor analysis is the size of the sample. There exist 
different opinions relating to the minimum sample size for factor analysis (MacCallum 
et al., 2001). In general it is accepted that larger samples are better even though in some 
cases they can become contradictory (Comrey and Lee, 1992; Cudeck and O’Dell, 1994; 
Kline, 1994; MacCallum et al., 1999; Mundfrom et al., 2005; Velicer, et al., 1982). As 
far as factor analysis is concerned, several authors have recommended the “rule of 100”, 
that the sample size should be equal to or greater than 100 observations (Gorsuch, 1983; 
Hair et al., 2010, Kline 1994; MacCallum et al., 1999). Moreover, according to 
Mundfrom et al., (2005), if there are more than 6 factors, the minimum sample size 
required is 100. According to their results with the variables-to-factor ratio set at 7 with 
high levels of communality and the “excellent” agreement criterion (level of 
congruence) the minimum sample varied from 75 to 100. The relation therefore between 
the minimum necessary sample size and the number of variables for a fixed number of 
factors according to Mundfrom et al., (2005) seem to be compensatory not proportional. 
This compliments a study by Marsh et al., (1998) by drawing the same conclusion with 
regards the confirmatory factor analysis. 
6.2.1. Correlation Matrix 
The underlying statistical assumptions influence factor analysis to the extent that they 
affect the derived correlations. The first step is a visual examination of the correlations, 
identifying those that are statistically significant.  
Table 6.1 presents the correlation matrix for the 34 variables that try to capture post-
acquisition performance. All the values that are bold in table 6.1 have a significant 
correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). A preliminary inspection of the correlations 
reveals that 69 are significant at the 0.01 level out of the 34 variables, something that is 
considered as an adequate basis for progressing to a further examination of adequacy for 
factor analysis (Hair et al., 2010). On the one hand, even though no limits can be placed 
on what is considered as too high or too low a correlation, factors that have not any 
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significant correlations might not consist a part of any factor. On the other hand if a 
variable has a large number of significant correlations it can consist as a part of several 
factors.  
6.2.2. Factor Analysis Output 
According to Ho, (2006), the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 
a statistic that specifies the proportion of variance in the variables that might be caused 
by underlying factors. Factor analysis can be suitable for the study’s data if values are 
close to 1.0. Therefore with a corresponding value of 0.786 factor analysis is 
appropriate. Moving on, in order to examine the adequacy of the correlation matrix the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity can be employed. Looking at the correlation matrix (Table 
6.1) it is clear significant correlations among the variables exist. Moreover, the 
expectation that the observed correlation matrix has small off-diagonal coefficients 
signifies the existence of independent variables. Thus, factor analysis attempts a more 
parsimonious understanding of the co-variation among a set of indicators because the
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Table 6.1: Correlations 
  Variables X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 
X1 Target Divestiture of Manufacturing 1               
X2 Target Divestiture of Distribution .847** 1              
X3 Target Divestiture of Sales .804** .887** 1             
X4 Target Divestiture of Administration .709** .744** .696** 1            
X5 Target Divestiture of R&D .775** .804** .760** .794** 1           
X6 
Acquirer Divestiture of 
Manufacturing .532** .434** .398** .338** .378** 1          
X7 Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution .519** .396** .371** .385** .382** .813** 1         
X8 Acquirer Divestiture of Sales .502** .438** .409** .332** .417** .887** .746** 1        
X9 
Acquirer Divestiture of 
Administration .477** .397** .365** .205* .269** .731** .578** .647** 1       
X10 Acquirer Divestiture of R&D .519** .417** .392** .374** .414** .797** .653** .813** .772** 1      
X11 
Redeployment of Target’s Product 
Innovation  .335** .328** .364** .298** .420** .248** .241** .230** .257** .291** 1     
X12 Redeployment of Target’s Know-how  .232** .215* .227** .107 .234** .233** .238** .212* .188* .252** .749** 1    
X13 
Redeployment of Target’s Marketing 
Expertise .279** .181* .134 .138 .204* .262** .199* .190* .292** .262** .640** .548** 1   
X14 
Redeployment of Target’s Supplier’s 
Relationship .218* .236** .128 .107 .185* .294** .249** .282** .212* .259** .497** .570** .632** 1  
X15 
Redeployment of Target’s 
Distribution Expertise .109 .141 .119 .072 .090 .142 .140 .083 .108 .098 .410** .466** .643** .623** 1 
X16 
Redeployment of Acquirer’s Product 
Innovation  -.138 -.120 -.142 -.077 -.072 -.005 -.076 -.001 -.022 .026 -.027 -.024 .054 -.237** -.007 
X17 
Redeployment of Acquirer’s Know-
how  -.243** -.158 -.224** -.182* -.209* .002 -.068 -.014 -.085 -.034 -.168 -.087 -.124 -.204* -.048 
X18 
Redeployment of Acquirer’s 
Marketing Expertise -.244** -.245** -.344** -.251** -.259** -.014 -.136 -.036 -.008 .020 -.182* -.128 .101 -.061 .117 
X19 
Redeployment of Acquirer’s Supplier 
Relationship -.312** -.240** -.230** -.237** -.250** -.026 -.125 -.045 -.121 -.042 -.090 .000 .051 .020 .071 
X20 
Redeployment of Acquirer’s 
Distribution Expertise -.235** -.212* -.236** -.271** -.323** -.014 -.115 -.040 -.076 -.030 -.211* -.077 .061 -.053 .224** 
X21 Organizational network changes .044 .114 .137 .112 .092 .090 .033 .075 .093 .110 .178* .227** .251** .204* .334** 
X22 Organizational knowledge changes -.139 -.109 -.110 -.067 -.097 -.030 -.042 -.062 .007 .022 .060 .158 .093 .041 .103 
X23 Retention of the Management team -.043 -.114 -.154 -.198* -.190* -.044 -.034 -.053 -.009 .005 .056 .083 .279** .121 .114 
X24 Formal organizational changes -.080 -.103 -.097 -.152 -.161 .000 -.121 -.031 .087 .103 .158 .257** .289** .115 .127 
Y1 (Value) R&D Capabilities .238** .230** .259** .191* .260** .156 .130 .159 .154 .272** .341** .271** .218* .122 .212* 
Y2 (Value) Design Cycle -.008 .011 .026 .054 .111 .088 .136 .086 .082 .212* .335** .292** .296** .178* .334** 
Y3 (Value) Product Cost .126 .175* .165 .131 .158 .041 .013 .085 .081 .150 .349** .300** .241** .294** .235** 
Y4 (Value) Input Prices -.119 -.077 -.119 -.105 -.081 -.032 -.179* -.029 -.005 .064 .123 .181* .159 .280** .192* 
Y5 (Value) Product Line .090 .091 .099 .053 .079 .008 .029 .024 .124 .206* .194* .299** .117 .108 .194* 
Y6 (Value) Geographical Coverage -.245** -.262** -.228** -.278** -.252** -.072 -.162 -.043 -.040 .019 -.093 .031 .035 .112 .217* 
Y7 (Performance) Market Share .038 -.004 -.041 .014 .089 .145 .161 .180* .142 .249** .253** .306** .311** .226** .169* 
Y8 (Performance) Sales -.077 -.093 -.088 .021 .039 .061 .115 .043 .028 .109 .156 .206* .222** .115 .101 
Y9 (Performance) Intrinsinc Profitability .048 .026 .034 .016 .142 .090 .126 .098 .029 .108 .174* .162 .236** .082 .077 
Y10 (Performance) Relative Profit .051 .007 -.002 -.011 .093 .147 .178* .095 .089 .149 .124 .150 .245** .182* .149 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
  Variables X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21 X22 X23 X24 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
X16 
Redeployment of 
Acquirer’s Product 
Innovation Capabilities 1                   
X17 
Redeployment of 
Acquirer’s Know-how 
in Manufacturing .789** 1                  
X18 
Redeployment of 
Acquirer’s Marketing 
Expertise .684** .670** 1                 
X19 
Redeployment of 
Acquirer’s Supplier 
Relationship .578** .612** .590** 1                
X20 
Redeployment of 
Acquirer’s Distribution 
Expertise .598** .627** .745** .634** 1               
X21 
Organizational network 
changes .286** .243** .207* .196* .217* 1              
X22 
Organizational 
knowledge changes .219* .268** .202* .172* .171* .647** 1             
X23 
Retention of the 
Management team .095 .059 .114 .082 .170* .306** .268** 1            
X24 
Formal organizational 
changes .187* .171* .216* .134 .225** .424** .465** .629** 1           
Y1 
(Value) R&D 
Capabilities .253** .058 .075 .049 .076 .352** .278** .151 .237** 1          
Y2 (Value) Design Cycle .302** .114 .183* .127 .187* .345** .262** .145 .206* .676** 1         
Y3 (Value) Product Cost .203* .074 .143 .207* .146 .322** .166 .176* .199* .534** .599** 1        
Y4 (Value) Input Prices .266** .155 .198* .417** .273** .314** .202* .188* .237** .411** .523** .629** 1       
Y5 (Value) Product Line .202* .104 .148 .140 .200* .373** .312** .127 .273** .638** .576** .527** .472** 1      
Y6 
(Value) Geographical 
Coverage .296** .311** .331** .414** .435** .333** .293** .160 .184* .286** .451** .321** .503** .459** 1     
Y7 
(Performance) Market 
Share .232** .040 .195* .116 .116 .430** .335** .175* .171* .421** .381** .309** .232** .460** .295** 1    
Y8 (Performance) Sales .212* .075 .171* .198* .094 .312** .298** .072 .153 .299** .338** .241** .151 .414** .255** .776** 1   
Y9 
(Performance) Intrinsinc 
Profitability .194* .107 .149 .054 .112 .289** .255** .208* .207* .318** .282** .208* .068 .321** .144 .559** .654** 1  
Y10 
(Performance) Relative 
Profit .111 .060 .068 .020 .101 .368** .347** .235** .236** .364** .362** .168 .208* .345** .244** .560** .564** .818** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N=136 
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number of factors is less than the number of measured variables (Brown 2006). In Table 
6.2, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity is depicted, which tests the hypothesis that the 
correlation matrix is an identity matrix, which signifies that all the diagonal terms are 1 
and all off-diagonal terms are 0. If the test value is large and the significance level is 
small (< 0.05), the hypothesis that the variables are independent can be rejected. For the 
purpose of this analysis, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity yielded a value of 3771.601 and 
an associated level of significance smaller than 0.001. Hence, the hypothesis that the 
correlation matrix is an identity matrix is rejected.  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 
.786 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3771.601 
df 561 
Sig. .000 
 
Table 6.2: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
As it can be seen from Table 6.3, the communalities are displayed. The communality of 
each variable is the proportion of variance in each variable accounted for by the 
common factors. The chosen method of analysis as it was mentioned was principal 
components and therefore, it is feasible to compute as many factors as there are 
variables. Once all of factors have been incorporated in the solution, the sum all of the 
variance of the variables is accounted for by the common factors. Consequently, the 
proportion of variance comprised by the common factors, or the communality of a 
variable is 1 for all the variables. 
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Variables Initial Extraction 
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .826 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .879 
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .842 
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .771 
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .846 
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .907 
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .741 
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .849 
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .722 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .848 
X11: Redeployment of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .801 
X12: Redeployment of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .676 
X13: Redeployment of Target’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .794 
X14: Redeployment of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship 1.000 .795 
X15: Redeployment of Target’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .759 
X16: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .850 
X17: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .795 
X18: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .768 
X19: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship 1.000 .673 
X20: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .743 
X21: Organizational Network Changes 1.000 .764 
X22: Organizational Knowledge Changes 1.000 .641 
X23: Retention of the Management Team 1.000 .662 
X24: Formal Organizational Changes 1.000 .814 
Y1: (Value) R&D Capabilities 1.000 .715 
Y2: (Value) Design Cycle 1.000 .703 
Y3: (Value) Product Cost 1.000 .688 
Y4: (Value) Input Prices 1.000 .695 
Y5: (Value) Product Line 1.000 .682 
Y6: (Value) Geographical Coverage 1.000 .694 
Y7: (Performance) Market Share 1.000 .726 
Y8: (Performance) Sales 1.000 .778 
Y9: (Performance) Intrinsic Profitability 1.000 .786 
Y10:(Performance) Relative Profit 1.000 .732 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 6.3: Communalities 
The following table (Table 6.4) depicts the Total Variance Explained. It shows the 
estimated number of common factors, the eigenvalues which are related to these factors, 
the percentage of total variance accounted for by each factor, and finally the cumulative 
percentage of total variance accounted for by the factors. In order to make a decision on 
the number of the factors to extract to represent the data, a useful way is to look at the 
eigenvalues associated with these factors. By employing the benchmark of preserving 
only factors with eigenvalues of 1 or greater, the first eight factors were retained for 
rotation. These eight factors account for 22.4%, 19.47%, 8.85%, 6.78%, 6.49%, 4.85%, 
4.54% and 2.95% of the total variance, respectively. That amounts to 76.3% of the total 
167 
 
variance is attributable to these eight factors. The remaining twenty-six factors together 
account for only approximately 23.7% of the variance. Therefore, a model with eight 
factors may be adequate to represent the data.  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.617 22.403 22.403 7.617 22.403 22.403 4.360 12.825 12.825 
2 6.622 19.477 41.880 6.622 19.477 41.880 4.171 12.268 25.093 
3 3.009 8.850 50.730 3.009 8.850 50.730 3.840 11.293 36.386 
4 2.308 6.789 57.519 2.308 6.789 57.519 3.643 10.714 47.100 
5 2.209 6.498 64.017 2.209 6.498 64.017 3.315 9.751 56.852 
6 1.651 4.857 68.874 1.651 4.857 68.874 3.305 9.722 66.573 
7 1.546 4.546 73.420 1.546 4.546 73.420 2.116 6.223 72.797 
8 1.003 2.951 76.371 1.003 2.951 76.371 1.215 3.574 76.371 
9 .960 2.824 79.195 
      
10 .783 2.303 81.498 
      
11 .670 1.972 83.470 
      
12 .614 1.806 85.276 
      
13 .531 1.561 86.837 
      
14 .465 1.367 88.204 
      
15 .416 1.224 89.427 
      
16 .384 1.130 90.557 
      
17 .369 1.084 91.641 
      
18 .336 .987 92.629 
      
19 .323 .949 93.578 
      
20 .278 .818 94.396 
      
21 .249 .733 95.129 
      
22 .216 .634 95.763 
      
23 .201 .592 96.355 
      
24 .191 .562 96.917 
      
25 .163 .481 97.398 
      
26 .149 .439 97.837 
      
27 .135 .398 98.235 
      
28 .120 .354 98.589 
      
29 .111 .326 98.915 
      
30 .103 .302 99.217 
      
31 .086 .254 99.471 
      
32 .065 .191 99.662 
      
33 .062 .182 99.844 
      
34 .053 .156 100.000 
      
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 6.4: Total Variance Explained 
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The scree test, as mentioned in Chapter 4, is performed by plotting the latent roots 
against the number of factors in their order of extraction. The shape of that resulting 
curve is used to evaluate the cut-off point. Figure 6.1 plots all the 34 factors. Starting 
with the first component, the plot slopes steeply downward and after the 8th component, 
it slowly becomes a horizontal line. That cut-off point where the plot changes its slope, 
in this case the 8th component, indicates the maximum number of factors to be extracted. 
Thus the scree plot indicates that an eight factor model should be sufficient to represent 
the data. 
 
Figure 6.1: Scree Test for Component Analysis 
 
The Component Matrix shows the unrotated component analysis factor matrix, and 
reveals the correlations that associate the variables to the eight extracted factors. The 
Component Matrix is presented in Table 6.5. Loadings, less than .390 were excluded to 
provide an uncluttered table. These coefficients, are named factor loadings, and reveal 
how closely the variables are related to each factor. Nevertheless, because the factors 
were extracted on the basis of the proportion of total variance explained, these factors 
are “unrotated” and as a result significant cross-loadings have occurred. Taking for 
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example, the variable Product Cost (Y3) it has loaded highly on Factor 1, Factor 2 and 
Factor 5. Also, the variable Relative Profit (Y10) has loaded highly on Factor 1, Factor 2 
and Factor 5. At the same time the variable Acquirer Divestiture of Sales (X8) has 
loaded highly on Factor 1 and Factor 3. 24 out of the 34 have cross-loadings and make 
the interpretation of the factors difficult and theoretically less meaningful. Therefore, 
rotation may improve the theoretically meaningful relationships among the variables. 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D .708  .410      
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .679 -.515       
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing .665  .483      
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales .644  .473      
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .644 -.459       
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .643 -.492       
X11: Redeployment of Target’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities .643        
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution .614        
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .613 -.498       
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration .592        
X12: Redeployment of Target’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing .581        
X13: Redeployment of Target’s Marketing Expertise .578   .491     
Y1: (Value) R&D Capabilities .574        
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .545 -.464       
Y7: (Performance) Market Share .485 .472       
Y3: (Value) Product Cost .470 .406   .422    
Y6: (Value) Geographical Coverage 
 .659       
X20: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise 
 .636 .488      
X18: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise 
 .630 .528      
X19: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship 
 .605 .425      
X16: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities  .599 .535      
Y4: (Value) Input Prices 
 .563       
X22: Organisational knowledge changes 
 .517       
Y2: (Value) Design Cycle .482 .513       
Y5: (Value) Product Line .448 .498       
X21: Organisational network changes .421 .493       
Y8: (Performance) Sales 
 .470       
X17: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing  .552 .616      
X14: Redeployment of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship .529   .555     
X15: Redeployment of Target’s Distribution Expertise .434   .518     
Y9: (Performance) Intrinsic Profitability 
   -.443 -.413    
Y10:(Performance) Relative Profit .415 .412   -.436    
X24: Formal organisational changes 
 .470    .419 -.524  
X23: Retention of the Management team 
      -.493  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 8 components extracted. 
 
Table 6.5: Component Matrix all Variables 
170 
 
 
In Chapter 4 of the thesis, it was mentioned that the orthogonal rotation technique was 
appropriate and it was decided that amongst the existing approaches (Quartimax, 
Varimax, and Equimax), which are available within the orthogonal technique, the 
Varimax approach is the most preferable since it produces a clearer separation of the 
factors (Kaiser, 1970; Kaiser, 1974). Examination of the factor loadings is presented in 
the Varimax Rotated Component Matrix, in Table 6.6, which shows that 32 of the 34 
variables loaded highly on 7 factors.  
As it is clear from Table 6.6 there exist some cross-loadings that require some further 
actions to be taken. According to Taylor (2006) and Hair et al (2010) there are several 
ways to cope with cross-loadings: 
1. The researcher can ignore those problematic variables and start interpreting the 
results if the purpose of the analysis is just data reduction. 
2. The researcher can employ a different rotation method (oblique instead of 
orthogonal) 
3. If there are many significant cross-loadings, there is a probability of further 
commonality among the cross-loaded variables and the factors. The solution to this 
problem is for the researcher to “rerun” the factor analysis stipulating a smaller 
number of factors to be extracted 
4. The researcher can investigate the “wording” of those cross-loaded variables and 
based on their meaning can assign them to the factors make most conceptual and 
logical sense. 
5. The researcher can employ a different factor model (common factor instead of 
principal component) in order to find out if changing the type of variance has any 
effect on the model. 
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6. The researcher can delete all the cross-loaded variables. The interpretation therefore 
of the new resulting “clean” factors will make their interpretation much easier. 
 
 
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .879        
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .863        
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .858        
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .847        
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .786        
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing  .913       
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales  .885       
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D  .868       
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration  .820       
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution  .791       
X17: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing   .868      
X16: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities   .858      
X18: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise   .844      
X20: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise   .805      
X19: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship   .760      
Y3: (Value) Product Cost    .775     
Y2: (Value) Design Cycle    .764     
Y4: (Value) Input Prices    .757     
Y5: (Value) Product Line    .743     
Y1: (Value) R&D Capabilities    .726     
Y6: (Value) Geographical Coverage    .536    .461 
X13: Redeployment of Target’s Marketing Expertise     .821    
X14: Redeployment of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship     .815    
X15: Redeployment of Target’s Distribution Expertise     .791    
X12: Redeployment of Target’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing     .717    
X11: Redeployment of Target’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities     .688    
Y9: (Performance) Intrinsic Profitability      .864   
Y8: (Performance) Sales      .846   
Y10:(Performance) Relative Profit      .802   
Y7: (Performance) Market Share      .764   
X24: Formal organisational changes       .858  
X23: Retention of the Management team       .781  
X22: Organisational knowledge changes       .535 .449 
X21: Organisational network changes       .453 .543 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Table 6.6: Rotated Component Matrix 
Using Taylor’s (2006) suggestion, it was decided to “rerun” with a smaller number of 
factors. The new analysis was performed with the restriction of seven factors because 
that corresponds also to the number of the hypothesised latent variables of the thesis 
model. The results are displayed in Table 6.7. It is clear that with those seven factor 
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loadings, there no cross-loadings. Thus, the primary objective with using the principal 
components analysis was to obtain the minimum number of factors and understand 
whether these perceptions can be “grouped” into factors that explain the underlying 
perceptions of the theory. That was achieved as all the groups of variables (factors) 
correspond to the underlying assumptions of the model.  
 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .874       
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .861       
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .860       
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .845       
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .785       
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing  .913      
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales  .884      
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D  .866      
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration  .819      
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution  .790      
X17: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing   .863     
X18: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise   .841     
X16: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities   .839     
X20: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise   .814     
X19: Redeployment of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship   .766     
Y4: (Value) Input Prices    .770    
Y3: (Value) Product Cost    .758    
Y2: (Value) Design Cycle    .752    
Y5: (Value) Product Line    .745    
Y1: (Value) R&D Capabilities    .703    
Y6: (Value) Geographical Coverage    .588    
X13: Redeployment of Target’s Marketing Expertise     .830   
X14: Redeployment of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship     .810   
X15: Redeployment of Target’s Distribution Expertise     .781   
X12: Redeployment of Target’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing     .733   
X11: Redeployment of Target’s Product Innovation 
Capabilities     .711   
Y9: (Performance) Intrinsic Profitability      .859  
Y8: (Performance) Sales      .846  
Y10:(Performance) Relative Profit      .794  
Y7: (Performance) Market Share      .760  
X24: Formal Organizational Changes       .839 
X23: Retention of the Management Team       .759 
X22: Organizational Knowledge Changes       .638 
X21: Organizational Network Changes       .581 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Table 6.7: Rotated Component Matrix Seven Factors 
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6.3. Factors 
That group of variables depicted on Table 6.7 corresponds to seven factors which in turn 
represent the six hypothesised latent variables and the one control variable of the thesis 
model. Namely those are: Target Asset Divestiture (Factor 1), Acquirer Asset 
Divestiture (Factor 2), Acquirer’s Recourse Redeployment (Factor 3), Value (Factor 4), 
Target’s Resource Redeployment (Factor 5), Post-acquisition Performance (Factor 6) 
and finally Organisational Changes (Factor 7).  
6.3.1. Acquirer and Target Asset Divestiture Factor 
In Chapter 3 asset divestiture was presented as the partial or complete sale or disposal of 
physical and organizational assets, shut down of facilities and reduction of work forces 
of target and acquirer businesses. Through asset divestiture, that is, by selling excess 
physical assets, laying off employees, and shutting down excess facilities, a firm may be 
able to sell and produce goods more efficiently. Therefore, Factor 1 and Factor 2 
represent the divestiture of asset to the target and to the acquirer respectively. Asset 
divestiture is a reasonable end result of a procedure where companies use acquisitions as 
means of reshaping their resources. However theories in management and finance are 
broadly unanimous in predicting that divestiture will lead to positive results. Thus asset 
divestiture of the target and the acquirer involves around distribution, R&D, sales, 
administration and manufacturing. 
6.3.2. Acquirer and Target Resource Redeployment Factor 
As it was presented in Chapter 3 ways of enhancing revenues involve (a) increased 
market coverage and (b) enhanced innovation capability. The exploitation of these 
revenue-based synergies (increased market coverage and innovation capability) is 
usually realized through resource redeployment. The next set of factors represents the 
redeployment of the acquirer resources to the target (Factor 3) and the redeployment of 
target resources to the acquirer (Factor 5). Acquisitions can create value and enhance 
revenues by redeploying resources from the target to the acquirer and/or, from the 
acquirer to the target, respectively. Thus resource redeployment to the target and to the 
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acquirer involves around know-how in manufacturing, marketing expertise product 
innovation capabilities, distribution expertise and supplier relationship. 
6.3.3. Value as a mediating Factor 
Value is considered as the mediating variable of the study. Value (Factor 4) consists of 
six variables that in turn form the three latent variables of the model, cost savings, 
market coverage and innovation capability. Cost savings consists of two variables, input 
prices and product costs. Moreover, market coverage comprises two variables, 
broadening of product line and geographical coverage. Also, innovation capability is 
measured by R&D capabilities and design cycle. In Chapter 2 it was argued that cost 
savings can enhance post-acquisition performance through asset divestiture, economies 
of scale and scope. Additionally, it was discussed that market coverage can be increased 
in acquisitions through the geographic and product line expansion. Likewise, innovation 
capability can result into premium prices and increased sales volumes and thus to higher 
profits.   
6.3.4. Post-acquisition Performance Factor 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that neither accounting nor market measures can be used as 
valid measures of post-acquisition performance and instead subjective measures can be 
used. Therefore, in this study post-acquisition performance (Factor 6) is captured by 
self-reported measures of changes in four variables, intrinsic profitability, sales, 
profitability relative to industry average (relative profit) and market share. 
6.3.5. Organisational Changes Factor 
One of the elements of having an impact on post-acquisition performance as it was 
argued in Chapter 3, are organisational changes (Factor 7). Organisational changes that 
take place post-acquisition, both formal and informal, can take many forms and can 
affect managers’ attitudes, managerial style and decision making. This factor is 
measured with four variables namely formal organisational changes, retention of the 
management team, organisational knowledge changes and organisational network 
changes. 
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6.4. Reliability  
The resulting seven factors of the analysis correspond to the hypothesised latent 
variables of the theory. Those variables are summarised in Table 6.9. An internal 
consistency test was employed in order to test the extent the variables measure the same 
construct. It is presented in Table 6.9 along with the other factors and items. An 
internally consistent test enhances the possibilities of the factors reliability. The rationale 
behind reliability and more specific internal consistency is that the individual items or 
indicators of the scale ought to measure the same construct and consequently be highly 
intercorrelated (Churchill 1979, Brown 2006). One measure of internal consistency is 
the reliability coefficient which assesses the consistency of the entire scale with the 
Cronbach’s alpha (Peter 1979). If Cronbach’s Alpha is above or close to the 0.7 
threshold it is suggested that all of the items are reliable and the entire test is internally 
consistent (Cronbach 1951, Hair et al 2010). As it can be seen, from Table 6.8 
Cronbach’s a ranges from 0.762 to 0.946, something that indicates a high overall 
consistency among the seven items. Therefore, based in this criterion, all of the items 
can be retained. 
6.4.1. Construct Validity 
Construct validity is the extent to which a set of measured items reflect the theoretical 
latent construct they were designed to measure. Therefore, tests were employed on the 
measurement model in order to check for construct validity, item reliability, internal 
consistency and discriminant validity. The results of these tests are reported in Table 6.8. 
Construct validity, is made up of four components, namely: face validity, convergent 
validity, discriminant validity and nomological validity. 
 
 
 
  
176 
 
Latent Variables Number 
of items 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted 
Construct 
Reliability 
Internal 
Consistency 
Cronbach’s 
a 
Acquirer Asset Divestiture 5 0.75 0.93 0.931 
Target Asset Divestiture 5 0.77 0.94 0.946 
Resource Redeployment to Acquirer 5 0.72 0.92 0.870 
Resource Redeployment to Target 5 0.66 0.90 0.904 
Organisational Change  4 0.56 0.83 0.762 
Cost Savings (Value) 2 0.65 0.80 0.772 
Market Coverage (Value) 2 0.72 0.75 0.703 
Innovation Capability (Value) 2 0.65 0.79 0.806 
Post-Acquisition Performance 4 0.71 0.91 0.881 
Table 6.8: Latent Variables 
 
Face validity is defined as the extent to which the content of the items is consistent with 
the construct definition. As it is solely based on the researcher’s judgement, face validity 
holds true as the constructs follow the hypothesised model. 
Convergent validity is the extent to which indicators of a specific construct “converge” 
or share a high proportion of variance in common. In order to assess convergent validity 
construct loadings and average variance extracted (AVE) are examined2. AVE should be 
0.5 or greater to indicate adequate convergent validity. In addition, AVE estimates 
should be greater than the square of the correlation between that factor and other factors 
to provide evidence of discriminate validity. Also construct reliability (CR) should be 
0.7 or higher to indicate adequate convergence or internal consistency3. As it is clear 
from table 6.9, all of the items are above 0.5 for AVE, all the items are above 0.7 
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threshold for CR therefore it is safe to declare that construct validity was achieved and 
can proceed with the analysis of the measurement model. 
Group of 
Variables 
Hypothesised Latent 
Variables 
Factors Number 
of items 
Internal 
Consistency 
Cronbach’s 
a 
X1 to X5 Target Asset Divestiture Factor 1 5 0.931 
X6 to X10 Acquirer Asset Divestiture Factor 2 5 0.946 
X17 to X20 Acquirer’s Recourse Redeployment Factor 3 
5 0.870 
X11 to X15 Target’s Resource Redeployment Factor 5 
5 0.904 
X21 to X24 Organisational Changes Factor 7 4 0.762 
Y1 to Y6 Value Factor 4 6 0.807 
Y7 to Y10 Post-acquisition Performance Factor 6 4 0.881 
Table 6.9: Factors 
 
6.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter factor analysis was employed to derive meaningful factors from the data 
obtained from the questionnaires. Therefore, using factors analysis, the perceptions of 
post-acquisition performance on 34 attributes were examined in order to understand 
whether these perceptions can be “grouped” and whether they can be reduced to a 
smaller number. Factor analysis was successful and resulted in a seven factor model. 
This result corresponds to the hypothesised variables of the thesis model.  
Therefore it is possible to continue the analysis of the data by means of structural 
equation modelling (SEM). Chapter 7 using SEM tries to examine dependence 
relationships between the exogenous (Post-acquisition performance, Value) and 
endogenous variables (Target and Acquirer Asset Divestiture, Target and Acquirer 
Resource Redeployment) simultaneously.  
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7. Structural Equation Modelling 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the analysis of the data using correlation and factor 
analysis. This chapter comprises the structural equation model and its application on the 
thesis. Specifically, this chapter examines the underlying relationships among the 
constructs and the variables using structural equation modelling. It is the best 
multivariate procedure for testing both the construct validity and theoretical 
relationships among a set of concepts represented by multiple measured variables. 
Section 7.2 presents the structural equation modelling as a statistical methodology. In 
section 7.3 the thesis model is described and defined. Moreover in section 7.4 the 
measurement model results are evaluated and depicted (Figure 7.1) and in table 7.2 all 
the latent variables and items are presented. In section 7.5 the structural model of the 
thesis is reviewed. Figure 7-2 along with Tables 7-6 to 7-9 report the results from 
carrying out a structural equation modelling analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
a review of the structural model results.  
7.2. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a family of statistical models that seek to explain 
the relationships among multiple variables (Hair et al., 2010). According to Byrne 
(2010) SEM is a statistical methodology that uses a confirmatory approach to the 
analysis of a structural theory bearing on some phenomenon. SEM examines the 
structure of interrelationships expressed in a series of equations, analogous to a series of 
multiple regression equations. SEM carries two important properties. First, causal 
processes studied are represented by a series of structural equations. Second, theory can 
be conceptualised clearer because these structural relations can be modelled pictorially.  
The structural equations within SEM depict all of the relationships among constructs 
(the dependent and independent variables) involved in the analysis. Constructs are 
unobservable or latent factors represented by multiple variables (similar to variables 
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representing a factor in factor analysis). SEM can be thought of as a unique combination 
of both types of multivariate techniques (interdependence and dependence), because its 
foundation lies in two widely accepted multivariate techniques: factor analysis and 
multiple regression analysis. 
Byrne (2010) argues that there exist four aspects that set SEM apart from other 
multivariate procedures. First, it uses a confirmatory rather than an exploratory approach 
to the data analysis. Second, SEM provides explicit estimates of error variance 
parameters, whereas traditional multivariate procedures are incapable of either assessing 
or correcting for measurement error. As a result, the statistical estimation process is 
improved, because the structural paths between latent variables are fairly free of the 
unreliabilities of their measurement indicators (Ho 2006). Third, SEM incorporates both 
unobserved and observed variables. Multiple regression is limited to the analysis of 
those variables that can only be directly observed or measured, whereas SEM has the 
ability to include unobserved (latent) variables in the analysis. Fourth, there are no 
alternative methods providing a straightforward platform to model multivariate relations, 
or to estimate point and/or interval indirect effects. 
Exogenous constructs are the latent, multi-item equivalent of independent variables. As 
such they use a variate of measures to represent the construct, which acts as an 
independent variable in the model. They are determined by factors outside the model, 
thus the term independent. Endogenous constructs are the latent, multi-item equivalent 
to dependent variables. These constructs are theoretically determined by factors within 
the model. 
As it was mentioned earlier, (Section 4.6.7 p.124) the sample size for SEM includes five 
considerations: 1) multivariate normality of the data. 2) Estimation technique. The most 
common SEM estimation procedure is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 3) Model 
complexity. The more complex a model can be, there is a need for larger samples. 4) 
Amount of missing data. Finally, 5) average error variance among the reflective 
indicators. Models containing multiple constructs with communalities less than 0.5 also 
require larger sizes for convergence and model stability (Enders and Bandalos, 2001). 
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The most common SEM estimation procedure is maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). MLE can provide valid results with sample sizes as small as 50 (Hair et al., 
2010). In addition, Boomsma (1982) suggested using a ratio r = p/k of indicators to 
latent variables. In this thesis, the number of indicators is 30 and the number of latent 
variable is 8, thus producing a ratio r of 3.75 (30/8=3). Furthermore, Boomsma’s (1982) 
simulations suggested that a ratio r of indicators to latent variables of r = 4 would require 
a sample size of 100. In Addition Marsh et al., (1998) ran 35,000 Monte Carlo 
simulations on LISREL CFA analysis, yielding data that suggested that: r = 3 would 
require a sample size of at 200. 
7.3. Defining the Model 
A model is a representation of the theory. Theory can be thought of as a systematic set 
of relationships providing a consistent and comprehensive explanation of phenomena. 
SEM in its most general form consists of two parts: the measurement model and the 
structural equation model. The measurement model specifies the rules of how the latent 
variables are measured in terms of the observed variables and describes the 
measurement properties of the observed variables. SEM is a flexible, comprehensive 
model that specifies the pattern relationships among independent and dependent 
variables, either observed or latent. It incorporates the strengths of multiple regression 
analysis, factor analysis and multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) in a single model that 
can be evaluated statistically. 
The use of SEM holds a major advantage compared to other multivariate methods. That 
is the number of the indicator variables. Using multiple indicators in SEM helps to keep 
the analysis of the model uncontaminated by errors of measurement in the indicators (Ho 
2006).  Bentler (1980) pointed out that too many indicators can make the model to fit the 
data really difficult.  
Also, some assumptions should be noted for the model. First, observations are 
independent from each other. Second, there is a random sampling of respondents. Third, 
there exists linearity between exogenous and endogenous variables. Finally, the 
observed variables are normally distributed. The absence of multivariate normality can 
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cause problems as the chi-square statistic can become inflated. This, in turn, can lead to 
and an upward bias in critical values and affect the process of determination of 
coefficient significance (Wang et al., 1996). 
The thesis’ AMOS estimation model consists of two parts, a) an inner structural model 
that captures the structural relationship between the endogenous and exogenous latent 
variables and b) an outer measurement model that captures the manifestation of 
constructs or latent variables in terms of observable variables. 
In the first part (a) the inner structural model specifies the relations among the constructs 
(latent variables) and can be written as: 
ζξβηη +Γ+=  
Where: 
• η is a (m×1) vector of latent endogenous variables 
• ξ is a (n×1) vector of exogenous variables 
• β is (m×m) matrix of endogenous variable coefficients 
• ζ is a (m×1) vector of residuals. 
 
Also, in order to allow ξ to be correlated the variance-covariance matrix of latent 
exogenous variables (φ) has to be specified. Thus, the outer measurement model can be 
written as: 
εη +Λ= yy  
δξ +Λ= xx  
Where: 
• y is a (p×1) vector of endogenous indicators 
• x is a (q×1) vector of exogenous indicators 
• yΛ is a (p×m) matrix of regression coefficients of ξ on x 
• ε is a (p×1) vector of measurement error for the indicators of the endogenous 
variables. 
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• δ is a (q×1) vector of measurement error for the indicators of the exogenous 
variables. 
Table 7.1 presents the hypothesised latent endogenous and exogenous variables of the 
model 
 
Latent Endogenous Variables (η)  • Value (Cost Savings, Market 
Coverage, Innovation Capability)4 
• Post-Acquisition Performance 
Latent Exogenous Variables (ξ) • Asset Divestiture 
• Resource Redeployment5  
Table 7.1: Latent Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
 
 
Finally so as to provide a metric, one indicator of each latent construct, it was specified 
as having a factor loading equal to one (Byrne, 2010). In the next sections the SEM 
model used is presented.  
7.3.1. Model Fit 
In order to assess the validity of the measurement model and the structural model, one 
has to look at the Goodness of Fit (GOF) indices. A number of fit indices have been 
developed along with unique approaches to the model fitting process (Byrne, 2010). 
Once a specified model is estimated, model fit compares the theory to reality by 
assessing the similarity of the estimated covariance matrix (theory) to reality (the 
observed covariance matrix). A number of goodness-of-fit measures are available to 
assess the overall fit of the hypothesised model. The extent to which the actual or 
                                                 
 
4
 Cost reduction, market coverage and innovation capability are the mediating variables of the 
model. 
5
 Asset divestiture, and resource redeployment are the post-acquisition actions 
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observed covariance input matrix corresponds with the predicted from the proposed 
model is measured by the goodness-of-fit (Ho, 2006) 
According to (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993) a measure of overall fit is the likelihood ratio 
chi-square ( 2χ ) statistic, the only statistically based measure of goodness-of-fit 
available in SEM. Using the chi-square statistic implies that the researcher wishes to 
reject the null hypothesis in order to support the alternative. In that aspect, the higher the 
value of the chi-square statistic the better the fit of the model under investigation. 
Nevertheless, in SEM insignificant differences are sought by the researcher between the 
actual and the predicted matrices. Therefore, the researcher seeks not to reject the null 
hypothesis and thus the smaller the chi-square value the better the overall fit of the 
model. However, the chi-square statistic is very sensitive to departures from multivariate 
normality of the observed variables and increases as a direct function of sample size 
(Ho, 2006). Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the Likelihood Ratio Test to sample size and 
its basis on the central 2χ  distribution, that assumes that the model fits perfectly in the 
population, led to problems of fit that are now widely known (Byrne, 2010). Therefore, 
researchers have addressed the 2χ  limitations by developing goodness-of-fit measures 
that take a more pragmatic approach to the evaluation process.  
The normal chi-square (CMIN/DF in AMOS) is the chi-square fir index divided by the 
degrees of freedom. This index is considered as an attempt to make the model chi-square 
less dependent on sample size. Different researchers have recommended using ratios as 
low as 2 or as high as 5 to indicate a reasonable fit (Marsh and Hocevar; 1985, Byrne, 
2010).  
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is the second measure to be 
included. The RMSEA is measure of discrepancy per degree of freedom and poses the 
question “how well would the model, with unknown but optimally chosen values, fit the 
population covariance matrix if it were available” (Browne and Cudeck, 1993, pp. 137–
138). Values ranging from 0.05 to 0.08 are deemed acceptable, values ranging from 0.08 
to 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and those greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit (Browne and 
Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum, et al.,, 1996).  
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The baseline model is usually referred to as the null or independence model and the 
observed variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. Also, because the 
independence model is constrained, it would probably provide a poor fit to any set of 
data. A number of incremental fit measures have been proposed, such as Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Relative Fit Index (RFI), Incremental Fit Index 
(IFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). However, evidence suggests that the NFI shows 
a tendency to underestimate fit in small sample sizes (Bentler, 1990) and that the RFI 
represents a derivative of the NFI (Bollen 1986). Therefore it is suggested that CFI and 
IFI should be used in order to address the issues of parsimony and sample size that are 
known to affect the NFI and RFI. All of these indices even though their underlying 
assumptions may be different to some degree, the all signify comparisons between the 
proposed model and the null or independent model. They range from a fit that is the 
same as the null model (0) to a perfect fit (1). Thus in the examination of the values as 
being indicative for a model fit, CFI and IFI are considered. Thompson (2000: 270-271) 
recommends the comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) as being the most useful when assessing the model fit 
Finally, is the root mean square residual (RMR). RMR is the mean absolute of the 
covariance residuals, which reflect the difference between observed and model-
estimated covariances. However, because the upper bound of RMR is not 1.0 but rather 
depends on the scale of the measured variables, an unstandardised RMR in difficult to 
interpret and the use of SRMR is recommended (Garson, 2012). SRMR is a standardised 
version of RMR. SRMR is the average difference between the predicted and observed 
covariances in the model, based on standardised residuals. Standardised residuals, in 
turn, are fitted residuals divided by the standard error of residuals. SRMR assumes a 
large enough sample to assume stability of the standard error. The smaller the SRMR the 
better the model fit. If SRMR equals 0 it indicates a perfect fit. A value less than .05 is 
widely considered good fit and below .08 as an adequate fit.  
Marsh and his colleagues (Marsh, et al.,, 2004; McDonald and Marsh, 1990) warned 
about relying on traditional cut-off values as “rules of thumb” to assess model fit across 
different research conditions and sample sizes. Their warning coincide with Hu and 
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Bentler’s (1998; 1999) conclusion that “it is difficult to designate a specific cut-off value 
for each fit index because it does not work equally well with various types of fit indices, 
sample sizes, estimators, or distributions” (page 449). Moreover, they argued that high 
incremental fit indices (> 0.90) are not a sufficient basis to establish the validity of 
interpretations based on the theory underlying the posited model. Rather, as pointed out 
by Hu and Bentler (1998), “consideration of other aspects such as adequacy and 
interpretability of parameter estimates, model complexity, and many other issues 
remains critical in deciding on the validity of a model” (page 450). In their recent 
comment on the dangers of setting cut-off values for fit indices, Marsh et al., (2004) 
recommended that interpretations of model-fit “should ultimately have to be evaluated in 
relation to substantive and theoretical issues that are likely to be idiosyncratic to a 
particular study” (page 340). 
Therefore the measures that were considered as goodness-of-fit for the purpose of this 
thesis in order to assess the validity of the model are the CMIN/DF CFI, IFI, RMSEA 
and SRMR. 
7.4. The Measurement Model 
Before forming the measurement model, tests for significance and model fit had to be 
performed to all of the latent variables with each one of their corresponding items. CFA 
was used for each construct at a time to ensure acceptable parameter estimate-to-
observation ratios (Bentler and Chou, 1987; Vorhies and Morgan, 2005). This procedure 
is in line with the suggestions of Joreskog (1993). Items were modified or deleted to 
achieve an accepted level of model fit. In order to attain an adequate unidimentionality 
with satisfactory fit indices, items were deleted.  The resulting latent variables are 
presented in the following Table 7.2. The variables that had to be deleted in order to 
achieve an acceptable model fit and unidimensionality were 4 in total: acquirer 
divestiture of R&D, target divestiture of R&D, acquirer product innovation and target 
product innovation. 
Using the remaining measurement variables and by using the two step approach, a 
measurement model was estimated before examining the structural model relationships 
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and the path model, in order to verify that the 26 measurement variables reflect the 8 
unobserved constructs (Ho, 2006; Hair et al., 2010; Byrne, 2009; Anderson and Gebring, 
1988). One of the biggest advantages of confirmatory factor analysis in SEM is its 
ability to quantitatively asses the construct validity of a proposed measurement theory.  
Before evaluating the fit of the path model presented in Figure 7.3, it is necessary to 
define a measurement model to verify that the 26 measurement variables that reflect the 
eight unobserved constructs that have been defined by the theory in the previous 
chapters. Those are, acquirer and target divestiture, acquirer and target resource 
redeployment, value (cost savings, innovation capability and market coverage) and post-
acquisition performance. The overall fit of a measurement model is determined by a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The fit of this model is extremely important in that 
all possible latent-variable structural models are nested within it. Obtaining a poor fit at 
this stage indicates a need for further refinement of the measurement model and 
precludes moving on to investigate latent-variable structural models (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). 
Latent Variables Items 
Acquisition Performance 
 
 
• Market Share 
• Sales 
• Intrinsic Profitability 
• Relative Profitability 
Cost Savings 
 
 
• Product Costs 
• Input Prices 
 Market Coverage • Extension of Product Lines 
• Geographical Coverage 
Innovation Capability • Product Innovation Capabilities 
• Development of design cycle 
Acquirer Asset Divestiture • Manufacturing 
• Logistics 
• Sales Network 
• Administrative Services 
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Latent Variables Items 
Target Asset Divestiture • Manufacturing 
• Logistics 
• Sales Network 
• Administrative Services 
Acquirer Resource Redeployment • Manufacturing Know-How 
• Marketing Resources 
• Supplier Relationships 
• Distribution Expertise 
Target Resource Redeployment • Manufacturing Know-How 
• Marketing Resources 
• Supplier Relationships 
• Distribution Expertise 
Table 7.2: Latent Variables and Items 
 
At this stage of the analysis, CFA is carried out to determine the degree of model fit and 
the adequacy of the factor loadings, the standardized residuals and explained variances 
for the measurement variables. Figure 7.1 presents the measurement model where all 
factor loadings are freed; items are allowed to load on only one construct; and latent 
constructs are allowed to correlate. 
The baseline comparisons fit indices CMIN/DF CFI, IFI, RMSEA and SRMR are all at 
acceptable levels (see Table 7.3). Given the range of the computed baseline comparisons 
fit indices, the remaining possible improvement in fit for the hypothesized model 
appears small as to be of little practical significance. 
 
CMIN/DF CFI IFI RMSEA SRMR 
1.909 0.906 0.908 0.82 0.695 
Table 7.3: Measurement Model Fit 
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Figure 7.1: Measurement Model Diagram 
 
All of the variables of the model are covariated and are significant so as to progress 
further to the structural model. As can be seen from Table II.1 (Appendix II) the 
regression weights are all significant at the p<0.001 level. Thus it is clear that all the 
hypothesised constructs and variables of the model are eligible for further inspection and 
testing the structural model. Also, the unstandardized regression weights are all 
significant by the critical ratio test (> ±1.96, p < .001) (see Table II.2, Appendix II). The 
standardized regression weights range from 0.597 to 0.988 (see Table II.2, Appendix II). 
These values indicate that the 26 measurement variables are significantly represented by 
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their respective latent constructs. Based on these tests, it can be concluded that the 
measurement model represents an “adequate fit” to the data. 
7.4.1. Construct Validity 
Construct validity is the extent to which a set of measured items reflect the theoretical 
latent construct they were designed to measure. Therefore, tests were employed on the 
measurement model in order to check for construct validity, item reliability, internal 
consistency and discriminant validity. The results of these tests are reported in Table 
II.3, Appendix II. Convergent validity is the extent to which indicators of a specific 
construct “converge” or share a high proportion of variance in common.  
In order to assess convergent validity construct loadings and average variance 
extracted (AVE) are examined. AVE should be 0.5 or greater to indicate adequate 
convergent validity. In addition, AVE estimates should be greater than the square of the 
correlation between that factor and other factors to provide evidence of discriminate 
validity. In addition, construct reliability (CR) should be 0.7 or higher to indicate 
adequate convergence or internal consistency. As it is clear from Table II.3, all of the 
items are above 0.5 for AVE and above the 0.7 threshold for construct reliability (CR). 
Therefore it is safe to state that construct validity was achieved and can proceed with the 
analysis of the measurement model.  
Also, the maximum squared variance (MSV) and the average shared squared 
variance (ASV) should not exceed the AVE. This is verified in Table II.3. Finally, the 
square root of the AVE should not be less than any of the correlation with another factor. 
Looking at Table II.4 (Appendix II) it is clear that no value for the square root of the 
AVE surpasses that. 
In summary, it is clear from both Table II.3 and Table II.4 that all items satisfy all the 
thresholds and therefore it is safe to declare that construct validity was achieved and can 
proceed with the analysis of the structural model. 
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7.5. Structural Model 
Confirmation of the measurement model has been achieved as it was shown in the 
previous section and, as such, the fit of the structural path model (Figure 7.2) can be 
evaluated. The factor structure confirmed in the measurement model is used as the 
foundation for the structural model. That is, the eight unobserved factors Acquirer 
Divestiture, Target Divestiture, Acquirer Redeployment, Target Redeployment, Cost 
Savings, Market Coverage, Innovation Capability and Post-acquisition Performance, 
together with their respective measurement indicators, and the correlated error terms are 
incorporated into the structural model in order to be evaluated. 
Selected goodness-of-fit statistics related to the hypothesised model are presented in the 
following table. The baseline comparisons fit indices CMIN/DF CFI, IFI, RMSEA and 
SRMR are all at acceptable levels (see Table 7.4). Given the range of the computed 
baseline comparisons fit indices, the remaining possible improvement in fit for the 
hypothesized model appears small as to be of little practical significance. 
CMIN/DF CFI IFI RMSEA SRMR 
1.717 0.927 0.928 0.73 0.0626 
Table 7.4: Structural Model Fit 
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Figure 7.2: Structural Model 
  
Figure 7.2 and Table 7.5 report the results for the structural model. The variance (as 
it can also be seen from Figure 7.2) in long term post-acquisition performance 
explained by the model is 0.34 or 34%. This is expected given the complexity of the 
model and the large number of items and factors that can have an effect on post-
acquisition performance.  
Some preliminary findings can be drawn from these results: 
First of all the three mediating variables in the model are cost savings, market 
coverage, and innovation capabilities; these variables are assumed to affect the 
firm’s long-term performance.  
Second, cost-based and revenue-based synergies contribute to acquisition 
performance.  
Third, Figure 7.2 shows that not all mediating variables have a positive effect on 
long-term performance, as it was expected a priori. Specifically, cost savings was 
found to have a negative effect on long-term performance, (
), while market coverage and innovation capabilities were found to have a 
positive effect on long-term performance; the estimated coefficients for the 
aforementioned mediating variables were ( ) and 
( ), respectively.  
Fourth, the benefits of acquisitions have been viewed as originating from increased 
cost efficiency gains by reducing slack.  
Fifth, the results indicate that benefits can also arise from increased revenues through 
an enhanced product line and innovation capability (Design cycle and R&D 
capabilities).  
Finally, innovation capability has a stronger impact on value and therefore on post-
acquisition performance.  
Table 7.5 presents a summary of the structural model regression results without the 
control variables. In the following sections each construct’s effect is looked in depth. 
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Description  
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Unstandardized Estimates Standardized 
Estimates Estimat
e 
S.E. C.R. P 
Effect of 
Mediating 
Variables on 
Post-
Acquisition 
Performance 
Performance Cost Savings -.301 .168 -1.793 .073 -.310 
Performance Market Coverage 
.345 .128 2.686 .007 .374 
Performance Inn. Capability .480 .160 3.012 .003 .494 
Asset 
Divestiture 
Effect on 
Mediating 
Variable 
Cost Savings Acq. Divestiture -.268 .148 -1.812 .070 -.185 
Cost Savings Target Divestiture 
.103 .061 1.683 .092 .182 
Resource 
Redeployment 
Effects on two 
Mediating 
Variables  
Market 
Coverage 
Acq. 
Redeployment 
.239 .059 4.055 *** .414 
Inn. Capability Acq. Redeployment 
.147 .055 2.655 .008 .268 
Market 
Coverage 
Target 
Redeployment 
.192 .072 2.653 .008 .272 
Inn. Capability Target Redeployment 
.216 .070 3.078 .002 .323 
Cross-Effects of 
Resource 
Redeployment  
Cost Savings Acq. Redeployment 
.195 .055 3.533 *** .355 
Cost Savings Target Redeployment 
.228 .069 3.290 .001 .340 
Cross Effects of 
Asset 
Divestiture 
Market 
Coverage Acq. Divestiture 
-.168 .155 -1.082 .279 -.110 
Inn. Capability Acq. Divestiture -.080 .148 -.538 .590 -.055 
Market 
Coverage 
Target 
Divestiture 
-.045 .064 -.711 .477 -.077 
Inn. Capability Target Divestiture 
.150 .068 2.198 .028 .268 
 Table 7.5: Structural Model Regression Weights 
 
7.5.1. Asset Divestiture and Cost Savings 
The hypotheses H1a and H1b in Chapter 3 (3.2) argued that the post-acquisition 
divestiture of the acquirer’s and the target’s assets improve the long-term 
performance of the merging firms through cost savings. The results presented in 
Table 7.5 do not support H1a since the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets has a 
negative significant effect on cost savings ( , ). As it was shown 
from the descriptive statistics of Chapter 5, there is a low degree of divestiture of the 
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acquirer’s assets compared with the target’s assets. Now it was illustrated than when 
the acquirer divests its assets, this will have a negative impact on cost savings.   
However, the results confirm Hypothesis H1b, since the divestiture of the target’s 
assets has a positive and statistically significant effect on the cost savings of the 
merged firm ( , ). These results indicate that the process of 
rationalising the target’s business does lead to systematic cost savings and increases 
value. They also suggest that the acquirer is less effective in rationalising its own 
assets that those of the target.  
The empirical correlation between the divestiture of the acquirer’s and target’s assets 
is positive and significant (β=0.227, p<0.001) (Table II.5, Appendix II) indicating 
that these two actions usually take place at the same time. Therefore even if the 
direct effect of target divestiture on cost savings is positive, a negative effect on post-
acquisition performance can be created in combination with the acquirer’s 
divestiture. In this instance a joint divestiture of the target’s and acquirer’s assets 
indicates that a mutual restructuring of assets is targeted instead of a standalone 
target divestiture.  
7.5.2. Resource redeployment and revenue-enhancing capabilities 
According to hypotheses H2a and H2b post-acquisition resource redeployment to 
the acquirer and the target should improve the long-term performance of the merging 
firms through improved market coverage and innovation capability. The results 
presented in Table 7.5 support both of these hypotheses as both redeployment to 
target, (i.e. the shift of resources from the acquiring firm to the target firm) and 
redeployment to acquirer,(i.e. the shift of resources from the target firm to the 
acquiring firm) have positive coefficients.  Specifically, the coefficients for the effect 
of redeployment to target on market coverage and innovating capabilities were found 
to be  (p<0.001) and  (p<0.05) respectively. And, the 
coefficients for the effect of redeployment to acquiring firm on market coverage and 
innovating capabilities were found   (p<0.05) and , 
respectively.  
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These results indicate that post-acquisition resource redeployment to both the target 
and the acquirer improves the revenue-enhancing capabilities of the merged firm. 
The flow and effectiveness of resource redeployment is bi-directional, signifying the 
existence of a process of making use of the acquirer’s excessive resources, as well as 
an investigation process of exploring and acquiring new resources from the target. 
Thus the target’s resources can be leveraged and developed through the acquirer’s 
support structure and systems.  
The empirical correlation between resource redeployment to the acquirer and 
resource redeployment to the target is positive and insignificant (β= 0.57, p>0.10) 
(shown in Table II.5), suggesting that, in some cases, these two actions do take place 
at the same time.  
7.5.3. Testing for Asymmetries between the Target and the Acquirer  
Furthermore, statistical tests were conducted to test for Hypotheses H3a and H3b, in 
order to check the significance of the differences between the two regression 
coefficients of the target and acquirer asset divestiture on cost savings and that of the 
target and acquirer resource redeployment on revenue enhancing capabilities. A 
fully-specified model with a nested model was compared in AMOS that constrains 
the two coefficients to be equal. The difference was significant (CMIN=3.945, df=1, 
p<0.05). This result confirms that the coefficients of acquirer and target divestiture 
are statistically different with the acquirer coefficient having a higher explanatory 
power on cost savings than the target’s coefficient. Thus, hypothesis H3a is 
supported. 
In addition a statistical test was employed to check the significance of the difference 
between the two regression coefficients of the target and the acquirer resource 
redeployment on innovation capability and market coverage. The same method was 
utilised as before, a fully-specified model with a nested model was compared in 
AMOS. The difference was not significant (CMIN=1.577, df=2, p>0.10). This result 
implies that resource redeployment to both targets and acquirers creates value 
through market coverage and innovation capabilities. Therefore hypothesis H3b is 
not supported.  
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7.5.4. Potential Cross Effects 
Next, the potential cross-effects of asset divestiture and resource redeployment are 
examined. It was argued in Chapter 3 that cross-effects of asset divestiture on 
capability enhancement and of resource redeployment on cost savings exist. It was 
implied that one source of value creation cannot be associated with only one type of 
post-acquisition activity (cost synergies and resource-based theories). Asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment mutually have intertwined effects on both 
types of synergies. 
The investigation of potential cross-effects reveals several noteworthy results. First 
of all, asset divestiture has either no, or a positive effect on revenue enhancing 
capabilities. The effects are asymmetric depending on the recipient of the divestiture 
measures. The effect of acquirer divestiture on market coverage (
) is negative and insignificant and the same holds for innovation 
capability ( )01.0,55.0 >−= pβ  (Table 7.5). The effect of the target divestiture is 
positive and significant on innovation capability ( )01.0,268.0 <= pβ , whereas, the 
effect of target divestiture on market coverage is negative and insignificant
( )01.0,77.0 >−= pβ . Those results indicate that the divestiture of the target’s assets 
can help costs and may even enhance innovation capability. Therefore, hypothesis 
H4a that following an acquisition the divestiture of the acquirer’s assets has an effect 
on revenue enhancing capabilities is rejected. However, hypothesis H4b that 
following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets has an effect on revenue 
enhancing capabilities is supported. These results indicate the difficulties in realizing 
the gains of post-acquisition divestiture action. Asset divestiture can sometimes deter 
a company’s development (McKinley, 1993). Downsizing might enable firms to 
reduce unnecessary resources, thus allowing for a more productive allocation of 
resources, but it might lead to reduced innovation (Dougherty and Bowman, 1995; 
Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) and hence reduced revenue potential. Additionally, after 
a divestiture, due to the manager’s being more conservative because they were 
reluctant of making innovative decisions as they might be  having job security 
concerns can result to less internal innovation of the firm (Hitt et al. 1996).  
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Second, resource redeployment’s effect on cost savings was examined. Acquirer’s 
resource redeployment has a positive and significant effect (  on 
cost savings and the same holds true for the resource redeployment to the target
. Therefore, hypotheses, H5a and H5b, that following an 
acquisition the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the target and the target’s 
resources to the acquirer have an effect on cost savings, are supported. These results 
indicate that resource redeployment not even does not hurt cost but at the same time 
contributes in achieving higher cost efficiency. One other major implication is that if 
standalone target divestiture does not improve cost savings, changing the way the 
target functions through the redeployment of resources to the target facilitate for 
further reduced costs. This end result is consistent with earlier empirical work that 
demonstrates that downsizing is more likely to create value when its scope expands 
to further than only cutting cost through elimination of slack to include related 
changes and resource reconfiguration (Anand and Sing, 1997; Nohria and Love, 
1996). 
7.5.5. Summary of Hypotheses Results 
Following the analysis of each of the thesis’s main research question and hypotheses, 
a summary of the results is presented below. Table 7.6 presents a summary of the 
hypotheses results that were formulated and presented in Chapter 3 in detail. 
 Having analysed and tested the hypotheses using the structural model, in the final 
section of the empirical analysis, further tests are conducted to control for the 
sensitivity of the model’s results to potential sources of sample heterogeneity 
emanating from payment method, target and bidder relative size, acquisition 
classification, acquisition type, redundancy of senior executives, similarities and 
organisational performance.  
The inclusion of all the above control variables does not seem to affect the model’s 
beta estimates for the three mediating variables, which are supposed to affect post-
acquisition performance. Indeed, as it is seen from Table 7.7, which reports the 
results of the structural model with the addition of the control variables, the inclusion 
of the control variables in the estimation of the structural equation model does not 
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alter the baseline beta estimates for the effects of costs savings, market coverage, and 
innovation capabilities on post-acquisition performance.  
Description Hypotheses Results 
Asset 
Divestiture 
Effects 
H1a 
Following an acquisition the divestiture of the acquirer’s 
assets improves the post-acquisition performance through cost 
savings 
 
Rejected 
H1b 
Following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets 
improves the post-acquisition performance through cost 
savings 
 
Supported 
Resource 
Redeployment 
Effects 
H2a 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the acquirer’s 
resources to the target  improves the post-acquisition 
performance through revenue-enhancing capabilities 
 
Supported 
H2b 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s 
resources to the acquirer  improves the post-acquisition 
performance through revenue-enhancing capabilities 
 
Supported 
Asymmetries 
between the 
Target and the 
Acquirer 
H3a 
Following an acquisition the divestiture of  target’s assets has 
a lower impact on cost savings than the divestiture of the 
acquirer’s assets 
Supported 
H3b 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s 
resources to the acquirer has a lower impact on revenue-
enhancing capabilities 
Rejected 
Cross Effects 
of Asset 
Divestiture 
H4a 
Following an acquisition the divestiture of the acquirer’s 
assets has an effect on revenue enhancing capabilities  
Rejected 
H4b 
Following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets 
has an effect on revenue enhancing capabilities 
Supported 
Cross-Effects 
of Resource 
Redeployment 
H5a 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the acquirer’s 
resources to the target has an effect on cost savings 
Supported 
H5b 
Following an acquisition the redeployment of the target’s 
resources to the acquirer has an effect on cost savings 
Supported 
 
 
 
 
Propositions 
Control 
Variables 
H7 Payment method Rejected 
H8 The relative size of the target and the acquirer Rejected 
H9 Different classifications of acquisitions Rejected 
H10 Different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer and the 
target 
Supported 
H11 Different degrees of diversification Rejected 
H12 Organisational Changes Supported 
H13 Changes in the number of senior executives made redundant Rejected 
 Table 7.6: Summary of Hypotheses Results 
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7.6. Structural Model with Control Variables 
In the next section the effect of each individual source of sample heterogeneity on 
the basic outcomes of the model is tested separately. 
Description Dependent Variable 
Control 
Variables Unstandardized Estimates 
Standardize
d Estimates 
  
    
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
  
Payment 
Method for 
funding  
Inn. 
Capability Payment -0.263 0.066 -4.013 *** -0.329 
Market Cov. Payment -0.005 0.065 -0.072 0.942 
-0.006 
Cost Savings Payment 0.033 0.065 0.512 0.609 0.047 
Relative Size  
Inn. 
Capability Relative Size 0.005 0.057 0.092 0.927 0.007 
Market Cov. Relative Size -0.013 0.057 -0.221 0.825 
-0.019 
Cost Savings Relative Size -0.050 0.057 -0.873 0.383 
-0.080 
Acquisition 
Classification  
Inn. 
Capability Classification -0.323 0.258 -1.252 0.211 -0.096 
Market Cov. Classification 0.042 0.257 0.165 0.869 0.014 
Cost Savings Classification 0.164 0.259 0.634 0.526 0.055 
Relatedness  
Inn. 
Capability Relatedness 0.156 0.069 2.260 0.024 0.191 
Market Cov. Relatedness 0.261 0.073 3.583 *** 0.343 
Cost Savings Relatedness 0.094 0.068 1.377 0.168 0.130 
Diversification  
Cost Savings Diversification 0.068 0.075 0.899 0.369 0.082 
Market Cov. Diversification 0.108 0.075 1.445 0.148 0.124 
Inn. 
Capability Diversification 0.137 0.075 1.828 0.068 0.147 
Organisational 
Changes  
Market Cov. Org. Changes 0.420 0.115 3.663 *** 0.378 
Cost Savings Org. Changes 0.235 0.108 2.179 0.029 0.224 
Inn. 
Capability Org. Changes 0.393 0.113 3.476 *** 0.330 
Senior Left  
Inn. 
Capability Senior Left -0.048 0.071 -0.673 0.501 -0.052 
Market Cov. Senior Left -0.023 0.071 -0.322 0.747 
-0.027 
Cost Savings Senior Left -0.001 0.071 -0.021 0.983 
-0.002 
Table 7.7: Summary of Hypotheses for Control Variables 
7.6.1. Payment Method 
In Chapter 5 it was shown that the majority of the sampled deals were financed with 
cash (79%). Also, according to hypothesis H7 the payment method affects the 
relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-
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acquisition performance. Controlling however for the method of payment in the 
structural equation model does not change the results of the baseline model, at least 
when it comes to two of the three mediating variables. 
Specifically, Table 7.7 (a more detailed version in Table II.8, Appendix II) shows 
cost savings to have no statistically significant effect on post-acquisition 
performance; the beta estimate for this variable was found to be -0.245 but it is 
statistically insignificant at the 10% level of significance. In the estimated baseline 
without controlling for the method of payment, cost savings were found to exert a 
negative and statistically significant effect on long-term performance. Then, the new 
estimates for the effect of market coverage and innovation capabilities remain 
roughly the same; the estimated coefficients for the aforementioned mediating 
variables were and , while in the baseline model the 
corresponding estimates were  and .  
The payment method was examined against the three mediating variables. Payment 
method was found to have a negative and significant effect on innovation capability
. Moreover, the results indicate that payment method has a 
negative insignificant effect on market coverage  and a 
positive insignificant effect on cost savings . As it was argued in 
Chapter 2 and 3 of the thesis, cash-financed deals enhance post-acquisition 
performance even if it is by a small amount. The findings indicate that innovation 
capability is impaired which can be due to the fact that cash and therefore financing 
is less is readily available post the acquisition.  
Overall, post-acquisition is not sensitive to the method of payment and, therefore 
proposition H7, that acquisitions funded with cash enhance post acquisition 
performance, must be rejected. 
7.6.2. Target and Bidder Relative Size 
According to Hypothesis H8, the relative size of the target and the acquirer affects 
the relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with 
post-acquisition performance.  
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Controlling for the relative size of the target in the structural equation model does not 
alter the results of the baseline model. As Table II.8 (Appendix II) shows the beta 
estimates for cost savings, market coverage and innovation capabilities are very 
close to the estimates of the baseline model. The new estimates are , 
and , while in the baseline model the corresponding 
estimates were ,   and .  
The relative size of the target was measured against the mediating variables. The 
results indicate that relative size has a negative and insignificant result on innovation 
capability, , on market coverage ,  and 
on cost savings , . One reason for this could be that the relative 
size of the majority of the targets is small and possibilities for synergies through cost 
efficiencies and resource enhancement are difficult to be realised (Seth, 1990b). 
 
7.6.3. Acquisition Classification 
According to Hypothesis H9 the classification of an acquisition affects the 
relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-
acquisition performance. However this proposition is hardly validated when control 
for this type of sample heterogeneity, i.e. acquisition’s classification, is taken into 
account in fitting the structural equation model.  Specifically, as Table II.8 shows, on 
the one hand, the beta estimates for the effect of innovation capabilities are now 
higher (  compared with the baseline estimates ), but, on 
the other hand, the estimates for cost savings are even more negative  (
 against ).  
Acquisition classification was also examined against the three mediating variables. 
Classification was found to have a negative insignificant result on innovation 
capability , a positive insignificant effect on market coverage 
 and finally a positive and insignificant effect on cost savings
. Therefore proposition H9 in not supported. 
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7.6.4. Acquisition Relatedness and Diversification 
Hypothesis H10 argued that different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer 
and the target affect the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. Indeed, Table II.8 
shows that the beta estimates for the effect of market coverage and innovation 
capabilities are higher than in the case of the baseline model; these estimates are 
 for market coverage ( ) and  for 
innovation capabilities ( ). However, as in the case of controlling for 
acquisition classification, the estimates for cost savings are even more negative  
 compared with .  
So hypothesis H10 is supported, as there are also positive and significant effects on 
innovation capability  and market coverage
. Even though there is a positive insignificant result on cost 
savings  proposition H10 is supported.  
However, the same does not hold for Hypothesis H11 that different degrees of 
diversification affect the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. Controlling for 
diversification does not have any effect on the relationship of cost based synergies 
and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. Indeed, as 
Table II.8 shows that the beta estimates for the effect of cost savings, market 
coverage, and innovation capabilities are marginally the same of the baseline 
model’s estimates; these estimates are  for cost savings (
),  for market coverage ( ), and 
for innovation capabilities ( ).  
This result is not surprising. As it has already been argued - Chapter 2 - acquisitions 
usually occur in order to expand business activities and to diversify revenues, but 
many of those acquisitions later prove to be unsuccessful (Andrade et al., 2001) 
Further, the benefits from diversification depend on the degree of relatedness of the 
merged firms business lines (Lee and Liebermand, 2010). Hence the lack of 
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statistically significant findings may be the result of high degree of relatedness of the 
business lines of the merged firms.    
 
7.6.5. Organisational Changes 
According to hypothesis H12, organisational changes affect the relationship of cost 
based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
performance. 
This proposition is confirmed in the case of market coverage and innovation 
capabilities. Table II.8 shows that the beta estimates for the effect of market 
coverage, and innovation capabilities are higher than the estimates of the baseline 
model; these estimates are  for market coverage ( ), and 
for innovation capabilities ( ). However the effect of costs 
savings is  compared with  in the baseline model. 
7.6.6. Senior Executives Left 
As it was discussed in Chapter 2, the acquirer may make a bid for a target and once 
taken over the bidder may then attempt to restructure the operations and the 
management style of the target (Copeland et al., 2000), by dismissing senior top 
executives and managers of the target. Hypothesis H13 argued that changes in the 
number of senior executives made redundant affect the relationship of cost based 
synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance.  
This proposition in not supported as it can be seen form Table II.8 as well when 
senior left is examined against the mediating variables all of the results are negative 
and insignificant. So either there was no sizable dismissals of target firm’s senior 
executives or the shakedown in the target firm (in terms of senior executives 
dismissed) was not significant enough to affect the performance of the company.  
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 Propositions Control Variables Results 
H7 Payment method  Rejected  
H8 The relative size of the target and the acquirer  Rejected  
H9 Different classifications of acquisitions Rejected 
H10 Different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer and the 
target  
Supported  
H11 Different degrees of diversification  Rejected 
H12 Organisational Changes  Supported 
H13 Changes in the number of senior executives made redundant Rejected 
Table 7.8: Summary of Hypotheses Results 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
 This chapter examined, using structural equation modelling, the underlying 
relationships among the latent constructs developed from factor analysis presented in 
Chapter 6. Section 7.2 presented the statistical technique of structural equation 
modelling and Section 7.3 described and defined the model under estimation.   
CFA analysis was carried out to determine the degree of model fit and the adequacy 
of the factor loadings, the standardized residuals and explained variances for the 
measurement variables. The baseline comparisons fit indices CMIN/DF CFI, IFI, 
RMSEA and SRMR were all at acceptable levels. Given the range of the computed 
baseline comparisons fit indices, the remaining possible improvement in fit for the 
hypothesized model appeared small as to be of little practical significance. The 
regression weights were all significant and all the hypothesised constructs and 
variables of the model are eligible for further inspection and testing of the structural 
model.  
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Also, the unstandardized regression weights were all statistically significant 
according to the critical ratio test (> ±1.96, p < .001). These values indicated that the 
26 measurement variables are significantly represented by their respective latent 
constructs. Based on these tests, it can be concluded that the measurement model 
represents an “adequate fit” to the data. Also, further tests were employed on the 
measurement model in order to check for construct validity, item reliability, internal 
consistency and discriminant validity. The results of these tests indicated that all of 
the items are above 0.5 for AVE and above the 0.7 threshold for construct reliability 
(CR). Therefore it is safe to state that construct validity was achieved and can 
proceed with the analysis of the measurement model. Also, the maximum squared 
variance (MSV) and the average shared squared variance (ASV) did not exceed the 
AVE, this was verified as well. Finally, the square root of the AVE was not be less 
than any of the correlation with another factor. 
All items satisfied all the thresholds and therefore it is safe to declare that construct 
validity was achieved and confirmation of the measurement model has been achieved 
the structural path model (Figure 7.2) was evaluated. The factor structure confirmed 
in the measurement model was used as the foundation for the structural model. That 
is, the eight unobserved factors Acquirer Divestiture, Target Divestiture, Acquirer 
Redeployment, Target Redeployment, Cost Savings, Market Coverage, Innovation 
Capability and Post-acquisition Performance, together with their respective 
measurement indicators, and the correlated error terms were incorporated into the 
structural model in order to be evaluated. 
Fitting the structural equation model did not support the cost-based rationale for 
undertaking acquisition activity. Cost savings not only did not improve post-
acquisition performance, but it was found to be detrimental to it.  
To account for the negative effect of cost savings on post-acquisition performance 
one needs to look at research hypotheses H1a and H1b. Specifically, the empirical 
results did not support research Hypothesis H1a, since the divestiture of the 
acquirer’s assets was found to have a negative and statistically significant effect on 
cost savings. However, the results did confirm Hypothesis H1b, as the divestiture of 
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the target’s assets had a positive and statistically significant effect on the cost savings 
of the merged firm.  
Hence these results indicate that the process of rationalising the target’s business 
does lead to systematic cost savings.  They also suggest that the acquirer is less 
effective in rationalising its own assets that those of the target. The empirical 
correlation between the divestiture of the acquirer’s and target’s assets is positive and 
suggests that these two actions usually take place at the same time. Therefore even if 
the direct effect of target divestiture on cost savings is positive, a negative effect on 
post-acquisition performance can be created in combination with the acquirer’s 
divestiture. In this instance a joint divestiture of the target’s and acquirer’s assets 
indicates that a mutual restructuring of assets is targeted instead of a standalone 
target divestiture.  
In contrast with the cost-based rationale, the revenue-based rationale for 
acquisitions was upheld, as market coverage and innovation capabilities were found 
to have a positive effect on post-acquisition performance.  Specifically, market 
coverage and resource innovation were found to have a statistically significant 
positive effect on post-acquisition performance, that is, the research hypotheses H2a 
and H2b were confirmed. 
The flow and effectiveness of resource redeployment is bi-directional, signifying the 
existence of a process of making use of the acquirer’s excessive resources, as well as 
an investigation process of exploring and acquiring new resources from the target. 
Thus the target’s resources can be leveraged and developed through the acquirer’s 
support structure and systems. Also, the empirical correlation between resource 
redeployment to the acquirer and resource redeployment to the target was positive 
and insignificant, suggesting that, in some cases; these two actions do not take place 
at the same time.  
Then the potential cross-effects of asset divestiture and resource redeployment were 
examined. Hypothesis H4a, according to which following an acquisition the 
divestiture of the acquirer’s assets has an effect on revenue enhancing capabilities 
was rejected. However, empirical support was found for hypothesis H4b, according 
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to which following an acquisition the divestiture of the target’s assets has an effect 
on revenue enhancing capabilities was supported. These results indicate the 
difficulties in realizing the gains of post-acquisition divestiture action. Asset 
divestiture can sometimes deter a company’s development (McKinley, 1993). 
Downsizing might enable firms to reduce unnecessary resources, thus allowing for a 
more productive allocation of resources, but it might lead to reduced innovation 
(Dougherty and Bowman, 1995; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) and hence reduced 
revenue potential. Additionally, after a divestiture, due to the manager’s being more 
conservative because they were reluctant of making innovative decisions as they 
might be  having job security concerns can result to less internal innovation of the 
firm (Hitt et al., 1996). Other potential reasons that might be associated with 
downsizing involve stunting risk taking (Staw et al., 1981), and violating employee 
trust (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). 
Additionally hypotheses H5a and H5b, according to which following an acquisition 
the redeployment of the acquirer’s resources to the target and the target’s resources 
to the acquirer have an effect on cost savings, are supported. Resource redeployment 
not even does not hurt cost but at the same time can subsidise higher cost efficiency. 
One other major implication is that if standalone target divestiture does not improve 
cost savings, changing the way the target functions through the redeployment of 
resources to the target facilitate for further reduced costs. This end result is consistent 
with earlier empirical work that demonstrates that downsizing is more likely to create 
value when its scope expands to further than only cutting cost through elimination of 
slack to include related changes and resource reconfiguration (Anand and Sing, 
1997; Nohria and Love, 1996). 
Finally control variables to account for other possible sources of sample 
heterogeneity were included in the statistical analysis, in two steps. In the first step, 
all controls were included in the analysis, while in the second step each control was 
included separately. The baseline’s model estimates concerning the effect of cost 
savings, market coverage, and innovation capabilities on long-term performance 
were , = −0.326, , = 0.374, and  , = 0.494, respectively.     
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 When all control variables were included in the model, no evidence of any model 
sensitivity to the controls was found. Presumably, this is down to the fact that some 
controls may be important and some others are not and hence the net effect is neutral. 
But when each control was included one at a time, some differentiating results were 
derived. 
To begin with, controlling for the payment method (whether the acquisition was 
cash-funded or not) does not affect the main results concerning the determinants of 
post-acquisition performance. The same holds for the control of relative size of the 
target and the acquirer; the model’s estimates was not found to be sensitive to this 
control. One reason for this could be that the relative size of the targets is small and 
due to the sample characteristics. Controlling for diversification also does not affect 
post-acquisition performance. While, different degrees of relatedness between the 
acquirer and the target have an effect on acquisition performance, different degrees 
of diversification do not affect post-acquisition performance.  
However, controlling for organisational changes did change the results when it 
comes to the effect of the market coverage (more positive effect) and cost savings 
(more negative effect). Also, when looking into the effects of the acquisition 
classification, i.e. whether the acquisition was friendly or not, the evidence revealed 
an increased positive effect on innovation capabilities and an increased negative 
effect and cost savings, on post-acquisition performance. 
In the next chapter of the thesis the conclusion along with the main findings of the 
thesis will be presented.    
    
  
209 
 
 
8. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1. Introduction 
The performance of mergers and acquisition has been in the centre of attention since 
the beginning of the last century. Recently it was observed that worldwide M&A 
activity reached in 2010 almost US$3 trillion, down from US$5.5 trillion from 2007. 
In the Greek financial sector the M&A activity started picking up in 1995 and 
culminated in 2001. More particularly, there was decline in total value of 
transactions in the volume of mergers and acquisitions in Greece considerably 
reaching €7bn in 2008 (with 153 transactions) and €4bn in 2009 (with 102 
transactions) (Center for Economic Research, 2010). In addition, the majority of the 
M&A deals concentrated in two sectors: the finance and the technology and 
telecommunications sector. Over the period 1999-2009 the Greek finance sector 
accounted for almost one quarter of the M&A transactions conducted (Center for 
Economic Research, 2010). Indeed, in the wake of Greece joining the euro the Greek 
banks realized that their size was too small for operation in an integrated European 
banking market. 
The academic literature offers limited evidence on Greek M&A post-acquisition 
performance and its driving factors. This thesis addressed the issue of the impact of 
two post-acquisition actions, namely, asset divestiture and resource redeployment on 
the long-term performance of Greek M&A deals.    
This chapter attempts to summarize the arguments of the thesis and draw some 
conclusions. An overview of the theoretical model is presented in Section 8.2. 
Section 8.3 presents the contributions of this thesis and provides recommendations 
for further research. Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this research and sets out 
avenues for future research. 
8.2. The Theoretical Model 
This thesis offers an in-depth examination of the effect of post-acquisition asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment on long-term corporate performance for a 
number of Greek M&A deals that took place over the period 2005-2009. The 
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primary propositions examined were the following. First, post-acquisition asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment positively affect the long-run corporate 
performance through the influence of two mediating variables, namely cost savings 
and improved revenue enhancing capabilities. Second, cost savings were assumed to 
result from divesting either the acquirer’s or the target’s assets, and third revenue 
enhancing capabilities were assumed to be derived from achieving increased market 
coverage and via the exploitation of innovation capabilities.  
Even though theories regarding value creation – using rationales from the cost 
efficiency and the resource base view – have been used previously, the author is not 
aware of any large scale empirical study that examines the dynamics of the 
relationship between post-acquisition activities and post-acquisition performance, 
using self-reported measures data from Greece as well as controlling for payment 
method, relative size, acquisition classification and type, relatedness, organisational 
changes and the number of top executives made redundant.  
Various theoretical approaches dealing with the underlying motives of M&As exist. 
The objective of this thesis was not to discuss in detail all of the underlying 
theoretical approaches of M&As and, as such, the theoretical foundations this thesis 
was built upon were mainly discussed. It was argued that wealth and profit 
maximization through the M&A process can be attained through a combination of 
synergies; revenue-based and cost based.  
Revenue-based synergies can be attained through market coverage and innovation 
capabilities. Greater market coverage, through geographical extension, allows the 
merged firm to sell existing products, once confined to particular markets, to a wider 
body of consumers, thereby enhancing the merged firm’s revenues. At the same time 
the company, by increasing its geographical coverage, diversifies its sources of 
revenues, since different markets may be hit by different macroeconomic shocks, or 
even the same macroeconomic shock may have different impact in two different 
markets. Innovation capabilities can be used strategically by firms to achieve 
competitive advantage. Firms therefore can also revise their strategies in accordance 
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with ever changing markets and customer needs so that they can create value and 
growth and in addition achieve superior performance.  
Cost savings is the second source of operating synergies. Under certain conditions, a 
larger firm may operate more efficiently than two smaller firms. Efficiency gains 
may come as the result of a number of factors which lead to lower costs. In order for 
economies of scale and scope to be exploited in an acquisition process, generally it 
can happen so through asset divestiture. Therefore, potential benefits exist in 
investigating the conditions under which firms can obtain valuable resources from 
acquisitions, even if target assets are subsequently divested.  
This thesis also examines the effect of resource redeployment on the post-acquisition 
performance of the merged firms. In general, resource redeployment deals with the 
shifting of resources from one firm to another, so that the latter can be used in a more 
efficient manner. In order to explain this reallocation of resources the thesis was 
based upon the resource-based view (RBV) or resource-based theory (RBT) and the 
more specifically in the dynamic capability perspective. 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm advocates that a company’s competitive 
advantage originates at the firm, and not at the industry level, and specifically in the 
unique bundle of resources and capabilities that the firm commands. It is not 
however that resources type as such are important, rather it is their functionality and 
how productively they are employed that makes the difference. This brings up the 
issue of capabilities. In other words, a firm will combine its resources with its 
capabilities in order to perform a business process in line with its strategy. The 
dynamic capability perspective is an extension of the RBV in that their assumptions 
are similar. In order to better comprehend the expression dynamic capabilities 
according to Abrosini and Bowman, (2009), is forget the definition of capability 
according to the RBV, and not to decompose the term into two separate words. There 
exist four main processes of dynamic capabilities; a) reconfiguration, b) leveraging, 
c) learning, and d) creative integration.  
Therefore using those arguments, sustaining long-term competitive advantage lies in 
the recombination of assets and resources that is resource reconfiguration and in 
212 
 
 
deploying a resource into a new field (an existing brand to a new product). In 
addition, the sustainability of long-term competitive advantage can derive from the 
effective and resourceful execution of tasks that originates from the successful 
implementation or not and the firm’s ability to integrate its assets and resources.  In 
acquisitions asset divestiture and resource redeployment are viewed as parts of a 
shared process of reconfiguration of the target and the acquirer. 
8.2.1. Reflecting/reviewing on the constructs 
To test the above propositions a Structural Equation Model (SEM) was fitted to 
subjective measures of corporate performance. Essentially, the thesis has built upon 
and expanded the methods of analysis used by Capron (1999) and other 
contributions (Capron, et al., 1998; Capron and Hulland, 1999; Capron, et al., 2001; 
Capron and Pistre, 2002; Maksimovic et al., 2011) in order to examine the impact of 
post-acquisition actions (i.e. asset divestiture and resource redeployment) on the 
post-acquisition performance. 
The thesis examines the effect of the post-acquisition measures taken by the 
management of the acquiring firm, in terms of resource redeployment and asset 
divestiture, on the post-acquisition performance of the merged firms. The primary 
hypothesis being tested is that the effect of asset divestiture and resource 
redeployment is transmitted to post-acquisition performance through the two 
mediating variables of cost savings and revenue enhancing capabilities.  
On the one hand, cost-efficiency theories focus on cost savings resulting from an 
acquisition. In turn, these cost savings are achieved through asset divestiture. In this 
thesis, asset divestiture refers to the extent to which merging firms eliminate their 
physical assets, dispose of inefficient management (and management practices) and 
cut back their personnel in different areas, such as R&D, manufacturing, logistics, 
sales networks, and administrative services. In turn, selling excess physical assets, 
laying off employees, and shutting down excess facilities may lead the (merged) firm 
to sell and produce goods more efficiently and this improved efficiency can be, in 
turn, translated into cost savings. Note, that improved efficiency essentially implies a 
better allocation of resources through the elimination of inefficient ones.  
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On the other hand, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm emphasizes the role of 
proper resource use, and resource redeployment, in providing the firm with a 
comparative advantage and hence boosts the revenues of the merged firm. Resource 
redeployment refers to “the extent to which a target or an acquiring firm uses the 
other firm's resources,” such as R&D capabilities, manufacturing know-how, 
marketing resources, supplier relationships, and distribution expertise. Note, that 
resource redeployment can enhance revenue, either by increasing market coverage 
(through geographical extension of the market and product line expansion) or by 
improving innovation capabilities (through design cycle and R&D capabilities). 
Aside from the direct effects on the mediating variables, asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment can have indirect, or cross effects on cost savings and 
revenue enhancement capabilities.  
Finally, the post-acquisition performance (which is what asset divestiture and 
resource redeployment are supposed to affect) is measured by self-reported 
measures of changes in market shares, sales, intrinsic profitability, and relative (to 
the industry’s) corporate profitability.  
8.2.2. Main Findings from the Thesis 
The descriptive statistics of the sample (analysed in Chapter 5) revealed a number of 
interesting features of the sample. To begin with, the sample in the study comprised 
Greek acquirers that were involved in M&A activity during the period of 2005 to 
2009. Looking into the categories of the companies examined, the majority (50%) 
fall in manufacturing (26.47%) and financial intermediation (23.53%). A summary of 
the main findings are presented below.  
8.2.2.1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
The deals surveyed mainly represent cases where larger firms acquired smaller ones. 
More specifically in the majority of the deals (60.3%) in the sample, the relative size 
ratio (that is the relative size of the target to the acquirer, on the basis of their annual 
sales) was below 25%, while only 2.9% of the sampled deals exhibited a ratio above 
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100%. This indicates that the sampled deals mainly represented cases where large 
firms acquired smaller ones.  
The companies examined, exhibited a good degree of business relatedness, and hence 
there were opportunities for cost savings to be achieved through divestiture of 
redundant assets and resource redeployment. More specifically, the descriptive 
analysis revealed regarding similarities in products and services 72% of the 
managers responded in the questionnaire as being “a lot” or “absolutely similar”. 
Regarding similar technology 55.9% replied that it was “a lot” or “absolutely 
similar”. In addition, concerning similarities in their customers they indicated that 
66.1% were “a lot” or “absolutely similar”. As far as similarities in their 
geographical markets were concerned, 58.1% answered that were “a lot” or 
“absolutely similar”.  
Furthermore, when asked whether they were direct competitors 41.2% indicated 
“not at all” or that there was “some” direct competition, while 31.7% indicated that 
they were “a lot” or “absolutely” direct competitors. Finally, regarding the question 
about complementarity of products/services the managers answered that 47.1% 
were “a lot” or “absolutely complementary” whereas 30.1% indicated that they were 
“not at all” or “some” complementarity. 
Subsequently, the geographical scope of the deals examined in the sample was 
considered. The findings revealed that 80 per cent of the M&As represented as 
domestic deals, whereas cross-border acquisitions only account for 20% of the 
sample. In addition, the target’s home country was examined. This 20% of cross-
border acquisitions that was observed represent acquisitions of targets from Eastern 
Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Cyprus, Ukraine and Poland) and the remaining 
4 (3%) come from Asia and Africa (Turkey and Egypt). 
The type of diversification the acquirer aimed to achieve through the M&A deal was 
examined as well. The majority of the companies in the sample (44%) diversified 
into related businesses while 24% were focused on one main business and 32% were 
conglomerates that diversified into related business.   
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When the method of payment was examined, it was found that cash was the 
preferred method of payment for the overwhelming majority of sampled cases 
(79%). This was followed by securities (10.1%), securities exchange (6.5%), and a 
combination of cash and securities (4.3%).  
Moving on, the acquisition classification was also examined. The descriptive 
statistics revealed that 95.6% of the cases were classified as friendly.  
Furthermore, the rationalisation of the acquisitions was examined. The main 
motive behind the rationalisation for the acquisition according to the respondents was 
to increase market share (36%). The second most significant rationale was 
geographic expansion, as indicated by 20.6% of the respondents. These two motives 
of rationalisation chosen by the respondents, confirm this thesis theoretical 
framework. It was argued that entering a new market is considered as one of the most 
important motives for participating in an acquisition (Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 
1999). But by entering a new market, a company increases its market coverage, 
provided the acquisition leads to geographic and product line expansion (Aaker, 
1996; Srivastava et al., 1998). Expanding across geography enables businesses to sell 
their products to whole new markets and in this way to increase revenues. 
Furthermore, expansion in new product lines ranked 3rd among responses, where 
18.3% of the respondents consider it as the most significant motive, and 29.2% 
viewed it as a significant rationale for an acquisition. New product lines are a logical 
choice of rationalising an acquisition. This is because new product lines along with 
brand reputation exploitation and sales network or marketing activities, can improve 
profits (Capron and Hulland, 1999). As far as cost efficiency is concerned, 22.3% of 
the respondents considered it to be a significant motive, while 26.8% gave it a score 
of 3 (neutral). The exploitation of resource redeployment (through an M&A activity) 
may lead to improvements in cost efficiency (Teece, 1982, Panzar and Willig, 1981). 
The motive that ranked last according to the answers on the questionnaire was to 
eliminate or reduce competition, where, out 101 respondents, 11 considered it as 
the as most significant reason (8.1%)   
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Next the statistics regarding the impact of organisational changes that took place 
within the business/es after the acquisition were presented. Four items/variables were 
used to capture these changes, namely post-acquisition network changes, post-
acquisition knowledge changes, retention of the acquired firms’ management team 
and formal organisational changes affected from the retention of the management 
team. In the first item, With respect to the post-acquisition organisational network 
changes, 31.6% of the respondents considered the network changes as a “positive 
impact” and 41.2% as “somewhat positive”. Looking at the responses related to 
organisational knowledge change, 39.7% rated these changes as “somewhat 
positive” and 28.7% as “positive”. Shifting the focus to the organisational changes 
affected from the retention of the management team from the acquired firm, 36% 
of the respondents viewed them as “neutral” and 29.4% as “positive”. Finally, 32.4% 
of the respondents viewed the formal organisational changes affected from the 
retention of the acquired firm as “somewhat positive”. 
Another important organizational change is the retention (or not) of the target’s top 
management team (TMT). The descriptive results indicated that for 49.3% of the 
cases examined, no executive was made redundant, followed by 11.6% of the deals, 
where two executives from the top management team were made redundant 
following the acquisition. Therefore, for the majority of the cases, no significant 
redundancies of the top management team were made. 
8.2.2.2. Summary of Post-Acquisition Divestiture Measures 
This section presents the statistics of the respondent’s answers to questions regarding 
their assessment of the rationalisation and restructuring measures that have been 
implemented following the acquisition. The managers responded to the questions 
from two different perspectives that of a) the acquired business and, b) existing 
business. 
Statistics showing the responses related to the acquirers’ and the targets’ degree of 
consolidation and restructuring across five functions, namely: manufacturing, 
distribution and services, sales networks, administrative services and R&D were 
presented. Those functions were also divided into two parts: a) 
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consolidation/restructuring of physical manufacturing facilities and/or points of 
services, and, b) reduction in manufacturing/services workforce following the 
acquisition. Five thresholds were defined in order to capture to what percentage the 
assets and the personnel were affected (0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 61-80% and 81-
100%). 
The statistics illustrated that the degree of post-acquisition asset divestiture for the 
target varies across the five functions and the various levels. Specifically, the extent 
of asset divestiture was concentrated in the 0-20% threshold of assets divested for the 
majority of cases. Also, it is worth noting that 20% to 22% of the acquirers divested 
above the 81% threshold of their assets. In addition, the statistics for the respondents’ 
indication of the percentage of consolidation and restructuring that took place for the 
existing business across the same five functions the results indicated that for the 
most cases, the acquirers divested their assets less than or equal to 20% across all of 
the five functions. 
Having analysed the results for both the target and the acquirer a comparison of the 
extent of asset divestiture of the target and acquiring firms were made. For example, 
looking into the 61% and above threshold (61% to 100%) of the assets divested 
following the acquisition, a total of 18.4% (=12.5% + 5.9%) was reported as far as 
the reduction in the physical manufacturing facilities and/or points of services closed 
of the target firm was concerned; the corresponding figure for the acquiring firm was 
1.5% (=1.5%+0%). The same held across all functions. Therefore, the target’s assets 
were divested in greater numbers than the acquirer’s assets. Of course, the fact that 
the target’s assets are more likely to be divested than the acquirer’ is a finding 
consistent with those in the literature (see Capron et al., 2001; Maksimovic, 2011).  
8.2.2.3. Summary of Post-Acquisition Resource Redeployment Measures 
This section presents the post-acquisition resource redeployment measures. The 
descriptive statistics regarding the redeployment of resources from the target in 
order to assist the existing business revealed that across all five categories the 
majority of the respondents reported that their businesses redeployed resources to 
“some extent”. For instance, R&D was mostly redeployed to “some extent” (33.1%), 
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manufacturing was 27.9%, marketing (28.7%), supplier relationship (36%) and 
distribution expertise (26.5%). The above statistics are consistent with (Capron 
1999), who states that redeployment from the target to the acquirer is rather 
uncommon. 
Conversely, looking into the descriptive statistics for redeployment of resources from 
the acquirer in order to assist the target revealed that across all five categories the 
majority of the respondents reported that their businesses redeployed resources to “a 
larger extent”. Specifically, it was observed for R&D (27.9%), manufacturing (36%), 
marketing (30.1%), supplier relationship (30.1%) and distribution expertise (30.9%). 
The comparison of the extent of resource redeployment across the acquiring firm and 
the target yielded some interesting results. In order to calculate the degree of 
redeployment, the percentages of the responses “to a large extent” and “to a very 
large extent” for the acquiring firm and the target firm were summed up. A total of 
27.2% (=18.4%+8.8%) of the respondents declared there was redeployment of R&D 
to the acquiring firm; that is, the acquiring firm used the target firm’s product 
innovation capabilities “to a large extent” or “to a very large extent”, whereas, a 
total of 44.1% (=27.9%+16.2%) of the respondents believed that the target firm used 
the acquiring firm’s product innovation capabilities “to a large extent” or “to a 
very large extent”.  
The extent of redeployment to target (i.e. the movement of resources from the 
acquirer to the target) was greater than the extent of redeployment to the acquiring 
firm. Thus, in the sampled cases of M&A activity, resources moved from the 
acquirers to the target companies. The above findings are consistent with Capron 
(1999) who stated that larger redeployment from the acquirer to the target is 
commonly used in order to enhance post-acquisition performance   
8.2.2.4. Summary of Value Creating Mechanisms 
As it has been argued the model in this thesis considers three ways of improving 
revenues: cost savings (product costs and input prices), market coverage (broadening 
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of product line and geographical coverage) and, enhanced innovation capability 
(R&D capabilities and design cycle). 
The questionnaire was divided into two sections (A and B) for these questions in 
order to capture all of the three cases. Section A referred to the acquired and existing 
business and Section B to the consolidated one. Out of the 136 respondents, 43.5% 
answered Section A and 56.5% answered Section B.  
Regarding Section A the impact of acquisition on the target was reported first. The 
majority of respondents reported a “positive impact”. Second the statistics regarding 
the impact of the acquisition on the position of the acquirer were presented. The 
majority of the respondents’ reported that for the existing business the impact ranged 
from “neutral” to “positive impact”.  
Section B referred to the impact of the acquisition of the consolidated business. 
Most of the respondents indicated that for the consolidated business the impacted 
extended from “neutral” to “positive”.  
It is evident that in all of the three cases (acquired, existing and consolidated 
business) that the impact of the acquisition was viewed as positive by the managers 
in the sample. Therefore, taking into consideration, that value is created through the 
acquisition, it was anticipated that post-acquisition performance will be enhanced. 
8.2.2.5 Summary of Acquisition Performance Measures 
The respondents were asked to rate the post-acquisition performance by providing 
self-reported figures of changes in market share, sales, intrinsic profitability and 
relative profitability compared to the industry average since the acquisition. The 
questionnaire was also divided into two sections (A and B) to distinguish between 
the two types of post-acquisition integration. Specifically, section A referred to the 
acquired and existing business and section B to the consolidated one. So, 43.5% of 
the respondents answered the section regarding the Section A and whereas the 
remaining 56.5% answered the section regarding the consolidated business Section 
B. 
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Regarding Section A, first the change of the acquisition performance for the target 
was depicted. The majority of the answers indicated “some increase” across the four 
items. The same results were observed (“some increase”) for the majority of the 
respondent’s answers regarding the acquirer as well. 
Section B referred to the consolidated business. Here, most of the answers reported 
“some increase” across all self-reported figures as well. Regarding the market share 
58.4% reported “some increase”, the same holds for sales (53.2%), intrinsic 
profitability (54.5%) and profitability (50.6%). 
It is clear from these findings, that across all businesses (acquired, existing and 
consolidated) managers’ report “some increase” on post-acquisition performance. 
Drawing from the resource-based theory of the firm and given the descriptive 
statistics presented in this chapter the expectation of an increased post-acquisition 
performance holds true. 
8.3. Research Contributions and Implications for Further Research 
In this section the contributions of this thesis will be discussed, along with a 
summary of the structural model’s results and implications for further research 
8.3.1. Theoretical Contribution 
This thesis contributed to the debate on the effectiveness of M&A activity in several 
ways. There exist a small number of comprehensive researches on M&As that look 
into this phenomenon in other countries outside of the US and the UK capital 
markets. In addition most of these studies examine post-acquisition performance by 
employing accounting data and event based studies with stock returns. Therefore, the 
originality of this study is that it tries to obtain new insights on the subject of the 
post-acquisition performance using arguments from the cost-based and resource-
based synergies, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, the dynamic capabilities 
perspective employing primary data of subjective measures. In addition, looking into 
recent Greek M&A literature that involve post-acquisition performance of M&As in 
Greece, the results apart from a few cases reveal a negative impact on post-
acquisition performance. Thus, it is in that scarcity of research of asset divestiture 
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and resource redeployment as predictors of post-acquisition performance in Greece 
and in that diversity of the results from previous studies that motivated the author to 
examine those phenomena. Therefore, this is (to the best of the author’s knowledge) 
the first large-scale empirical study conducted in Greece drawing on detailed primary 
data on a high range of post-acquisition actions followed by the managers of the 
acquiring companies rather than secondary data.  
Second, the majority of the literature employing cost-based and resource based 
arguments to examine post-acquisition performance looked only into horizontal 
acquisitions (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron et al., 1998; Capron, 1999; Capron and 
Mitchell, 2001; Krishnan et al.,2004; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007). This thesis 
contributed to the literature by examining both horizontal and conglomerate 
acquisitions. Therefore, by examining several post-acquisition actions it was shown 
that different types of synergy (Capron, 1999) and value creation (Chatterjee, 1986) 
can be associated with both types of acquisitions, contrasting the critique often 
addressed to previous studies which associated a type of acquisition with a type of 
synergy. One explanation can be due to increased geographical and market coverage 
that results in increased market power. It was argued in the literature review that 
according to economic theories on acquisition motives corporate value can be 
increased through increasing market power. With increased market power the firm 
can charge a higher price in order to earn a greater profit margin and thus increase 
profitability (Chatterjee, 1986, Lubatkin, 1983;1987) 
Third, this thesis extended the existing body of research by including new control 
variables; namely the payment method, acquisition classification, acquisition type, 
business relatedness, organisational changes, the number of top executives made 
redundant. At the same time, the thesis controls for established control variables such 
as the relative size and geographic scope. 
Fourth, at the conceptualisation and measurement level, this thesis contributed to the 
debate on whether and to what extent post-acquisition performance in Greek M&A 
deals is influenced by asset divestiture (and hence cost savings) and resource 
redeployment (and hence improved revenues). The analysis was conducted by using 
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an established set of measures and by adding items and variables and methodologies 
the study encapsulated this vast range of post-acquisition actions.  
Finally, improvements and changes were made on the questionnaire employed using 
the pre-testing procedure. The majority of the reviewers commented on the order of 
the questions of the questionnaire. The order of the questionnaire changed to reflect 
their suggestions. The final order of the sections was as follows: 1) Value creating 
mechanisms, 2) Acquisition performance, 3) Control questions, 4) Organisational 
Changes, 5) Post-acquisition resource redeployment measures and 6) Post-
acquisition divestiture measures. The section regarding the post-acquisition 
divestiture measures (Section 6) and especially the order of the questions and their 
importance appeared to raise concerns with the reviewers. Thus, after having the 
items rated their order of how they showed changed.  Consequently, the resulting 
order was: 1) Manufacturing, 2) Distribution, 3) Sales networks, 4) Administration 
and 5) R&D). Regarding the first page of the survey they felt that there should be a 
brief synopsis of the survey, a small guideline of how to answer the questions and 
provide to the respondents reassurance about the confidentiality of all the 
information obtained. 
8.3.2. Empirical Findings and Conclusions from the Structural Model 
A structural equation model (SEM) was estimated using a number of latent variables 
to account for asset divestiture, resource redeployment, cost savings, market 
coverage, innovation capabilities, and post-acquisition performance.  This section 
discusses the main findings and the conclusions derived from the estimation of this 
model.  
The estimation of SEM revealed that the effect of cost savings (achieved either from 
divesting the acquirer’s or the target’s assets) on post-acquisition performance was 
negative; Capron (1999) for instance found that cost savings had a lower (compared 
with the effect of market coverage and innovation capabilities) but still a positive and 
statistically significant effect on post-acquisition.  
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Indeed, the negative effect of costs savings on post-acquisition performance 
constitutes an interesting result given that the basic framework for assessing the 
importance of an acquisition has been that of cost-based synergies expected to be 
derived from the deal. The estimation of SEM showed the divestiture of the 
acquirers’ assets does not reduce costs. This outcome might be due to inherent 
problems of managing a multiproduct firm (Hitt et al 1991a). The requirement to 
produce synergies in related diversified firms from M&As can impose pressure on 
the managers (Hitt et al 1994). Obtaining these synergies and in particular those that 
are inimitable is quite complex and challenging. While in unrelated diversified firms 
efficient management can be more complicated than originally presumed. The 
objective of unrelated diversified firms is to achieve financial synergies. These are 
not easy to obtain due to the loss of strategic control, information asymmetries from 
operating several diverse businesses and complications from applying financial 
controls (Hitt et al 1994). Therefore, while some initial gains may be attained with 
initial product diversification those are likely offset by prolonged diversification 
further away from the firm’s core business (Markides (1992, 1995). Product 
diversification can therefore have a curvilinear or an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with firm performance (Hitt et al 1994). According to Lee and Mandhavan (2012), 
there exist negative synergy theories that can affect the performance impact of a 
divestiture and these theories include diseconomies of scale and over-diversification, 
while others find a negative relationship (Bergh, 1995; Montgomery & Thomas, 
1988). One explanation of this result might be that the asset divestiture of the 
acquirer hurts performance instead of enhancing it. 
In contrast with the negative effect of cost savings, the estimated model showed the 
importance of revenue-based synergies, achieved through the mediating variables of 
market coverage and innovation capabilities; the latter two mediating variables were 
found to positively affect the long-term corporate performance, in the case of Greek 
M&As. This finding leads to the conclusion that there are substantial benefits to be 
exploited in acquisitions, since, in these types of acquisitions, revenues may increase 
through enhanced market coverage and innovation capability. Contrary however to 
the empirical finding of Capron (1999), market coverage was found to have a weaker 
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impact on post-acquisition performance than innovation capability, which requires 
major changes in the way of operating a business and may take longer to translate 
into actual performance. This weaker impact of market coverage on performance can 
also be explained by the very small proportion of cross-border acquisitions in the 
sample (just 20% of the sampled cases). Further, the benefits of revenue 
enhancement (for corporate performance) can come either from exploiting any of the 
acquirer’s excess resources (resource redeployment to the target) or from acquiring 
new resources from the target (resource redeployment to the acquiring firm). 
Next, the potential cross-effects of asset divestiture and resource redeployment were 
examined. It was argued that asset divestiture and resource redeployment mutually 
have intertwined effects on both types of synergies. It was implied that one source of 
value creation cannot be associated with only one type of post-acquisition activity 
(cost synergies and resource-based theories). The investigation of potential cross-
effects reveals several noteworthy results. 
First, asset divestiture has either no, or a positive effect on revenue enhancing 
capabilities. The effects are asymmetric depending on the recipient of the divestiture 
measures. The effect of acquirer divestiture on market coverage is negative and 
insignificant and the same holds for innovation capability. However, the effect of the 
target divestiture is positive and significant on innovation capability, whereas, the 
effect of target divestiture on market coverage is negative and insignificant. Those 
results indicate that the divestiture of the target’s assets can help costs and may even 
enhance innovation capability. These results indicate the difficulties in realizing the 
gains of post-acquisition divestiture action.  
Second, resource redeployment’s effect on cost savings was examined. Acquirer’s 
resource redeployment has a positive and significant effect on cost savings and the 
same holds true for the resource redeployment to the target. These results indicate 
that resource redeployment not even does not hurt cost but at the same time 
contributes in achieving higher cost efficiency. One other major implication is that if 
standalone target divestiture does not improve cost savings, changing the way the 
target functions through the redeployment of resources to the target facilitate for 
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further reduced costs. This end result is consistent with earlier empirical work that 
demonstrates that downsizing is more likely to create value when its scope expands 
to further than only cutting cost through elimination of slack to include related 
changes and resource reconfiguration (Anand and Sing, 1997; Nohria and Love, 
1996). 
Finally, in the case of Greek M&As one cannot associate one source of value 
creation such as revenue-based synergies with a single type of post-acquisition action 
like resource redeployment, since asset divestiture (i.e. another type of post-
acquisition action) presents revenue-based synergies. In the wake of an acquisition, 
the divestiture of the target’s assets was not normally accompanied by some 
movement of resources from the acquirer to the target. In other words, the acquirer 
did not “complete” the task of rationalizing the target’s asset, by first cutting any 
excess assets of the latter and then amend the remaining assets with some 
complementary resources.  
8.3.3. Empirical Findings and Conclusions from the control variables 
Tests were conducted to control for the sensitivity of the model’s results to potential 
sources of sample heterogeneity emanating from payment method, target and bidder 
relative size, acquisition classification, acquisition type, redundancy of senior 
executives, similarities and organisational performance. The inclusion of all the 
above control variables did not alter the baseline beta estimates for the effects of 
costs savings, market coverage, and innovation capabilities on post-acquisition 
performance. 
However, when the effect of each individual control variable on the basic outcomes 
of the model is tested separately some interesting results arise. First of all, In Chapter 
2 and 3 of the thesis, it was argued that cash-financed deals enhance post-acquisition 
performance. However, when including method of payment in the structural 
equation model does not change the results of the baseline model, at least when it 
comes to two of the three mediating variables. The findings indicate that innovation 
capability is impaired post the acquisition. One reason that this might be the case is 
that sometimes a greater percentage of the acquirer’s capital could have been used to 
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finance the actual acquisition and this can result on a negative impact on the post-
acquisition performance (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). 
Second, including the relative size as a control variable in the structural model 
produced negative insignificant results on the three mediating variables. This result 
can be due to the majority of the targets being relatively small compared to their 
acquirers and therefore restructuring the target may have been deemed unnecessary 
or of limited input to value creation (Capron, 1999). 
Third, when the classification of the acquisition (95.7% of the cases were classified 
as friendly) was taken into account in the structural model the results revealed that it 
did not affect the relationship of cost based synergies and resource enhancement 
capabilities with post-acquisition performance.  This result might be related to the 
fact that returns to acquirers involved in hostile acquisitions can be more positive 
than in friendly or “unopposed” acquisitions (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). 
Fourth, it was argued that different degrees of relatedness between the acquirer and 
the target affect positively the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. Indeed, the structural 
model estimates for the effect of market coverage and innovation capabilities are 
higher than in the case of the baseline model. It was argued that sources of synergy 
that can create competitive advantage do not only stem from economies of scope but 
also from similarities in the business lines and resources 
Sixth, the statistical analysis revealed that including diversification as a control 
variable does not affect the relationship of cost based synergies and resource 
enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition performance. As it has been argued, 
acquisitions usually occur in order to expand business activities and to diversify 
revenues, but many of those acquisitions later prove to be unsuccessful (Andrade et 
al., 2001).  
Seventh, in respect to the post-acquisition organisational network changes it was 
found that they exert a positive and significant effect on the relationship of cost 
based synergies and resource enhancement capabilities with post-acquisition 
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performance. It was previously argued in Chapter 2 that interpersonal networks add 
value (Achrol, 1997) and the Top Management Team’s (TMT) network of internal 
and external affiliations in which a successful firm is rooted can play a significant 
role to the continuation of its success (Kiessling et al., (2008).  Organisational 
knowledge is considered as one of the most important resources of the organisation 
(Grant 1996; Kiessling et al., 2008) from a strategic point of view.  
Finally, the retention (or not) of the target’s top management team (TMT) was 
examined as a control variable as well. However, the effects of the retention of TMT 
on the relationship between cost based synergies and resource enhancement 
capabilities with post-acquisition performance, showed no significant effect. 
8.3.4. Implications for Managers 
The obvious policy implication from the study’s results is that when considering an 
acquisition, managers should not look at cost-based synergies alone for making their 
case for a possible target. Revenue-based synergies, achieved through resource 
redeployment (to the target or the bidder) must be considered as well. Even though, 
the statistical analysis revealed a negative effect from cost savings and because there 
is a probability that the sample has affected the results, caution should be exercised 
when interpreting the relationship in management and decision making. In addition, 
this outcome can be due to sample characteristics and especially from manufacturing 
and industry effects. Hence, a direct conclusion here can be that the divestiture of the 
acquirer’s assets should be an action cautiously undertaken by the managers of the 
acquiring firm. The same conclusion however cannot hold for case of the target’s 
assets, since the process of rationalising the target’s business through assets 
divestiture does lead to systematic cost savings. Thus the management of the 
acquiring firm should not opt for a joint divestiture of the target’s and acquirer’s 
assets, but instead it must solely focus on standalone target divestiture. 
Moreover, the results indicate that post-acquisition resource redeployment to both the 
target and the acquirer improves the revenue-enhancing capabilities of the merged 
firm. The flow and effectiveness of resource redeployment is bi-directional, 
signifying the existence of a process of making use of the acquirer’s excessive 
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resources, as well as an investigation process of exploring and acquiring new 
resources from the target. Thus the target’s resources can be leveraged and developed 
through the acquirer’s support structure and systems. 
Looking for potential cross-effects of asset divestiture and resource redeployment, 
the results indicate that one source of value creation cannot be associated with only 
one type of post-acquisition activity (cost synergies and resource-based theories). It 
was found that asset divestiture has either no effect, or a positive effect on revenue 
enhancing capabilities. The effects are asymmetric depending on the recipient of the 
divestiture measures. The effect of acquirer divestiture on market coverage is 
negative and insignificant and the same holds for innovation capability. However, the 
effect of the target divestiture is positive and significant on innovation capability, 
whereas, the effect of target divestiture on market coverage is negative and 
insignificant. Those results indicate that the divestiture of the target’s assets can help 
costs and may even enhance innovation capability. Managers should therefore take 
notice with the difficulties in realizing the gains of post-acquisition divestiture 
action. Asset divestiture can sometimes deter a company’s development (McKinley, 
1993). Additionally, after a divestiture, due to the manager’s being more 
conservative because they were reluctant of making innovative decisions as they 
might be  having job security concerns can result to less internal innovation of the 
firm (Hitt et al. 1996).  
In addition, when further potential cross-effects were considered, it was found that 
resource redeployment’s effect on cost savings has a positive and significant effect 
on both the acquirer’s and target’s resource redeployment. These results indicate that 
resource redeployment not even does not hurt cost but at the same time contributes in 
achieving higher cost efficiency. One other major implication is that if standalone 
target divestiture does not improve cost savings, changing the way the target 
functions through the redeployment of resources to the target facilitate for further 
reduced costs. This end result is consistent with earlier empirical work that 
demonstrates that downsizing is more likely to create value when its scope expands 
to further than only cutting cost through elimination of slack to include related 
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changes and resource reconfiguration (Anand and Sing, 1997; Nohria and Love, 
1996). 
8.4. Research Limitations and Direction for Further Research 
In this section the research limitation of the study are presented along with 
suggestion for further research. 
8.4.1. Research Limitations 
It is essential at this stage to mention that even though this represents a framework of 
prospective research on post-acquisition performance, the findings should be 
construed in accordance with some limitations indicating directions for future 
research. 
The first limitation relates to a small sample size (136 cases). Despite the fact that 
rules of thumb regarding minimum SEM approach sample sizes were met, only 310 
M&A deals were identified in the time frame observed (2005-2009). This represents 
a reasonable response rate of 44%.   
Another limitation emanates from the cross-sectional nature of the study; any cross-
sectional study does not allow the researcher to examine the dynamic interplay 
among the variables under consideration, i.e. the researcher cannot study how the 
variation of variables over time affects the relationship among them. Nevertheless, 
this was mitigated through the use of the SEM approach. 
In addition, this thesis relies on data provided from managers in Greek firms, so the 
generalisation of the findings might be limited. In relation to this, the web survey 
questionnaire was completed by a single manager (key informant) from the acquiring 
company. Therefore, the key informant approach requires careful consideration of 
certain issues in order to reduce potential measurement error. Also, as reliability is 
linked to the informant’s hierarchical position and tenure, informants in high 
hierarchical positions with a longer tenure are more reliable (Homburg et al. 2012). 
Consequently, the Managing Directors or the Chief Executive officers of the firms in 
our sample were targeted as the most knowledgeable informants. While, that might 
be true, at the same time choosing acquirers from one country, apart from contacting 
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a country specific study, it was an intentional approach of dealing with inconsistency 
of firm’s backgrounds. Also, it has to be recognised that selection of the sample was 
directed by pragmatic reasoning established on time and cost constraints.  
Likewise, since the majority of companies in the sample came from two industries, 
the manufacturing industry (26%), and the finance and insurance industry (24%), 
any conclusions derived from the empirical findings should be applied with caution 
to M&A cases outside these two industries. This however should be of no great 
concern, since the aforementioned sectors dominated the field of Greek M&As in the 
previous years.  
8.4.2. Direction for Further Research 
A quite interesting research issue would to be to contrast the results across studies 
that employed different measures of post-acquisition performance. For example, a 
comparison can be made between subjective measures of corporate performance and 
market measures of corporate performance. In addition, further research could focus 
on the effect of the type of resources redeployed, as well as on the scope of the 
redeployment, that is, whether it was unilateral or bilateral. 
Furthermore because of the negative effect of cost saving on post-acquisition 
performance, it would be interesting to include in the theoretical framework negative 
synergy theories that can affect the performance impact of a divestiture, that 
comprise diseconomies of scale and over-diversification. 
Finally, further research can concentrate on further moderating variables to try to 
interpret the relationship between asset divestiture and post-acquisition performance. 
For example, to include moderating conditions to capture industry effects that are 
present in one industry and not in another. This moderating variable can examine 
industry effects of post-acquisition performance and even different types of 
acquisition. Also, differences in divestiture performance may be related to the 
network and alliance structures of the firms divesting their business units. In addition 
research that has been done specific action in resource markets, factor markets, 
market entry via M&A or alliances. 
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I. APPENDIX I 
Figure I.1: Questionnaire (English version) 
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Figure I.2: Questionnaire (Greek version) 
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II. APPENDIX II 
Table II.1: Measurement Model Regression Weights 
   
Esti
mate S.E. C.R. P 
AcquirerDivestAdmin <--- Acquirer_Divestiture 1.000    
AcquirerDivestSales <--- Acquirer_Divestiture 1.140 .103 11.031 *** 
AcquirerDivestDistrib <--- Acquirer_Divestiture 1.292 .129 10.015 *** 
AcquirerDivestManuf <--- Acquirer_Divestiture 1.272 .106 12.013 *** 
TargetDivestAdmin <--- Target_Divestiture 1.000    
TargetDivestSales <--- Target_Divestiture 1.077 .088 12.266 *** 
TargetDivestDistrib <--- Target_Divestiture 1.126 .087 12.938 *** 
TargetDivestManuf <--- Target_Divestiture .996 .085 11.749 *** 
TargetRedepDistribExpert <--- Target_Redeployment 1.000    
TargetRedepSuppRelation <--- Target_Redeployment .953 .103 9.260 *** 
TargetRedepMarketExpert <--- Target_Redeployment .993 .109 9.094 *** 
TargetRedepKnowhowManuf <--- Target_Redeployment .857 .111 7.716 *** 
AcquirerRedepSuppRelation <--- Acquirer_Redeployment 1.000    
AcquirerRedepMarketExpert <--- Acquirer_Redeployment 1.285 .132 9.710 *** 
AcquirerRedepKnowhowManuf <--- Acquirer_Redeployment 1.122 .128 8.783 *** 
AcquirerRedepDistribExpert <--- Acquirer_Redeployment 1.226 .125 9.776 *** 
Intrinsinc_Profitaility <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance 1.000    
Sales <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .653 .070 9.354 *** 
Market_share <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .485 .064 7.559 *** 
Relative_Profit <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .806 .061 13.122 *** 
Value_RD_Capabilities <--- Innovation_Capability 1.000    
Value_Design_Cycle <--- Innovation_Capability .995 .104 9.605 *** 
Value_Product_Cost <--- Cost_Savings 1.000    
Value_Input_Prices <--- Cost_Savings .949 .104 9.120 *** 
Value_Product_Line <--- Market_Coverage 1.000    
Value_Geographic_Coverage <--- Market_Coverage .949 .109 8.720 *** 
 
Table II.2: Standardised Regression Weights Measurement Model 
   Estimate 
AcquirerDivestAdmin <--- Acquirer_Divestiture .737 
AcquirerDivestSales <--- Acquirer_Divestiture .897 
AcquirerDivestDistrib <--- Acquirer_Divestiture .824 
AcquirerDivestManuf <--- Acquirer_Divestiture .988 
TargetDivestAdmin <--- Target_Divestiture .776 
TargetDivestSales <--- Target_Divestiture .918 
TargetDivestDistrib <--- Target_Divestiture .958 
TargetDivestManuf <--- Target_Divestiture .889 
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   Estimate 
TargetRedepDistribExpert <--- Target_Redeployment .746 
TargetRedepSuppRelation <--- Target_Redeployment .819 
TargetRedepMarketExpert <--- Target_Redeployment .802 
TargetRedepKnowhowManuf <--- Target_Redeployment .676 
AcquirerRedepSuppRelation <--- Acquirer_Redeployment .731 
AcquirerRedepMarketExpert <--- Acquirer_Redeployment .852 
AcquirerRedepKnowhowManuf <--- Acquirer_Redeployment .770 
AcquirerRedepDistribExpert <--- Acquirer_Redeployment .840 
Intrinsinc_Profitaility <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .932 
Sales <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .687 
Market_share <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .597 
Relative_Profit <--- Post-Acquisition_Performance .881 
Value_RD_Capabilities <--- Innovation_Capability .809 
Value_Design_Cycle <--- Innovation_Capability .833 
Value_Product_Cost <--- Cost_Savings .824 
Value_Input_Prices <--- Cost_Savings .797 
Value_Product_Line <--- Market_Coverage .828 
Value_Geographic_Coverage <--- Market_Coverage .786 
 
Table II.3: Construct Validity 
 
No. of 
items CR (>0.7) AVE (>0.5) MSV6 ASV7 
Cost Savings 2 0.793 0.657 0.566 0.183 
Acquirer Divestiture 4 0.923 0.751 0.237 0.055 
Target Divestiture 4 0.937 0.788 0.237 0.064 
Target Redeployment 4 0.847 0.582 0.129 0.069 
Acquirer Redeployment 4 0.876 0.640 0.199 0.064 
Post-Acquisition Performance 4 0.863 0.618 0.188 0.059 
Innovation Capability 2 0.805 0.674 0.566 0.211 
Market Coverage 2 0.789 0.652 0.514 0.191 
 
 
                                                 
 
6
 Maximum Squared Variance (MSV) should be lower than AVE (MSV<AVE) 
7
 Average Shared Squared Variance (ASV) should be lower than AVE (ASV<AVE) 
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Table II.4: Factor Correlation Matrix with square root of the AVE 
Cost 
Saving
s 
Acquirer 
Divestiture 
Target 
Divestitur
e 
Target 
Redeployme
nt 
Acquirer 
Redeploymen
t 
Post-Acquisition 
Performance 
Innovation 
Capability 
Market 
Coverage 
0.811               
0.003 0.866             
0.023 0.487 0.888           
0.342 0.313 0.243 0.763         
0.323 -0.010 -0.302 -0.011 0.800       
0.207 0.124 0.029 0.226 0.145 0.786     
0.752 0.154 0.143 0.359 0.187 0.434 0.821   
0.672 -0.091 -0.204 0.176 0.446 0.306 0.717 0.807 
 
Table II.5: Correlations and Covariances 
   Estimate 
Acq Dives <--> Target Dive .490 
Target Dive <--> Acq Red -.308 
Target Red <--> Acq Red .050 
Acq Dives <--> Target Red .319 
Acq Dives <--> Acq Red -.017 
Target Dive <--> Target Red .271 
 
Table II.6: Covariances 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Acq Dives <--> Target Dive .227 .055 4.151 *** 
Target Dive <--> Acq Red -.419 .134 -3.130 .002 
Target Red <--> Acq Red .057 .113 .505 .614 
Acq Dives <--> Target Red .138 .042 3.281 .001 
Acq Dives <--> Acq Red -.009 .047 -.187 .852 
Target Dive <--> Target Red .302 .108 2.808 .005 
 
Table II.7: Squared Multiple Correlations 
   Estimate 
inn capability   .238 
market coverage   .272 
Cost_Savings   .247 
Performance   .339 
Value_Geographic_Coverage   .578 
Value_Input_Prices   .642 
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   Estimate 
Sales   .536 
Intrinsinc_Profitaility   .372 
Relative_Profit   .591 
Market_share   .840 
Value_Product_Line   .711 
Value_RD_Capabilities   .636 
Value_Design_Cycle   .725 
Value_Product_Cost   .741 
AcquirerRedepKnowhowManuf   .585 
AcquirerRedepMarketExpert   .729 
AcquirerRedepSuppRelation   .550 
AcquirerRedepDistribExpert   .726 
TargetRedepKnowhowManuf   .452 
TargetRedepMarketExpert   .633 
TargetRedepSuppRelation   .658 
TargetRedepDistribExpert   .603 
TargetDivestManuf   .777 
TargetDivestDistrib   .913 
TargetDivestSales   .854 
TargetDivestAdmin   .584 
AcquirerDivestManuf   .972 
AcquirerDivestDistrib   .686 
AcquirerDivestSales   .809 
AcquirerDivestAdmin   .547 
 
Table II.8: Regression Weights Measures for Control Structural Model  
Descripti
on 
Dependent 
Variable 
independent 
Varibles Unstandardized Estimates 
Standar
dized 
Estimat
es 
  
  
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P   
Baseline 
Model Performance 
Cost Savings 
-0.301 0.168 
-
1.793 
0.07
3 -0.31 
Market Cov. 0.345 0.128 2.686 
0.00
7 0.374 
Inn. 
Capability 0.48 0.16 3.012 
0.00
3 0.494 
Payment 
Method 
for 
funding  
Performance Cost Savings -0.23 0.148 
-
1.558 
0.11
9 -0.245 
Performance Market Cov. 0.351 0.125 2.806 
0.00
5 0.387 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.388 0.132 2.94 
0.00
3 0.429 
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inn capability Payment -0.23 0.068 
-
3.387 *** -0.282 
market coverage Payment -0.022 0.07 
-
0.316 
0.75
2 -0.027 
Cost_Savings Payment 0.034 0.066 0.509 
0.61
1 0.043 
Relative 
Size  
Performance Cost Savings -0.318 0.17 
-
1.871 
0.06
1 -0.326 
Performance Market Cov. 0.366 0.127 2.877 
0.00
4 0.397 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.479 0.16 3.004 
0.00
3 0.49 
Cost_Savings Relative Size -0.005 0.057 -0.09 
0.92
8 -0.008 
market coverage Relative Size 0.065 0.06 1.087 
0.27
7 0.092 
inn capability Relative Size 0.005 0.056 0.081 
0.93
6 0.007 
Acquisiti
on 
Classifica
tion  
Performance Cost Savings -0.41 0.181 
-
2.265 
0.02
4 -0.42 
Performance Market Cov. 0.341 0.129 2.647 
0.00
8 0.379 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.572 0.165 3.46 *** 0.601 
Cost_Savings Classification 0.131 0.264 0.497 
0.61
9 0.042 
market coverage Classification -0.065 0.286 
-
0.227 0.82 -0.019 
inn capability Classification -0.456 0.265 
-
1.719 
0.08
6 -0.144 
Relatedn
ess  
Performance Cost Savings -0.499 0.191 
-
2.611 
0.00
9 -0.499 
Performance Market Cov. 0.422 0.129 3.26 
0.00
1 0.46 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.607 0.179 3.399 *** 0.602 
Cost_Savings Relatedness 0.089 0.07 1.266 
0.20
5 0.119 
market coverage Relatedness 0.271 0.078 3.471 *** 0.333 
inn capability Relatedness 0.21 0.073 2.893 
0.00
4 0.286 
Diversifi
cation 
Performance Cost Savings -0.322 0.171 
-
1.887 
0.05
9 -0.333 
Performance Market Cov. 0.361 0.128 2.816 
0.00
5 0.397 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.486 0.16 3.048 
0.00
2 0.503 
Cost_Savings 
Diversificatio
n 0.115 0.074 1.549 
0.12
1 0.131 
market coverage Diversificatio 0.189 0.079 2.401 0.01 0.202 
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n 6 
inn capability 
Diversificatio
n 0.128 0.074 1.732 
0.08
3 0.145 
Organisat
ional 
Changes 
Performance Cost Savings -0.577 0.195 
-
2.963 
0.00
3 -0.591 
Performance Market Cov. 0.384 0.139 2.758 
0.00
6 0.413 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.693 0.175 3.964 *** 0.721 
Cost_Savings 
Organisational 
Changes 0.177 0.094 1.88 0.06 0.184 
market coverage 
Organisational 
Changes 0.383 0.103 3.715 *** 0.379 
inn capability 
Organisational 
Changes 0.404 0.1 4.047 *** 0.413 
Senior 
Left 
Performance Cost Savings -0.298 0.166 
-
1.796 
0.07
3 -0.306 
Performance Market Cov. 0.346 0.129 2.692 
0.00
7 0.372 
Performance 
Inn. 
Capability 0.478 0.153 3.133 
0.00
2 0.492 
inn capability Senior Left -0.07 0.072 
-
0.973 0.33 -0.081 
market coverage Senior Left 0.013 0.078 0.163 
0.87
1 0.014 
Cost_Savings Senior Left 0.031 0.074 0.423 
0.67
2 0.036 
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III. APPENDIX III 
R&D capabilities Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 2 1.5 3.4 3.4 
Neutral 14 10.3 23.7 27.1 
Somewhat Positive 16 11.8 27.1 54.2 
Positive Impact 27 19.9 45.8 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Design cycle Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Neutral 14 10.3 23.7 25.4 
Somewhat Positive 19 14.0 32.2 57.6 
Positive 25 18.4 42.4 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Product costs Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 15 11.0 25.4 25.4 
Somewhat Positive 15 11.0 25.4 50.8 
Positive Impact 29 21.3 49.2 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Input Prices Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 12 8.8 20.3 20.3 
Somewhat Positive 19 14.0 32.2 52.5 
Positive Impact 28 20.6 47.5 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
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Broadening of product line Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 17 12.5 28.8 28.8 
Somewhat Positive 22 16.2 37.3 66.1 
Positive Impact 20 14.7 33.9 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Geographical coverage Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 12 8.8 20.3 20.3 
Somewhat Positive 10 7.4 16.9 37.3 
Positive Impact 37 27.2 62.7 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
R&D capabilities Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 2 1.5 3.4 3.4 
Neutral 27 19.9 45.8 49.2 
Somewhat Positive 17 12.5 28.8 78.0 
Positive Impact 13 9.6 22.0 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Design cycle Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Neutral 26 19.1 44.1 45.8 
Somewhat Positive 21 15.4 35.6 81.4 
Positive Impact 11 8.1 18.6 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Product costs Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 24 17.6 40.7 40.7 
Somewhat Positive 23 16.9 39.0 79.7 
Positive Impact 12 8.8 20.3 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
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Input Prices Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Neutral 19 14.0 32.2 33.9 
Somewhat Positive 27 19.9 45.8 79.7 
Positive Impact 12 8.8 20.3 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Broadening of product line Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 17 12.5 28.8 28.8 
Somewhat Positive 26 19.1 44.1 72.9 
Positive Impact 16 11.8 27.1 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Geographical Coverage Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 14 10.3 23.7 23.7 
Somewhat Positive 13 9.6 22.0 45.8 
Positive Impact 32 23.5 54.2 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
 
 
Market share Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Some Decline 2 1.5 3.4 3.4 
No Change 11 8.1 18.6 22.0 
Some Increase 30 22.1 50.8 72.9 
Significant Increase 16 11.8 27.1 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
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Sales Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Some Decline 6 4.4 10.2 10.2 
No Change 7 5.1 11.9 22.0 
Some Increase 30 22.1 50.8 72.9 
Significant Increase 16 11.8 27.1 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Intrinsic profitability (Profit/capital employed) Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Some Decline 4 2.9 6.8 8.5 
No Change 5 3.7 8.5 16.9 
Some Increase 30 22.1 50.8 67.8 
Significant Increase 19 14.0 32.2 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Profitability relative to industry average Acquired Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
No Change 10 7.4 16.9 18.6 
Some Increase 40 29.4 67.8 86.4 
Significant Increase 8 5.9 13.6 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Market share Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Some Decline 2 1.5 3.4 3.4 
No Change 15 11.0 25.4 28.8 
Some Increase 34 25.0 57.6 86.4 
Significant Increase 8 5.9 13.6 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
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Sales Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Some Decline 5 3.7 8.5 8.5 
No Change 12 8.8 20.3 28.8 
Some Increase 36 26.5 61.0 89.8 
Significant Increase 6 4.4 10.2 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Intrinsic profitability (Profit/capital employed) Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Some Decline 7 5.1 11.9 13.6 
No Change 9 6.6 15.3 28.8 
Some Increase 37 27.2 62.7 91.5 
Significant Increase 5 3.7 8.5 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Profitability relative to industry average Existing Business SECTION A 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 1 .7 1.7 1.7 
Some Decline 3 2.2 5.1 6.8 
No Change 18 13.2 30.5 37.3 
Some Increase 33 24.3 55.9 93.2 
Significant Increase 4 2.9 6.8 100.0 
Total 59 43.4 100.0  
Missing System 77 56.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
R&D capabilities consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.3 1.3 
Neutral 25 18.4 32.5 33.8 
Somewhat Positive 26 19.1 33.8 67.5 
Positive Impact 25 18.4 32.5 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
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Design cycle consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.3 1.3 
Neutral 25 18.4 32.5 33.8 
Somewhat Positive 25 18.4 32.5 66.2 
Positive 26 19.1 33.8 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Product costs consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 2 1.5 2.6 2.6 
Neutral 18 13.2 23.4 26.0 
Somewhat Positive 31 22.8 40.3 66.2 
Positive Impact 26 19.1 33.8 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Input Prices consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 24 17.6 31.2 31.2 
Somewhat Positive 26 19.1 33.8 64.9 
Positive Impact 27 19.9 35.1 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Broadening of product line consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 1 .7 1.3 1.3 
Neutral 25 18.4 32.5 33.8 
Somewhat Positive 29 20.6 37.6 71.4 
Positive 22 16.2 28.6 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
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Geographical coverage consolidated business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Neutral 26 19.1 33.8 33.8 
Somewhat Positive 22 16.2 28.6 62.3 
Positive Impact 29 21.3 37.7 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Market share Consolidated Business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Some Decline 3 2.2 3.9 3.9 
No Change 9 6.6 11.7 15.6 
Some Increase 45 33.1 58.4 74.0 
Significant Increase 20 14.7 26.0 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Sales Consolidated Business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 1 .7 1.3 1.3 
Some Decline 5 3.7 6.5 7.8 
No Change 11 8.1 14.3 22.1 
Some Increase 41 30.1 53.2 75.3 
Significant Increase 19 14.0 24.7 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
 Intrinsic profitability (Profit/capital employed) Consolidated Business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 5 3.7 6.5 6.5 
Some Decline 3 2.2 3.9 10.4 
No Change 15 11.0 19.5 29.9 
Some Increase 42 30.9 54.5 84.4 
Significant Increase 12 8.8 15.6 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
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Profitability relative to industry average Consolidated Business SECTION B 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Significant Decline 2 1.5 2.6 2.6 
Some Decline 5 3.7 6.5 9.1 
No Change 23 16.9 29.9 39.0 
Some Increase 39 28.7 50.6 89.6 
Significant Increase 8 5.9 10.4 100.0 
Total 77 56.6 100.0  
Missing System 59 43.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Your products/services were similar 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 13 9.6 9.6 9.6 
Some 17 12.5 12.5 22.1 
Neutral 8 5.9 5.9 27.9 
A lot 63 46.3 46.3 74.3 
Absolutely 35 25.7 25.7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Your technology was similar 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 10 7.4 7.4 7.4 
Some 29 21.3 21.3 28.7 
Neutral 21 15.4 15.4 44.1 
A lot 54 39.7 39.7 83.8 
Absolutely 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Your geographical markets were similar 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 18 13.2 13.2 13.2 
Some 19 14.0 14.0 27.2 
Neutral 20 14.7 14.7 41.9 
A lot 57 41.9 41.9 83.8 
Absolutely 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
The types of customers to which you sold were similar 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 17 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Some 14 10.3 10.3 22.8 
Neutral 15 11.0 11.0 33.8 
A lot 69 50.7 50.7 84.6 
Absolutely 21 15.4 15.4 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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You were direct competitors 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 37 27.2 27.2 27.2 
Some 19 14.0 14.0 41.2 
Neutral 37 27.2 27.2 68.4 
A lot 27 19.9 19.9 88.2 
Absolutely 16 11.8 11.8 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Your products/services were complementary 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 23 16.9 16.9 16.9 
Some 18 13.2 13.2 30.1 
Neutral 31 22.8 22.8 52.9 
A lot 47 34.6 34.6 87.5 
Absolutely 17 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Proportion of the acquired business’s annual sales 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
<25% 82 60.3 60.3 60.3 
25-49% 34 25.0 25.0 85.3 
50-74% 12 8.8 8.8 94.1 
75-100% 4 2.9 2.9 97.1 
>100% 4 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Conglomerate diversified into unrelated businesses 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 46 33.8 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 90 66.2   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Firm diversified into related businesses 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 2 62 45.6 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 74 54.4   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Firm focused on one main business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 3 32 23.5 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 104 76.5   
Total 136 100.0   
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Type of payment 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Cash 107 78.7 78.7 78.7 
Cash / Securities 6 4.4 4.4 83.1 
Securities 14 10.3 10.3 93.4 
Securities Exchange 9 6.6 6.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Classification of the acquisition 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Friendly 130 96.0 96.0 96.3 
Hostile 6 4.0 4.0 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Market share increase (Rationalization) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 49 36.0 40.5 40.5 
2 29 21.3 24.0 64.5 
3 13 9.6 10.7 75.2 
4 17 12.5 14.0 89.3 
5 13 9.6 10.7 100.0 
Total 121 89.0 100.0  
Missing System 15 11.0   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Geographical expansion (Rationalization) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 28 20.6 24.1 24.1 
2 15 11.0 12.9 37.1 
3 26 19.1 22.4 59.5 
4 26 19.1 22.4 81.9 
5 21 15.4 18.1 100.0 
Total 116 85.3 100.0  
Missing System 20 14.7   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Expansion in new product lines (Rationalization) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 22 16.2 18.3 18.3 
2 35 25.7 29.2 47.5 
3 20 14.7 16.7 64.2 
4 21 15.4 17.5 81.7 
5 22 16.2 18.3 100.0 
Total 120 88.2 100.0  
Missing System 16 11.8   
Total 136 100.0   
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Cost efficiency (Rationalization) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 25 18.4 22.3 22.3 
2 16 11.8 14.3 36.6 
3 30 22.1 26.8 63.4 
4 28 20.6 25.0 88.4 
5 13 9.6 11.6 100.0 
Total 112 82.4 100.0  
Missing System 24 17.6   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Eliminate/reduce competition (Rationalization) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
1 11 8.1 10.9 10.9 
2 12 8.8 11.9 22.8 
3 26 19.1 25.7 48.5 
4 16 11.8 15.8 64.4 
5 36 26.5 35.6 100.0 
Total 101 74.3 100.0  
Missing System 35 25.7   
Total 136 100.0   
 
Post-acquisition organizational network changes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 4 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Neutral 33 24.3 24.3 27.2 
Somewhat Positive 56 41.2 41.2 68.4 
Positive Impact 43 31.6 31.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Post-acquisition organizational knowledge changes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Somewhat Negative 3 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Neutral 40 29.4 29.4 31.6 
Somewhat Positive 54 39.7 39.7 71.3 
Positive Impact 39 28.7 28.7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Retention of the acquired firm’s management team 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Negative Impact 4 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Somewhat Negative 11 8.1 8.1 11.0 
Neutral 49 36.0 36.0 47.1 
Somewhat Positive 32 23.5 23.5 70.6 
Positive Impact 40 29.4 29.4 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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Formal organizational changes affected from the retention of the acquired firm 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Negative Impact 2 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Somewhat Negative 5 3.7 3.7 5.1 
Neutral 59 43.4 43.4 48.5 
Somewhat Positive 44 32.4 32.4 80.9 
Positive Impact 26 19.1 19.1 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Senior executives left 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0 67 49.3 49.3 49.3 
1 12 8.8 8.8 58.1 
10 1 .7 .7 58.8 
2 16 11.8 11.8 70.6 
3 16 11.8 11.8 82.4 
4 6 4.4 4.4 86.8 
5 9 6.6 6.6 93.4 
6 1 .7 .7 94.1 
7 2 1.5 1.5 95.6 
N/A 6 4.4 4.4 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Use of acquired business’s product innovation capabilities 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 31 22.8 22.8 22.8 
Very Little 23 16.9 16.9 39.7 
To Some Extent 45 33.1 33.1 72.8 
To a Large Extent 25 18.4 18.4 91.2 
To a Very Large Extent 12 8.8 8.8 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Use of acquired business’s know-how in manufacturing process/ services 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 26 19.1 19.1 19.1 
Very Little 38 27.9 27.9 47.1 
To Some Extent 38 27.9 27.9 75.0 
To a Large Extent 25 18.4 18.4 93.4 
To a Very Large Extent 9 6.6 6.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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Use of acquired business’s marketing expertise 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 30 22.1 22.1 22.1 
Very Little 38 27.9 27.9 50.0 
To Some Extent 39 28.7 28.7 78.7 
To a Large Extent 23 16.9 16.9 95.6 
To a Very Large Extent 6 4.4 4.4 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Use of acquired business’s supplier’s relationship 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 19 14.0 14.0 14.0 
Very Little 29 21.3 21.3 35.3 
To Some Extent 49 36.0 36.0 71.3 
To a Large Extent 34 25.0 25.0 96.3 
To a Very Large Extent 5 3.7 3.7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Use of acquired business’s distribution expertise 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 24 17.6 17.6 17.6 
Very Little 29 21.3 21.3 39.0 
To Some Extent 36 26.5 26.5 65.4 
To a Large Extent 34 25.0 25.0 90.4 
To a Very Large Extent 13 9.6 9.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Transfer of product innovation capabilities to the acquired business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 24 17.6 17.6 17.6 
Very Little 23 16.9 16.9 34.6 
To Some Extent 29 21.3 21.3 55.9 
To a Large Extent 38 27.9 27.9 83.8 
To a Very Large Extent 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Transfer of know-how in manufacturing process/ services to the acquired business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 23 16.9 16.9 16.9 
Very Little 23 16.9 16.9 33.8 
To Some Extent 19 14.0 14.0 47.8 
To a Large Extent 49 36.0 36.0 83.8 
To a Very Large Extent 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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Transfer of marketing expertise to the acquired business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 23 16.9 16.9 16.9 
Very Little 16 11.8 11.8 28.7 
To Some Extent 23 16.9 16.9 45.6 
To a Large Extent 41 30.1 30.1 75.7 
To a Very Large Extent 33 24.3 24.3 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Use of your existing business’s supplier relations by the acquired business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 16 11.8 11.8 11.8 
Very Little 18 13.2 13.2 25.0 
To Some Extent 31 22.8 22.8 47.8 
To a Large Extent 40 29.4 29.4 77.2 
To a Very Large Extent 31 22.8 22.8 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
Transfer of distribution expertise to the acquired business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Not at all 26 19.1 19.1 19.1 
Very Little 16 11.8 11.8 30.9 
To Some Extent 26 19.1 19.1 50.0 
To a Large Extent 42 30.9 30.9 80.9 
To a Very Large Extent 26 19.1 19.1 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of physical manufacturing facilities/ points of services closed or resold Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 73 53.7 53.7 53.7 
21-40 24 17.6 17.6 71.3 
41-60 14 10.3 10.3 81.6 
61-80 8 5.9 5.9 87.5 
81-100 17 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of manufacturing/services workforce cut Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 74 54.4 54.4 54.4 
21-40 26 19.1 19.1 73.5 
41-60 15 11.0 11.0 84.6 
61-80 7 5.1 5.1 89.7 
81-100 14 10.3 10.3 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
305 
 
 
% of physical manufacturing facilities Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 87 64.0 64.0 64.0 
21-40 40 29.4 29.4 93.4 
41-60 7 5.1 5.1 98.5 
61-80 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of manufacturing/services workforce cut Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 102 75.0 75.0 75.0 
21-40 30 22.1 22.1 97.1 
41-60 2 1.5 1.5 98.5 
61-80 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of physical distribution facilities closed or resold Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 63 46.3 46.3 46.3 
21-40 30 22.1 22.1 68.4 
41-60 16 11.8 11.8 80.1 
61-80 5 3.7 3.7 83.8 
81-100 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of distribution personnel cut Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 63 46.3 46.3 46.3 
21-40 34 25.0 25.0 71.3 
41-60 15 11.0 11.0 82.4 
61-80 6 4.4 4.4 86.8 
81-100 18 13.2 13.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of physical distribution facilities closed or resold Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 79 58.1 58.1 58.1 
21-40 48 35.3 35.3 93.4 
41-60 6 4.4 4.4 97.8 
61-80 2 1.5 1.5 99.3 
81-100 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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% of distribution personnel cut Existing Business Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 92 67.6 67.6 67.6 
21-40 36 26.5 26.5 94.1 
41-60 5 3.7 3.7 97.8 
61-80 1 .7 .7 98.5 
81-100 2 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of sales networks closed or resold Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 62 45.6 45.6 45.6 
21-40 33 24.3 24.3 69.9 
41-60 18 13.2 13.2 83.1 
61-80 1 .7 .7 83.8 
81-100 22 16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of sales personnel cut Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 65 47.8 47.8 47.8 
21-40 27 19.9 19.9 67.6 
41-60 20 14.7 14.7 82.4 
61-80 7 5.1 5.1 87.5 
81-100 17 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of sales networks closed or resold Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 84 61.8 61.8 61.8 
21-40 46 33.8 33.8 95.6 
41-60 5 3.7 3.7 99.3 
61-80 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of sales personnel cut Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 101 74.3 74.3 74.3 
21-40 28 20.6 20.6 94.9 
41-60 6 4.4 4.4 99.3 
61-80 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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% of administrative services closed Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 57 41.9 41.9 41.9 
21-40 24 17.6 17.6 59.6 
41-60 16 11.8 11.8 71.3 
61-80 9 6.6 6.6 77.9 
81-100 30 22.1 22.1 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of administrative personnel cut Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 58 42.6 42.6 42.6 
21-40 27 19.9 19.9 62.5 
41-60 14 10.3 10.3 72.8 
61-80 13 9.6 9.6 82.4 
81-100 24 17.6 17.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of administrative services closed Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 92 67.6 67.6 67.6 
21-40 38 27.9 27.9 95.6 
41-60 4 2.9 2.9 98.5 
61-80 1 .7 .7 99.3 
81-100 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of administrative personnel cut Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 100 73.5 73.5 73.5 
21-40 31 22.8 22.8 96.3 
41-60 4 2.9 2.9 99.3 
81-100 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 74 54.4 54.4 54.4 
21-40 25 18.4 18.4 72.8 
41-60 10 7.4 7.4 80.1 
61-80 3 2.2 2.2 82.4 
81-100 24 17.6 17.6 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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% of R&D personnel cut Acquired Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 76 55.9 55.9 55.9 
21-40 24 17.6 17.6 73.5 
41-60 10 7.4 7.4 80.9 
61-80 7 5.1 5.1 86.0 
81-100 19 14.0 14.0 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 95 69.9 69.9 69.9 
21-40 34 25.0 25.0 94.9 
41-60 6 4.4 4.4 99.3 
61-80 1 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
 
% of R&D personnel cut Existing Business 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
0-20 102 75.0 75.0 75.0 
21-40 31 22.8 22.8 97.8 
41-60 3 2.2 2.2 100.0 
Total 136 100.0 100.0  
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IV. APPENDIX IV 
 
Appendix IV.I  
 
Factor Analysis Unrestricted 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .786 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3771.601 
df 561 
Sig. .000 
 
Communalities 
 
InitialExtraction
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .826 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .879 
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .842 
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .771 
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .846 
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .907 
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .741 
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .849 
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .722 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .848 
X11: Redep of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .801 
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .676 
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .794 
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship 1.000 .795 
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .759 
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .850 
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .795 
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .768 
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship 1.000 .673 
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .743 
X21: Organisational Network Changes 1.000 .764 
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes 1.000 .641 
X23: Retention of the Management Team 1.000 .662 
X24: Formal Organisational Changes 1.000 .814 
Y1: R&D Capabilities 1.000 .715 
Y2: Design Cycle 1.000 .703 
Y3: Product Cost 1.000 .688 
Y4: Input Prices 1.000 .695 
Y5: Product Line 1.000 .682 
Y6: Geographical Coverage 1.000 .694 
Y7: Market Share 1.000 .726 
Y8:Annual Sales 1.000 .778 
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability 1.000 .786 
Y10: Relative Profit 1.000 .732 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.617 22.403 22.403 7.617 22.403 22.403 4.360 12.825 12.825 
2 6.622 19.477 41.880 6.622 19.477 41.880 4.171 12.268 25.093 
3 3.009 8.850 50.730 3.009 8.850 50.730 3.840 11.293 36.386 
4 2.308 6.789 57.519 2.308 6.789 57.519 3.643 10.714 47.100 
5 2.209 6.498 64.017 2.209 6.498 64.017 3.315 9.751 56.852 
6 1.651 4.857 68.874 1.651 4.857 68.874 3.305 9.722 66.573 
7 1.546 4.546 73.420 1.546 4.546 73.420 2.116 6.223 72.797 
8 1.003 2.951 76.371 1.003 2.951 76.371 1.215 3.574 76.371 
9 .960 2.824 79.195       
10 .783 2.303 81.498       
11 .670 1.972 83.470       
12 .614 1.806 85.276       
13 .531 1.561 86.837       
14 .465 1.367 88.204       
15 .416 1.224 89.427       
16 .384 1.130 90.557       
17 .369 1.084 91.641       
18 .336 .987 92.629       
19 .323 .949 93.578       
20 .278 .818 94.396       
21 .249 .733 95.129       
22 .216 .634 95.763       
23 .201 .592 96.355       
24 .191 .562 96.917       
25 .163 .481 97.398       
26 .149 .439 97.837       
27 .135 .398 98.235       
28 .120 .354 98.589       
29 .111 .326 98.915       
30 .103 .302 99.217       
31 .086 .254 99.471       
32 .065 .191 99.662       
33 .062 .182 99.844       
34 .053 .156 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D .708 .410      
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .679-.515      
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing .665 .483      
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales .644 .473      
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .644-.459      
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .643-.492      
X11: Redep of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities .643 -.362     
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution .614       
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .613-.498      
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration .592 .359      
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing .581  .368     
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing Expertise .578  .491     
Y1: R&D Capabilities .574.361       
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .545-.464      
Y7: Market Share .485.472       
Y3: Product Cost .470.406   .422    
Y6: Geographical Coverage  .659       
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise  .636 .488      
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise  .630 .528      
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship  .605 .425      
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities  .599 .535      
Y4: Input Prices  .563   .365 -.362  
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes  .517       
Y2: Design Cycle .482.513       
Y5: Product Line .448.498       
X21: Organisational Network Changes .421.493      .398
Y8:Annual Sales  .470  -.384-.379   
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing  .552 .616      
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship .529  .555     
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution Expertise .434  .518     
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability .382.390  -.443-.413   
Y10: Relative Profit .415.412  -.378-.436   
X24: Formal Organisational Changes  .470    .419 -.524 
X23: Retention of the Management Team  .378    .365 -.493 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 8 components extracted. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .879       
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .863       
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .858       
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .847       
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .786.407      
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing  .913      
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales  .885      
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D  .868      
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration  .820      
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution  .791      
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing   .868     
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities   .858     
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise   .844     
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise   .805     
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship   .760     
Y3: Product Cost    .775    
Y2: Design Cycle    .764    
Y4: Input Prices    .757    
Y5: Product Line    .743    
Y1: R&D Capabilities    .726    
Y6: Geographical Coverage    .536   .461
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing Expertise     .821   
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship     .815   
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution Expertise     .791   
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing     .717   
X11: Redep of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities     .688   
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability      .864  
Y8:Annual Sales      .846  
Y10: Relative Profit      .802  
Y7: Market Share      .764  
X24: Formal Organisational Changes       .858 
X23: Retention of the Management Team       .781 
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes       .535.449
X21: Organisational Network Changes       .453.543
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 .517 .540 -.039.367 .429 .321 .128 .030 
2 -.423-.232.553 .455 .094 .363 .285 .181 
3 .089 .536 .681 -.172-.403-.174-.137.022 
4 -.361.210 .131 -.152 .695 -.544.081 .010 
5 .480 -.424.236 .465 .029 -.541-.154.002 
6 .417 -.300.256 -.554 .134 .082 .580 .052 
7 .086 -.231.291 -.263 .377 .373 -.683-.192
8 .059 -.017-.076-.114 .039 .003 -.223.962 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix IV.II 
 
Factor Analysis 7 Factor Restriction 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .786 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3771.601 
df 561 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Communalities 
 
InitialExtraction
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .826 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .869 
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .835 
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .762 
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .846 
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing 1.000 .906 
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution 1.000 .741 
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales 1.000 .848 
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration 1.000 .720 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D 1.000 .843 
X11: Redep of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .683 
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .637 
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .782 
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship 1.000 .731 
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .651 
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities 1.000 .777 
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing 1.000 .789 
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise 1.000 .764 
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship 1.000 .671 
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise 1.000 .734 
X21: Organisational Network Changes 1.000 .606 
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes 1.000 .560 
X23: Retention of the Management Team 1.000 .625 
X24: Formal Organisational Changes 1.000 .767 
Y1: R&D Capabilities 1.000 .682 
Y2: Design Cycle 1.000 .687 
Y3: Product Cost 1.000 .671 
Y4: Input Prices 1.000 .692 
Y5: Product Line 1.000 .681 
Y6: Geographical Coverage 1.000 .573 
Y7: Market Share 1.000 .726 
Y8:Annual Sales 1.000 .778 
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability 1.000 .777 
Y10: Relative Profit 1.000 .721 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
315 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 7.61722.403 22.403 7.617 22.403 22.403 4.369 12.851 12.851 
2 6.62219.477 41.880 6.622 19.477 41.880 4.154 12.218 25.069 
3 3.0098.850 50.730 3.009 8.850 50.730 3.840 11.295 36.364 
4 2.3086.789 57.519 2.308 6.789 57.519 3.633 10.684 47.049 
5 2.2096.498 64.017 2.209 6.498 64.017 3.408 10.023 57.072 
6 1.6514.857 68.874 1.651 4.857 68.874 3.226 9.489 66.561 
7 1.5464.546 73.420 1.546 4.546 73.420 2.332 6.859 73.420 
8 1.0032.951 76.371       
9 .960 2.824 79.195       
10 .783 2.303 81.498       
11 .670 1.972 83.470       
12 .614 1.806 85.276       
13 .531 1.561 86.837       
14 .465 1.367 88.204       
15 .416 1.224 89.427       
16 .384 1.130 90.557       
17 .369 1.084 91.641       
18 .336 .987 92.629       
19 .323 .949 93.578       
20 .278 .818 94.396       
21 .249 .733 95.129       
22 .216 .634 95.763       
23 .201 .592 96.355       
24 .191 .562 96.917       
25 .163 .481 97.398       
26 .149 .439 97.837       
27 .135 .398 98.235       
28 .120 .354 98.589       
29 .111 .326 98.915       
30 .103 .302 99.217       
31 .086 .254 99.471       
32 .065 .191 99.662       
33 .062 .182 99.844       
34 .053 .156 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D .708       
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .679 -.515      
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing .665  .483     
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales .644  .473     
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .644 -.459      
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .643 -.492      
X11: Redep of Target’s Product 
Innovation Capabilities .643       
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution .614       
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .613 -.498      
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration .592       
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing .581       
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing 
Expertise .578   .491    
Y1: R&D Capabilities .574       
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .545 -.464      
Y7: Market Share .485 .472      
Y3: Product Cost .470       
Y6: Geographical Coverage  .659      
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution 
Expertise  .636 .488     
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing 
Expertise  .630 .528     
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier 
Relationship  .605      
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product 
Innovation Capabilities  .599 .535     
Y4: Input Prices  .563      
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes  .517      
Y2: Design Cycle .482 .513      
Y5: Product Line .448 .498      
X21: Organisational Network Changes  .493      
Y8:Annual Sales  .470      
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in 
Manufacturing  .552 .616     
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s 
Relationship .529   .555    
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution 
Expertise    .518    
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability    -.443    
Y10: Relative Profit        
X24: Formal Organisational Changes  .470     -.524 
X23: Retention of the Management Team       -.493 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 7 components extracted. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
X2: Target Divestiture of Distribution .874
      
X5: Target Divestiture of R&D .861
      
X3: Target Divestiture of Sales .860
      
X4: Target Divestiture of Administration .845
      
X1: Target Divestiture of Manufacturing .785
      
X6: Acquirer Divestiture of Manufacturing 
 
.913 
     
X8: Acquirer Divestiture of Sales 
 
.884 
     
X10: Acquirer Divestiture of R&D 
 
.866 
     
X9: Acquirer Divestiture of Administration 
 
.819 
     
X7: Acquirer Divestiture of Distribution 
 
.790 
     
X17: Redep of Acquirer’s Know-how in Manufacturing 
  
.863 
    
X18: Redep of Acquirer’s Marketing Expertise 
  
.841 
    
X16: Redep of Acquirer’s Product Innovation Capabilities
  
.839 
    
X20: Redep of Acquirer’s Distribution Expertise 
  
.814 
    
X19: Redep of Acquirer’s Supplier Relationship 
  
.766 
    
Y4: Input Prices 
   
.770
   
Y3: Product Cost 
   
.758
   
Y2: Design Cycle 
   
.752
   
Y5: Product Line 
   
.745
   
Y1: R&D Capabilities 
   
.703
   
Y6: Geographical Coverage 
   
.588
   
X13: Redep of Target’s Marketing Expertise 
    
.830
  
X14: Redepl of Target’s Supplier’s Relationship 
    
.810
  
X15: Redep of Target’s Distribution Expertise 
    
.781
  
X12: Redep of Target’s Know-how in Manufacturing 
    
.733
  
X11: Redep of Target’s Product Innovation Capabilities 
    
.711
  
Y9: Intrinsic Profitability 
     
.859 
 
Y8:Annual Sales 
     
.846 
 
Y10: Relative Profit 
     
.794 
 
Y7: Market Share 
     
.760 
 
X24: Formal Organisational Changes 
      
.839 
X23: Retention of the Management Team 
      
.759 
X22: Organisational Knowledge Changes 
      
.638 
X21: Organisational Network Changes 
      
.581 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .516 .537 -.040 .352 .447 .313 .148 
2 -.425 -.230 .552 .467 .093 .350 .337 
3 .092 .539 .683 -.157 -.407 -.168 -.130 
4 -.373 .207 .134 -.158 .686 -.549 .052 
5 .488 -.426 .236 .460 .035 -.537 -.152 
6 .400 -.294 .250 -.571 .129 .060 .587 
7 .091 -.239 .303 -.266 .370 .397 -.691 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
